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Abstract

In this study, I analyze eight novels from the tumultuous decade of the 1790s:
Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofU40lpho (1793) and The Italian (1798); Eliza Parsons'

The Castle of Wolfen bach (1793) and Eleanor Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798);
Regina Maria Roche's The Children ofthe Abbey (1796) and Clermont (1798); Eliza
Fenwick's Secresy; or, the Ruin on the Rock (1796) and Mary Wollstonecraft's The
Wrongs of Woman, or Maria (1798). The novels I examine are unified not only by the
decade in which they were written, but also by the discursive fields that shape their
presentation of the female body. My analysis, influenced by the poststructuralist work of
Michel Foucault and by feminist studies, focuses on specific cultural fields that enable
me to approach the female Gothic in its rich historical dimensions.
I illustrate that eighteenth-century medicine and law exerted considerable
influence over the ways in which women perceived themselves, their bodies, their
choices, their virtue. Because neither medical nor legal discourse is seamless, the Gothic
novelists I examine are able to respond with their own versions of female physicality as
they attempt to imagine women's agency. Exposing the ideological work of such
dominant discourses, the novels in this study offer representations of the female subject
that break down binaries of mind and body, as well as reason and emotion. Since the
heroines reflect an embodied self that might participate in self-determination, I focus on
particular medical and legal attempts to inscribe the female body. In turn, I demonstrate
that the heroines often deploy a rhetoric ofjustice that empowers their struggles to
overcome physical determinism.

...
VI

I argue that female Gothic novelists were intimately aware that certain popular
medical ideas created barriers between them and their claims to natural and legal rights. It
is my claim that as medicine studies, explains, defines, cures, and confines the body, it
shapes women's relationship to the legal discourse that offers or denies them political
identity. In turn, I assert that the novelists' creation of a recognizable female protagonist
indicates their attempts to imagine a subject that can maintain physical, emotional, and
moral integrity in the face of injustice. In the interstices between body and emotion,
public and private, justice and love, these women construct the Gothic female self.
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Chapter One:
Situating the Female Gothic: Critical and Theoretical Contexts

Emily St. Aubert, in Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho, puts on a brave
show of feminine assertion and resistance when the villain Montoni demands her estates.
He cruelly taunts and berates her for this stubbornness, hinting that he might allow his
henchmen to violate her. Having attempted tears of supplication and emotional appeals,
Emily finally calls upon her legal rights in order to repel Montoni's claims on the
property she inherits from her aunt. In several scenes, she engages in a calm, self-assured
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dialogue with Montoni, who sneers at her confidence and demands that Emily concede

!

mysterious groans interrupt one of their conversations, however, Emily sinks weakly into

I

a chair, overcome by terror that has sapped her strength. This scene represents the

J

{.,

his power over her. Emily refuses, fmnly claiming the power of law and justice. When

strange juxtaposition between assertive claims and physical weakness often expressed in
the Gothic romances that flourished in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 1
While passionate villains, virtuous maidens, exotic locales, perilous travels, ruined castles
and abbeys, wild thunderstonns, secret inheritances, murderous crimes, discovered
kinships, and domestic resolutions are all generic elements of the Gothic, the most
enduring feature-so strikingly demonstrated by Emily St. Aubert-remains the
sensitive, threatened, resistant female body.

I I use "novel" and "romance" interchangeably throughout this study. Contemporary readers would have
used the term romance to indicate the narrative's anti-mimetic qualities; however, I also use the term novel
as the label most modem readers would recognize and as a way of recognizing the narratives' engagement
with historical concerns that their authors shared.

...
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Yet narratives dominated by threatening circumstances and emotional responses,
female authors repeatedly create a paradoxical figure: the Gothic heroine whose fragile
body appears to undermine by her bold claims. As the female protagonist trembles, sinks,
faints, among other sensitive physical responses, she also assertively insists that certain
rights belong to her. The heroine's "Gothic body," with its "violent, vulnerable
immediacy" (Bruhm xvii), and her reliance on personal rights present a conflict that
draws on eighteenth-century medical and legal discourses. Although both discourses
present particular subjectivities for eighteenth-century women, they seem to offer
conflicting versions of the female self. In this study, I argue that female Gothic novelists
were intimately aware that certain popular medical ideas created barriers between them
and their claims to natural and legal rights. It is my claim that as medicine studies,
explains, defines, cures, and confines the body, it shapes women's relationship to the
legal discourse that offers or denies them political identity. In turn, I assert that the
novelists' creation of a recognizable female protagonist indicates their attempts to
imagine a subject that can maintain physical, emotional, and moral integrity in the face of
injustice. In the interstices between body and emotion, public and private, justice and
love, these women construct the Gothic female self.
In this study, I analyze eight novels from the tumultuous decade of the 1790s:
Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries of Udolpho (1793) and The Italian (1798); Eliza Parsons'
The Castle of Wolfen bach (1793) and Eleanor Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798);
Regina Maria Roche's The Children ofthe Abbey (1796) and Clermont (1798); Eliza
Fenwick's Secresy; or, the Ruin on the Rock (1796) and Mary Wollstonecraft's The
Wrongs of Woman, or Maria (1798). The novels I examine are unified not only by the

..

3

decade in which they were written, but also by the discursive fields that shape their
presentation of the female body. My analysis, influenced by the poststructuralist work of
Michel Foucault and by feminist studies, focuses on specific cultural fields that enable
me to approach the female Gothic in its rich historical dimensions. 2 In this chapter, I
summarize the critical conversation about the Gothic and my stake in this discussion. I
also outline the contours of eighteenth-century medical and legal discourses, which as I
argue throughout my study frequently overlap in the Gothic novel.

Discourses of Gothic
Even as scholars continue to spill much ink within Gothic studies, there remains
significant work to be done in the field. 3 Because the Gothic is a vast field, every
configuration has shifted, even if slightly, the meaning of the novels. For instance,
putting Radcliffe in the context of the French Revolution4 or in a study of Gothic origins S

2 One of the dangers inherent in a study devoted to women's bodies and rights is the reification of sexual
difference. For example, critics have challenged the category of female Gothic itself on the basis that
gendered terminology reproduces sexual binaries. See James Watt Contesting the Gothic; Robert Miles
"The Gothic Aesthetic: The Gothic as Discourse"; David Richter, "The Reception ofthe Gothic Novel in
the 1790s." These charges, however, have been answered by critics who fmd the term productive. Kari J.
Winter also explains that "the different subject positions of men and women [novelists] did not lead
inevitably to misogyny on the one hand and feminism on the other" (92). Furthermore, E. J. Clery has
rewritten the term as "women's Gothic" in order to shift attention to the active passion within the novels.
I use the term "female Gothic" to highlight the gender politics that underlie much of the Gothic genre,
particularly those novels written by women.
Part of that work, in fact, is excavation. As more eighteenth-century works-fiction, drama, poetry,
treatises, pamphlets, history-are digitized and become accessible through the internet, the broader the
field will become. As texts that were previously unattainable except through expensive travel and time
consuming archival research are now becoming available and even searchable online, the potential for new
historical connections has increased exponentially.
4 See Claudia Johnson's Equivocal Beings, which argues that the French Revolution was a powerfully
disruptive event that reworked the meaning of sensibility and gender. Women's novels, Johnson explains,
reflect the uncertain gender status of sentimental men and active women. As Johnson examines Radcliffe's
novels, she also analyzes works by Wollstonecraft, Burney, and Austen.
5 Michael Gamer examines the genre's origins in Romanticism and the Gothic: Genre, Reception, and
Canon Formation. James Watt complicates the Gothic's generic status in Contesting the Gothic.
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has yielded very different results, which reaffinns the supple quality of "Gothic" and its
continued significance for literary studies. Yet such studies are not adequate to all
purposes. Scholars demonstrate a continual need to reestablish the meaning of the
powerful, popular Gothic genre, and my study examines a specific set of cultural issues
that eighteenth-century women novelists addressed. The writers in this study express the
reality of the female body, its perils and pleasures, its natural and constructed fOnDS, its
central place in the experience of gender. More specifically, I claim that the novelists'
attention to the female body intersects with contemporary medical and legal concerns that
influenced notions of self and identity. For women in particular these two "master
discourses" touched nearly all aspects of their lives. In distinct ways, both medical and
legal discourses defined who they were and regulated what they could do. The novels in
this study, written largely for a female audience, illustrate the intersection of "Gothic
bodies" with medicine and law.
My work builds on Steven Bruhm's examination of the nerved mind in his study
Gothic Bodies: The Politics ofPain in Romantic Fiction. His considerable introduction
explains the ways in which pain, as both physical event and aesthetic experience, draws
attention to the body's psychological activity (4, 12-13). Drawing on medical discussions
of the brain and nerves, Bruhm explains that Robert Whytt, a pioneer in eighteenth
century neurophysiology, challenged Decartes' model of the disembodied soul: "Whytt
hypothesized that the soul extends from the brain down the spinal column, through the
nerve endings, and to all parts of the body" (11). Whytt's assertions that the mind and
body were intimately, physiologically connected enable Bruhm to develop a "politics of
pain" that includes: the relationship of individual perceiver to society; the body's
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subjection to political forces; imagining pain as a means of encouraging and rejecting
political sympathies (27-29). I find Bruhm's focus particularly relevant to my discussion
of the science of sensibility. As I argue throughout this study, but particularly in chapter
one, the embodied mind poses a challenge to women writers, whose relationship to their
bodies was troubled by scientific and cultural assumptions about the women's
weaknesses. Although Bruhm's study sets up a valuable theoretical and historical
framework, his analysis of Radcliffe's novels, which I address in my first chapter,
neglects the gendered aspects of the body and mind. Furthermore, while he makes a
connection between medicine and law by describing Emily's body as her "property in the
self," he fails to consider the discursive constraints that women faced. Bruhm asserts that
the Gothic heroine's empowerment is not necessarily located in her ownership of private
property, but "is first affirmed at a more basic site, the one at which Locke originally
located it: in the protagonist's body" (43).6 Although I support Bruhm's identification of
the site at which Emily is empowered, I argue that medical literature provides a more
complete explanation of how the gendered body is invested with or denied legal and
social authority.
My study also depends in part on David Punter's provocative claims in Gothic
Pathologies: The Text, the Body, and the Law, as well as the evocative nature of his
work. 7 As he discusses Gothic texts from the eighteenth century to the twentieth, Punter

Bruhrn himself concedes that gender is largely absent in his work: "There [is] no chapter on gender
politics, to which W ollstonecraft and Mary Shelley would contribute (and, I admit, which seems to be
begged for by the chapter on Radcliffe and Wordsworth)" (xxi).
7 Punter boldly claims that "in the context ofthe modern, Gothic is the paradigm of all fiction, all
textuality" (1). PWlter's introduction, which firmly positions him within psychoanalytic theory, indicates
the ease with which critics might generalize the Gothic genre, or even the Gothic experience. Although
Punter offers certain compelling insights regarding the function of law and the nature of the body within
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articulates a connection between the law and the body that proves productive for my
examination of the female Gothic text: "The law is the performative taken to the highest
degree, that version of the word which has immediate physical effects, of incarceration,
for example, of pain of death. Thus the law forms a frame or grid through which all
bodies must pass; at the same time, and inevitably, it serves to standardise those bodies"
(45). In his chapter on eighteenth-century Gothic texts, Punter argues, "Eighteenth
century fiction, the' site' of the Gothic, is obsessed with the law, with its operations,
justifications, limits" (19). Such sweeping pronouncements enable him to analyze texts
such as Tom Jones, Peregrine Pickle, and Sir Launcelot Greaves as well as The Castle of

Otranto, The Monk, and The Italian within the context ofa Gothic study. Focusing on the
figures of the attorney and the justice of the peace, on the image of the prison, and on
representations of trials, Punter argues that the Gothic novel explores through private and
public experiences "a single oppressive system devoted to the repression, criminalisation,
and incarceration of the body" as well as "the face--or mask--of terror which the law
wears to those enmeshed in its toils" (42).
Since his work abandons the issue of gender as it meanders through three
centuries of narrative, Punter leaves ample room to develop an analysis of women's
writing and female bodies. 8 I explain more thoroughly how fields of medicine and law, in

fictional texts, his introduction is incoherent. I utilize his most interesting observations to position myself;
however, I find that his attempts to draw in all textuality within a generalized notion of "Gothic" dizzying
and unconvincing.
8 For example, he notes, "Gothic is thus a fiction of exile, of bodies separated from minds, of minds without
a physical place to inhabit, cast adrift on seas of space and time which appear to bear no relation to the
moral life" (17). Punter ignores the struggles of women writers to portray, without degrading the status of
either, the female body and mind as inextricably linked; these struggles, I argue, are central to the female
Gothic novel. Since he does, in fact, examine Radcliffe's The Italian, it is all the more surprising that he
can sustain such an argument.

~
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ways that sometimes overlap and sometimes parallel the other, attempt to produce
standardized bodies. Like Punter, I focus on the cultural intersections of the body and law
in Gothic novels. Indeed, his focus inspires my efforts to layer multiple discourses in
order to discover the nuances of the female Gothic. I argue, however, that women's
literary expressions of these intersections often complicate or challenge them. In my
second chapter especially, I examine how women writers embrace ideals of natural law,
which support a moral order that Gothic heroines follow almost effortlessly. Eliza
Parsons' The Castle o/Wolfenbach and Eleanor Sleath's The Orphan o/the Rhine
provide excellent examples of the ways in which female Gothic novels articulate
women's relationship to positive and natural law, as well as the role of the body in
understanding and performing moral obligations.
There have been a number of feminist studies of the Gothic that have also
informed my approach to the novels presented here. Notably, feminist scholars were
among the first to "discover" many Romantic-era women writers and to recuperate these
novels for literary studies. 9 In her 1976 text Literary Women, Ellen Moers introduces the
term "female Gothic," ushering in a new field of study devoted to women authors whose
heroine-centered fiction addresses fear and terror. 10 Julian Fleenor's 1983 collection The

Female Gothic sets up many of the stholarly concerns that remain a central part of

Early studies such as Montague Summers' The Gothic Quest (1938) and Devendra Varma's The Gothic
Flame (1957) offered scholars a new sense of the Gothic novel's literary importance, yet later feminist
criticism, from which my study draws, provided a more political understanding of women's contributions
and opened up the field to include more women writers.
10 See chapters 5 and 7. Moers notes that "Gothic" (rather than "female") is the more disputed tenn.
9
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Gothic studies. II In the introduction, Fleenor explains that the spatial imagery-the
castles, abbeys, forests, prisons--ofGothic novels stands in for the female body, which is
typically equated with its sexual and reproductive functions.
My study continues this focus on women's bodies, yet I agree with Kate Ferguson
Ellis that Gothic spaces represent women's social and symbolic positions. In The
Contested Castle, Ellis argues that the dominant image of the castle becomes a means for
women Gothic novelists to critique and resist the notion that the home is "a sphere of
safety for them" (x). 12 Eugenia Delamotte, in Perils ofthe Night, claims that Gothic
spaces provide a symbolic language to express anxieties about the boundaries of self.
Gothic architecture is both "the repository of mystery" and the embodiment of
"mammoth social institutions whose power transcends that of any individual" (Delamotte

15, 17).13 Likewise, Diane Hoeveler's Gothic Feminism examines the contradictions of
the domestic sphere as she argues that social and economic pressures led to the
phenomenon of "professional femininity" in female Gothic novels. Hoeveler asserts that
the novelists present a calculated fa~ade of "wise passiveness" that women could mimic
as they fulfilled their social functions of wives and mothers (7). Combining Ellis'and
Hoeveler's cultural approach with Fleenor's examination of the female body, I offer a
Il Although Fleenor claims that the author's sex is irrelevant to the "female Gothic" category, the essays in
her volume mostly address women writers. Importantly, the woman-centered literature of terror serves as
the focus of the collection, making the label coherent and productive.
l2 Her study illustrates the variety of ways that female Gothic novels respond to the emerging capitalist
economy of the eighteenth century and the resulting shift in gender expectations. As the separate spheres
became more precisely delineated, women's sexuality also became more strictly monitored, culminating in
an ideal of angelic purity that was impossible to maintain without a dangerous inexperience or ignorance,
as Gothic novelists demonstrate. Terror, Ellis argues, is a transgressive response to forbidden knowledge,
action, and desires. Female characters must subvert their passive, innocent domestic roles by actively
purifying the castle of evil and danger.
13 Delamotte addresses the historical institutions that created barriers for women, but primarily explores the
psychological consequences, as fictionalized in the Gothic, that result from these arbitrary and
unreasonable barriers.

...
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cultural analysis of women's "embodied selves" that emphasizes discursive formations
and literary resistance.
E. J. Clery's The Rise ofSupernatural Fiction 1762-1800 (1995) establishes the
cultural conversations in which I take part. In her historical explanation of how the rise of
supernatural fiction parallels the rise of consumerism, Clery provides a close examination
of Radcliffe's use of English law that is compelling yet incomplete. Comparing Emily's
superstitions with her understanding of her legal rights, Clery argues that both are
products of fancy, rather than firmly rational conclusions. I assert instead that the medical
constructions of the embodied mind clarify the consequences of the heroine's legal
claims. Emily is not forced, as Clery insists, to understand that "her qualifications for
humanity-rationality, emotions-are superfluous" (120); instead, she learns that the
social discourse that promises and denies her rights is unjust according to its own
rhetoric. Picking up where Clery leaves off, I further explain the conflict between natural
and positive law, contextualize this conflict within the practices of eighteenth-century
law, and elaborate on its significance for female Gothic narratives. Starting with
Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho and The Italian, I claim that the authors in this
study link the "natural" female body to natural justice. Although the audience may indeed
be prompted to reflect "on the illusory nature of the law's 'phantom-objectivity,' its
interested, man-made nature, through a literal-minded representation of the law as
haunted house" (Clery 126), the female audience is also encouraged to claim rights to
autonomy and freedom as well as property and protection.
There have been, of course, gestures toward the medical field. Clery mentions that
passion, a prominent emotion in Gothic novels, was classified and interpreted within the

..
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scientific community (Women's Gothic 15). Hoeveler claims that the female novelists
were responding to the institutions that were organizing their lives, including the medical
spaces of the asylum and clinic (xiii-xiv). Focusing on Gothic dramatists, Marjean
Purinton argues, "Both Gothic and science were ... discursive fields upon which
anxieties about social identity and physicality could be displaced" (135). These critics
indicate the importance of the medical field to the female Gothic and the potential for
extended explanations of the ways in which science and medicine influenced fictional
representations of women. None of these critics, however, addresses the particular
combination of medical and legal discourses that deeply informs the female Gothic
novels in this study. By examining both discourses, I offer a more complete discussion of
the female Gothic's "embodied self," which reflects women's physical and emotional
experiences. The body, therefore, is central to my analysis of the female subject.
Although I focus on the cultural discourses that construct a "self," the novelists at least
assumed an authentic, gendered self that interacted meaningfully with those discourses.
While this presents a certain tension in each of my chapters, the third chapter addresses
this dilemma more thoroughly by examining the discursive techniques of perception that
fmd expression in Regina Maria Roche's The Children ofthe Abbey and Clermont.
Although I utilize a cultural studies approach in my study, psychoanalysis has
proven an important means of examining the Gothic self. Using psychoanalytic theory in
her deconstruction of such binaries as surface/depth, reason/irrationality,
repression/sexuality, Eve Sedgwick reaffirms the importance of the "self' in the female
Gothic. She explains, "The self expressed or explored by these conventions is all surface,
but its perimeter is neither fixed nor obvious: the veil? the countenance? the heart? This
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self is at least potentially social, since its 'character' seems to be impressed on it from the
outside and to be displayed facing outward" (261). By focusing on the "trappings" that
critics impatiently abandoned, Sedgwick shows that the fictional surfaces not only
provide generic coherence but also shed light on the problem of personal identity with
which the Gothic struggles.
The psychoanalytic work of Eugenia Delamotte, however, draws on such binaries
to explain the persistent virgin/whore dichotomy within the Gothic novels. In Perils of
the Night Delamotte argues that only two versions of the self ("the Good Other Woman"

and the "Evil Other Woman") are available to the heroine. Because both versions are
"Other," stifled and hidden in the narrative, the heroine ultimately develops no
autonomous sense of self (Delamotte 154). In tum, Kari Winters explains that the female
Gothic explores the problems of being the Other, while the horrors of the male Gothic
stem from a fear of the Other (Winter 92). Anne Williams, on the other hand, argues that
the female Gothic's "comic plot, its emphasis on terror rather than horror, and its
insistence on the possibilities of female 'reason' ... not only affirm the possibilities of
'feminine' strength; they also sketch in the outlines of a female self that is more than the
'other' as purely archetypal or stereotypical" (138). Although my work does not depend
on psychoanalytic theory in the ways that Williams' argument does, I agree with her
stance on the complex nature of the female Gothic heroine. What I demonstrate, then, are
the ways in which the novels draw on discourses of medicine and law as they present the
fictional female self.
I argue that the novels' attention to the body is not necessarily a reflection of
psychological processes. Clare Kahane, however, uses psychoanalysis to discuss
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pregnancy and childbirth, the differentiating biological processes of the female body,
which she argues, "can arouse fears about bodily integrity that are intimately related to
one's sense of self' (345). Juliann Fleenor also relies on mythical or psychological terms
to explain the meaning of Gothic female identity: "the conflict at the heart of the Female
Gothic [is] the conflict with the all-powerful, devouring mother" (16). Fleenor argues that
women's bodies are objects of fear and disgust in a genre that "accepts rather than
challenges that limited definition of female biology" (15). Fleenor's polarized terms
"accept" and "challenge" do not adequately convey the complex interaction between
eighteenth-century Gothic novels and the medical field. Instead, as the authors attempt to
imagine a female body and "self," they engage with and sometimes challenge the medical
definitions. Furthermore, the sometimes unsuccessful, capitulatory, or contradictory
attempts to rework the female subject demonstrate the difficulty of applying such general
labels as "conservative" and "subversive."
My focus throughout this study is on the ways in which eighteenth-century
medical discourse produced legal subjects designed to support British economic and
social systems. I argue that because women's bodies and their rights are never far apart in
the female Gothic, the novels demonstrate that scientific explanations are never
disinterested or objective and have distinctly sociopolitical consequences. Although
medicine seems to offer an empirical account of observable bodily functions, it
nevertheless attaches cultural meanings to its object. In the sometimes circular economy
of discourse, medicine also appears to reinforce already-intact assumptions. As the
female subject lives out the meaning of her medically-articulated body, her experiences
are mediated by legal discourse. This normative structure provides a useful triangulation
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with medicine and the female Gothic because the novels so frequently feature legal
entanglements. I assert that the medical field creates barriers (whether intentionally or
not) to women's juridical sUbjectivity. Although the eighteenth-century woman's status
in law is always problematic, her recourse to a positive legal identity--one which asserts
rights, claims freedoms, and demands justice-is hindered most profoundly by medical
or scientific discourse. The Gothic heroines resemble "real" women in that they reflect
certain processes to which historical women were subjected. The fictional narratives
allow women to imagine new possibilities for the female subject. Although sometimes
limited by the discourses with which they engage, the novels challenge or rewrite aspects
of medical and legal discourse in significant ways.

Discourses of Medicine
In The Archaeology ofKnowledge, Michel Foucault notes that discourses are
unified by "the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during
a given period of time" (33).14 My study will discuss the medicalized female body as an
object that "appears" in eighteenth-century culture. Individualized, objectified, and
categorized within medical discourse, women's bodies are "objects that are shaped by
measures of discrimination and repression, objects that are differentiated in daily
practice, in law, in religious casuistry, in medical diagnosis, objects that are manifested in
pathological descriptions, objects that are circumscribed by medical codes, practices,
treatment, and care" (33). As the female body was differentiated within eighteenth
14 Foucault here describes the discourse of madness, but his general defmition of discourse offers a means
of analyzing medical science's production of the female body. Although Foucault's description of the ways
in which discourse constructs its objects applies to both men and women, I focus on the women in order to
explore the Gothic's persistent attention to the heroine's physicality.
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century scientific discourse, its physical variations resulted in a subordinate subject
position for women. While this subordination might not surprise the modem scholar, I
argue that the discourse's instability, a feature explored by medical historians such as
Roy Porter, offered authors alternative possibilities for depicting the heroines' self
determination and self-control. In his genealogies, Foucault also demonstrates that
discourses include that which is authorized, dominant, and accepted, as well as that which
is contradictory, subversive, and rejected; discourse is not only the language of the field
but also the practices, techniques, and spaces that characterize the field. Gothic novelists,
I argue, construct a range of possibilities for the female medical subject by capitalizing
on the fluid nature of discourse.
Because the Enlightenment values of rationality, systemization, and hierarchy
demand a unified system, medical discourse aimed at a coherent, authoritative narrative
of the physical body. Christopher Lawrence explains, however, that eighteenth-century
medical discourse was a loosely designated field of theory, techniques, cures, and
practitioners. Although efforts were made to differentiate between scientific orthodoxy
and folk medicine, the medical field "was not closed when compared to today, either
socially (as an occupation) or culturally (in the meanings given to sickness)" (Lawrence
7). According to Foucault, eighteenth-century medicine was distinguished by
[t]he development of a medical market in the form of private clienteles, the
extension of a network of personnel offering qualified medical attention, the
growth of individual and family demand for health care, [and] the emergence of a
clinical medicine strongly centred on individual examination, diagnosis and
therapy... (Power/Knowledge 166)
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While nineteenth-century medicine increasingly boasted an organized clinical machine in
which doctors enjoyed a powerful position, the eighteenth century had only begun to
establish medicine's institutional power.
One of the reasons that eighteenth-century medicine proved a less totalizing
discourse was its relationship to the capitalist marketplace. Roy Porter notes, "[I]t was
quite impossible to draw the dividing lines, separating the sheep from the goats, men of
integrity from quacks" ("Plutus or Hygeia?" 76). The possibility of corrupt, greedy
physicians threw doubt on the efficacy or authority of individual practitioners. In
addition, the consumerist model reigned, as the demand of patients or potential patients
often drove the supply of physicians. 15 Because medicine was a buyer's market in which
doctors depended on clients' desires and choices, therefore, Porter cautions modem
scholars not to look at medicine as an encroaching authority on the lives of eighteenthcentury individuals (47). As the newly emerging capitalist marketplace opened up a space
for all sorts of medical treatments, "many fields of irregular medicine were growing in
tandem" (44); thus, an alluring variety of treatments were on offer. The democratizing
effect of commercial medicine, however, was tempered by the specialized training and
university education of influential physicians.
Although the disciplinary technologies of medicine were not entirely intact,
science had long been ascendant by the late eighteenth century, disenchanting the natural
world with rational explanations. Thus, the scientific quality of medical inquiry gave it

15 Thomas Beddoes, an eighteenth-century physician, initiated one of the great concerns in the medical
profession: "Medicine had to choose between the cash-nexus and the knowledge-nexus. Medicine could be
moved by money, or it could be animated and organized by science, by the imperatives of the search for
truth" (porter, "Plutus or Hygeia?" 87).
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some authority as it offered empirical ways of understanding the body and its relationship
to the world. Furthermore, the increased attention to healthy living generated a need for
knowledgeable managers of physical well-being. Porter admits, "Georgian affluence,
together with the secular temper of an Enlightenment age in which the claims of the body
began to take precedence over those of the soul, spelt good times for doctors" (Disease
40-41). The promise of health, long life, and physical comfort continued to sustain the
discourse's power. Focusing on the material body, practitioners reaffirmed its centrality
to a fulfilling life and underscored the need to maintain health through proper medical
treatment. The priority of bodily claims contributed to the process of individualization.
Physicians concentrated on the symptoms presented by the patient and delved into that
patient's lifestyle to determine the cause. They acted as detectives, listening to the
patient's narrative, and then reasoning the cause through largely deductive means.
Diagnosis did not simply name the disease or complaint but rather identified a disruption
in the individual's body. Elite physicians emphasized "the importance of harmony, of
natural place and the serious consequences of bodily matter crossing its proper
boundaries" (Lawrence 29). The purpose of medical treatment, then, was to "return [the
body] to its own natural state" (Lawrence 12).
Examining and theorizing the body on an individual level, physicians gave
significance to the particular, the local, the personal. David Armstrong suggests that "the
process of corporal objectification becomes not a destructive assault on human
individuality but the very practice through which that individuality is given a literally
solid foundation and manifestation" (22). In other words, the materiality of the body
reinforces an ideology of individualism, in which one might claim property in the self
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and its accompanying rights. Nikolas Rose illustrates the process by which medicine
"subjectivized" people-turning them into subjects as well as subjecting them to new
forms of power:
Medicine was bound up with the delineation of the unique human being, the
human person in his or her very individuality and vitality, as a possible object for
positive knowledge; that is to say, as a territory which could be mastered by a
form of truth regulated by rationalities proper to the codes of scientific reason.
Medicine was perhaps the first positive knowledge to take the form of expertise,
in which the human being was not only to be known but to be the subject of
calculated regimes of reform and transformation. ("Medicine" 49)
Furthermore, Rose argues, "Medicine was linked to the secularization of the ethical
regimes through which individuals come to describe themselves in the languages of
health and illness, to question themselves in terms of norms of normality and pathology,
to take themselves and their mortal existence as circumscribing their values" (49).
Medical discourse coincides with ethical living as "humans have been urged to engage in
practices of self-formation, to master themselves, improve themselves and regulate
themselves in the name of certain problems and through the use of certain techniques"
(69).
I assert that these processes are explored and often resisted in the female Gothic
novel. In emphasizing the productive aspect of medicine, therefore, I do not wish to
suggest that the experience of medicine was entirely positive for women. While medical
discourse can be seen as producing the conditions of selfhood, the definitions of women's
nature created in this discourse appear to rationalize a variety of oppressions. As
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medicine "produced" the body, it also created the conditions by which the body would be
dominated, especially the female body, whose "natural" unruliness demanded particular
kinds of external and internal control. Woman's individuality and body are inextricably
linked in eighteenth-century medicine: knowing her "self' as a discrete individual, she
also knows her body as a danger to her "self." I argue that the women novelists in this
study demonstrate an understanding of female bodies and minds that was rooted in the
medical field. Subjected to the technologies of medicine in ways that estranged and
objectified their bodies, women experienced scientific praxis in intimate and immediate
ways. Even the experience of gender difference was mediated by science. According to
Thomas Laqueur, medicine invested the human body with two distinct sexes. Laqueur
argues that anatomical representation shifted from a "one-sex" to a "two-sex" model over
the seventeenth century: while early medical treatises depicted the female body as an
inverted male body, with direct correspondences in genitalia and bodily fluids, by the
latter part of the century medicine assumed a fundamental difference between male and
female anatomies. Such gendered differences became an important part of medical
discussions beyond reproductive equipment. With the two-sex model, biological
differences "spoke" more authoritatively for social differences, as the material body
seemed to present natural grounds for disparities in social, political, or legal status.
The struggle over gender in medicine continued through the eighteenth
century. In The Mind Has No Sex? Londa Schiebinger argues that "the ascendancy of the
male expert" in gynecology had serious, practical consequences: "Women lost control not
only over their own health care, but over definitions of their own minds and bodies as
well" (118). Once women were displaced from medical practice, she continues, "this
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exclusion was made to seem natural. Physicians would-in the absence of womendevelop a picture of female nature that suggested that women were inherently
unscientific" (118). Schiebinger explains that because women's subordination was at
odds with Enlightenment values of equality and natural rights, eighteenth century
thinkers turned to science to "provide objective evidence in the debate over woman's
intellectual and physical character" (215). The natural world, therefore, becomes the final
arbiter in this political dilemma: "Within this framework, an appeal of natural rights
could be countered only by proof of natural inequalities.... [I]f women are to be
excluded from the polis, one must demonstrate a 'natural difference' between men and
women in order to legitimate that exclusion" (Schiebinger 216). As 1 will argue
throughout this study, medical discourse, providing the basis for individuality yet
withholding its attendant rights, is a profoundly conflicted arena for women. A scientific
field, medicine offered a narrative of identity that was difficult to resist.
Nonetheless, women were not necessarily passive recipients of medical practice
or theory. While many theories of the nature of female bodies and minds did influence
women's conception of themselves, there existed a parallel practice that sometimes
contradicted dominant medical thought. As their writings attest, women continued to
practice medicine in the domestic sphere, and this self-care is recorded in the domestic
medical receipt books that assisted them in managing their households. 16 They contain a
variety of cures that women received from family members, other women, physicians,

16 Beddoes, however, deplored not only the entrepreneur-physician but also the "private practitioner," the
lay person who considered herself well-versed in medical theories and remedies. He saw the influx of
domestic medicine publications as a perfect example of both evils; in these self-help books, medicine was
compromised and commercialized (Porter, "Plutus or Hygeia?" 79). In other words, Beddoes advocated a
specialist approach to medicine.
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and newspapers. 17 Lady Eleanor Dundres' receipt book, for example, has an "oppening
draught [sic]" from Dr. Ford, "a cheap laudanum" and "the strong opium pills" from Dr.
Wardrop. Lucy Culley's book contains a remedy for cancer involving a poultice of hot
turkey figs copied from the newspaper. In Memory, Wisdom, and Healing, Gabrielle
Hatfield discusses the shift from "popular" or "folk" cures to professional medicine,
claiming that "with the so-called 'rationalization' of medicine in the eighteenth century,
the medical profession was at pains to distance itself from the non-scientific remedies of
the past" (l0). Domestic receipt books sometimes provide a glimpse of vestigial folk
practice. In Ann Ward's receipt book is a remedy for convulsive fits that seems almost
superstitious: "Take a live pigeon and pluck the feathers from its breast, then hold the
breast of the pigeon to the pit of the child[' s] stomach till the fit leave the child which
will convulse the pigeon."
This history of home-based medicine and remedies, although influenced and
sometimes supplanted by professional science, offered women opportunities for self-care
as they managed their own health. These conflicting views are both represented in the
eighteenth-century domestic receipt books, which reveal not only women's frequent and
unremarkable involvement with medical practice but also their confidence in some
physician-prescribed cures. What modern scholars might see as a dichotomy between
medical knowledge and folkloric beliefs about the body is instead a continuum of facts,
practices, and beliefs in which one will find conflicting views that co-exist, struggles
between long-held wisdom and emergent knowledge, and a range of ideas that make up
17 See Sandra Sherman's article "Printed Communities: Domestic Management Texts in the Eighteenth
Century," which argues that such volumes created communities of women readers and writers, especially
when recipes were authorized through personal recommendations.
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the discourse. Eighteenth-century women's participation in medical practice through
domestic receipt books suggests that women could participate in the discourse that
studied, defined, and diagnosed their physical and mental states. 18 I assert that just as
historical women refused to relinquish entirely the management of their bodies, so
fictional Gothic women resisted domination. As they struggle for control over their
bodies, the heroines reflect a discursive struggle that has consequences for their juridical
identities.

Discourses of Law
Like medicine, the law offers a set of norms that systematizes human bodies and
activity. In Whigs and Hunters, E: P. Thompson reflects on the law as both a series of
rules and proscriptions and as an ideology (260). Thompson notes that in order for law to
be effective, it must systematically adhere to a logic of equality, universality, and justice
that is generally free from external manipulation. Moreover, law must actually enact
justice, at least sometimes. 19 These qualities create faith in the power, efficacy, and
necessity of law, producing in turn an ideology that people internalize (263). According
to Ludmilla J ordanova, law is also a human science that shares features of medical
discourse:

18 Hatfield also notes that professional physicians were often too expensive and unavailable for rural
populations, which made domestic medicine a necessary alternative even when orthodox medicine was
deemed superior (15). Household books, also kitchen or domestic books, provide a glimpse of the
alternative practice. Within the domestic sphere, women could manage their bodies and still employ the
official medical knowledge promoted in their culture.
19 Thompson does, however, assert, "The greatest of all legal fictions is that the law itself evolves, from
case to case, by its own impartial logic, true only to its own integrity, unswayed by expedient
considerations" (250).
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The law and its applications are not self-evidently part of human science but are
nonetheless relevant. First, law provides an important setting within which
distinctions acquire their felt quality, where a society reworks its fundamental
categories, albeit within fairly firm constraints. Second, law, as theorized and
practiced, aimed at a certain consistency, a systematic quality that makes it akin to
the project of a human science. In the process, it relied on assumptions about
human nature, which aspired to be more than the opinions of a select few and to
be based upon a deeper understanding of humanity. Those who tried to theorize
sexual behavior and human nature had both legal codifications and legal practice
available to them as part of their mental armory. (157)
Jordanova here refers to the enlightenment project of which both science and law are a
part. Medical and legal discourses strive for an objective uniformity, as they "practice"
on the physical body. Attempting to create a rational system of knowledge and
regulation, law achieved the status of "master science, at once a design for living and the
ultimate hermeneutic tool" (Zomchick 29). Such a master science or discourse could
authorize a number of possible identities for the "juridical subject," who is "both an
object of visible and invisible forces of power as well as a subject empowered by her or
his internalization of that same law" (Zomchick xv). The juridical subject, therefore, is a
positive, active figure that extends the promise of self-determination and individual
autonomy within an authorized script.
In John Locke's work on the sociopolitical individual, upon which much of
eighteenth-century legal discourse depended, the body assumes central importance. His
claim, "Each Man has a Property in his Self," establishes the body as original property.
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Forming the basis of rights, "Property" refers to distinct, physical bodies that are owned
by self-determining individuals. This body then serves as the foundation for contractual
exchange between individuals, as each owns a body and the labor that body produces. At
the heart of contract theory is the original "property in the self," which the fully-realized
juridical subject uses to claim ownership, natural rights, and individual autonomy.
Women's problematic relationship with contract theory, however, poses difficulties to
their juridical subjectivity. As Carol Pateman and Susan Staves argue, the "self' to which
Locke refers is distinctly male. Pateman's and Staves' attention to gender, their insistence
on the physical, turns the idealized "self' into the particular, material person. 20 What
female Gothic novelists do, then, is depict the female body not simply as property, but as
the physical source of reason, emotion, intellect, and morality-in short, the material
embodiment of an authentic self. Such a formulation shifts the novels' articulation of
property in the self to a more general notion ofjustice that also finds expression in legal
discourse.
For eighteenth-century England in particular, the law served not only as an
instrument of hegemonic class power but also' as the foundation for national or even
personal identity. Women, however, experienced legal discourse in another way. The
principle of coverture-women's loss of legal identity as they become wivestransferred legal responsibilities and rights to men. As legal records demonstrate,
eighteenth-century women were never truly erased from the law. As femes sole ap.d as
widows, women often participated in legal and economic activities. Additionally,
Carol Pateman's The Sexual Contract and Susan Staves' Married Women's Separate Property serve as
two benchmark studies of women's relationship to legal philosophy and practice in the eighteenth century.
While I rely on their theoretical articulations, I examine various legal treatises to discover moments of
resistance to dominant ideas about women and law.
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married women were involved in endeavors, such as businesses, that required legal
sanctions. As critics have noticed, the female Gothic addresses the problem of coverture
and its impact on women's inheritance and property ownership. Although the female
protagonist in Gothic novels is nearly always single, a feme sole, she is also a minor or
"infant" who has limited potential for legal activities. Examining the ways in which
marriage, coverture, and inheritance structure women's lives, the scholarly conversation
about legal matters in the Gothic tends to emphasize law's oppressive functions. I argue
that female Gothic novels demonstrate that women are often displaced in legal discourse
because the medical field constructs a female body that cannot bear the weight of active
citizenship. Governing women's lives through coverture and property laws, the legal
field also shaped women's relationship to justice and natural rights. The female Gothic
persistently invokes the discourse by presenting legal tangles, complications, and
resolutions. Significantly, however, women often seem estranged from the mechanisms
of law that ostensibly protect them.
As Gothic novels show female characters' troubled experiences with legal issues,
they seem to indicate flaws in positive law and to depend largely on versions of natural
law for the restoration of order and justice. The institutions, personnel, and procedures
that make up "law" are also known as positive law, in which "no element of law preexists
an act of the state" (Schmidt xv). Dennis Schmidt explains, "Unlike positive law, which
varies according to time and place, natural law is based upon invariant fundamental
principles that provide nonns for justice" (xv). Natural law also provided powerful
justification for moral living: "the law that preserved the stars from wrong was also the
rule of duty" (Willey 14). The connections between the natural body and natural law,
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terms that were used to validate eighteenth-century cultural practices, enable these novels
to depict spaces of authority and resistance for their heroines. 21 Natural law theory, then,
asswnes an important role in the female Gothic.
. Samuel Pufendorf, in The Whole Duty ofMan According to the Law ofNature
(1691), explains, "The Law of Nature asserts that this or that thing ought to be done,
becasue from right Reason it is concluded that the same is necessary for the Preservation
of Society amongst men" (preface, image 7). Like Pufendorf, William Blackstone refers
to the need for rational faculties to understand natural law. When God "created man, and
endued him with freewill to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down certain
immutable laws of human nature, whereby that freewill is in some degree regulated and
restrained, and gave him also the faculty of reason to discover the purport of those laws"
(Blackstone 1.39-40). Human reason, therefore, becomes the primary faculty by which
one ascertains "what the law of nature directs in every circumstance in life" (Blackstone
1.41). Because reason is not perfect or infallible, divine or revealed law supplies a
corrective to flawed understandings of natural law. Blackstone declares, "[u ]pon thse two
foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human law; that is to
say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these" (1.42).
The uneasy consciences of Gothic villains support Blackstone's assertion that "the
laws of eternal justice" and "the happiness of each individual" are inextricably connected
(40). Because Gothic novels frequently deliver punishments and resolutions to crimes

21 Indeed, both legal and medical discourses demonstrate the power of appeals to nature. lordanova
explains, "The constant reliance on 'nature' provided a semblance of stability, although in fact it was
notoriously hard to pin down" (159). The use of "nature" in scientific and legal language, which appeared
to fix the meaning of the female subject, generally resulted in an authoritative rationale for women's
subordination.
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outside of a court system, they indicate flaws within positive law which can be corrected
only through a return to a higher authority.22 As Pufendorf and Blackstone explain, the
divine origins of law-that is, naturallaw-can supply just such deficiencies in positive
law. In all the novels explored here, women's experiences with positive law are troubled
and conflicted. I argue that the "Radcliffean" school, with its romantic conclusions,
indicates that natural law, judiciously administered through positive laws, ultimately can
provide justice for wronged women. The tragic novels of Eliza Fenwick and Mary
Wollstonecraft, however, present an unbridgeable gap between positive laws and ideals
ofjustice. At the heart of each novel, then, is a vision ofjustice that supports the Gothic
heroine, whether or not the conclusion ends with empowerment and fulfillment.
The first chapter will discuss the ways in which Ann Radcliffe's novels The
Mysteries ofUdolpho! (1793) and The Italian (1798) reject cultural constructions of

sensibility. Returning to sensibility's medical roots, I argue that the novels depict the
female body in ways that acknowledge and resist medical discourse. In so doing, the
novels demonstrate that the body serves as a crucial means of establishing knowledge and
justice. My second chapter takes up the problems historical and fictional women faced
when they experience crimes and injustice. As I analyze Eliza Parson's The Castle of
Wolfenbach (1793) and Eleanor Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798), I assert that the

conclusion's portrayal of abrupt conversions enables the narratives to present "natural"
justice that upholds the heroines' moral understanding. The intricacies of natural and

Noting that female characters' conscious self·worth supplies them with a measure of power, Delamotte
also argues that this power must be supported by Providential rescue and does not necessarily provide
women with positive identities. Delamotte argues that providential rescue works as a deus ex machina that
saves the virtuous heroine but provides her with no positive identity (33).
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positive law, which fonn the basis of my discussion, enable the authors to avoid the
problematic aspects of each and to present a just conclusion to the heroines' suffering. In
turn, I argue that although these novels share the dubious distinction of being named in
Jane Austen's Northanger Abbey, they are more than mere literary curiosities.
The third chapter also discusses neglected Gothic novels: The Children ofthe

Abbey (1796) and Clermont (1798) by Regina Maria Roche. As part of the "Radcliffean
school," these two texts offer romantic endings that justify the heroines' choices. In this
analysis, however, I examine cultural techniques of perception that structure women's
experiences. Whereas the first two chapters focus on the heroines' sensitive bodies, this
chapter investigates technical structures within medical and legal discourse that lead to
claims of truth. The notion, stemming from cognitive science and Cartesian philosophy,
that perception does not provide easy access to reality has devastating consequences for
the heroines, who experience the social gaze in deeply personal ways. Yet the novels
provide an implicit critique of medical and juridical perception, enabling the heroines to
establish their own sense of morality and to follow their notions of natural law even at the
risk of social condemnation. This optimistic vision turns tragic in Eliza Fenwick's

Secresy, or Ruin on the Rock (1796) and Mary Wollstonecraft's Maria, or the Wrongs of
Woman (1798), which the fourth chapter will examine. These radical authors present
heroines who resist yet ultimately succumb to the power of social institutions. Although
the heroines of each novel also follow their conscience, their understanding of "natural"
laws ofjustice and morality, they are confined by medicine and law in tragic ways. Their
bodies display the effects of institutional forces, which are depicted as diseased and
corrupt. Differing in consequence, however, the narratives remain a part of the discursive
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resistance displayed in each novel within this study. I assert that medicine and law
produce remarkably similar effects on the Gothic's embodied female self. These eight
novels, however, do not simply replicate the discourses but engage with them, and often
resist them, as they present heroines who are neither completely determined by nor
completely free from their bodies.
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Chapter Two:
Bodies of Knowledge and the Sensible Mind in Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries of
Udolpho and The Italian
My discussion of Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho (1793) and The
Italian (1798) is shaped by two concerns. First, Radcliffe's use of sensibility, a concept

loaded with cultural baggage, is rarely examined in its medical sense. The receptivity of
the body to sensory impressions-and the subsequent creation of ideas-serves as a
crucial issue that Radcliffe explores through the heroine's "sensibility." Returning to the
connection between nerves and knowledge, I argue that Radcliffe's depiction of
sensibility has implications beyond the aspects that critics typically examine, such as
imaginative excesses, gendered emotion, and disproportionate sympathy. Instead, the
heroine's sensitive and susceptible body is responsible for producing knowledge, which
in turn enables her to claim rights and autonomy. Offering a new sense of the challenges
and dangers that Radcliffe's heroines face, the medical construction of sensibility also
provides a means of knowledge and selfhood, which leads to the second concern that
influences my approach to sensibility. Ifwomen's bodies are responsible for knowledge
(in the sense that the body takes in impressions and forms ideas), then they also
potentially have power. Indeed, medical theories about the nervous system and its
relationship to knowledge contain radically democratic possibilities, since the evidence of
one's own senses and the cognitive ability to develop ideas render external authority less
totalizing, less responsible for the individual self. The body-knowledge matrix that offers
this power, however, can be constrained or sanctioned by institutions such as legal
systems.

1
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Ann Radcliffe's heroines are, if not the first, at least the most famous

representations of a female subject who defines her body within and against the medical
field in order to rewrite her juridical status. In these two novels, Radcliffe challenges
certain repressive aspects of legal discourse and rejects problematic claims within
medical discourse regarding women's hypersensitivity. 1 Because law and medicine
provide positive identities as well as potentially liberatory and empowering consequences
for the female self, Radcliffe never suggests a wholesale rejection of these discourses.
For example, medical discourse, with its emphasis on the individual, provides a
foundation upon which people can make claims about autonomy, identity, and
individualism. Likewise, legal discourse provides a master narrative of individual rights
and political power that women might access for their own benefit. In The Mysteries of

Udolpho and The Italian, then, Radcliffe negotiates the constructive and repressive
aspects of medicine and law. I argue that in Udolpho Radcliffe links problematic bodies
with tenuous legal status and ineffectual claims to rights. Appearing as a pathological
subject, an extreme version of sensibility, Emily makes claims to knowledge and
ultimately to rights that seem unstable. Nevertheless, the heroine deploys her body's
potential by exercising self-control and resisting impressions that would render her
vulnerable to victimization. In contrast, The Italian's heroine, Ellena, exhibits emotional
and physical health that provides her with a more secure sense of autonomy, selfhood,
and agency. Ellena's physical stability and epistemological certainty radically undermine

1 Interestingly, Radcliffe had family connections in both medicine and law. Her relatives included a few
respected physicians, one of whose patients was Hester Lynch Thrale (Norton 22). Her husband William
studied for the bar and practiced for a brief time before turning his efforts to the Gazetter in 1791 (Norton
82).
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the "facts" produced within the juridical spaces of the novel. Radcliffe's warnings about
emotion, imagination, and weakness thus become critiques of institutional injustice.

Nenres and Knowledge: Sensibility and the MindIBody Connection
In eighteenth-century theories of the nerves, sensory impressions are responsible
for the individual's understanding of the world. According to G. S. Rousseau,
seventeenth-century brain scientist Thomas Willis inaugurated a paradigm shift, after
which "a physiological theory of perception was a necessary condition to explain feelings
of every sort (whether genuine or otherwise) and especially the diversity of simple and
complex passions" (l54)? Because Willis's model of human physiology limited the soul
to the brain, scientific interest in the nervous system became paramount: "this organ [the
brain] alone depends upon the nerves for all its functions" (Rousseau 145). In turn, nerves
"alone can be held responsible for sensory impressions, and consequently for knowledge"
(Rousseau 146). Grounded in medical theories, sensibility "denoted the receptivity of the
senses and ... connoted the operation of the nervous system, the material basis for
consciousness" (Barker-Benfield xvii). John Locke's sensationalist psychology draws on
Willis's work. According to Locke's schema, as the senses are impressed by outside
stimuli, the brain processes the sensations in order to create ideas. 3 Eighteenth-century

2 This paradigm's success is measured by the degree to which it "deflected" the efforts of subsequent
scientists and thinkers-and Rousseau says it was substantial. Scientists turned their attention to the
functions of the nervous system; moralists built their philosophies on the correspondences between soul
and anatomy; theologians had to account for the role of physical sensation in their theories of the soul.
(150-152). Rousseau notes that novels of sensibility and sentiment were unimaginable before the paradigm
shift.
3 See Essay on Human Understanding 2.14. Locke argues, "Thus the perception or thought which actually
accompanies, and is annexed to, any impression on the body, made by an external object, being distinct
from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call sensation;
which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses."
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French physician Pierre Jean Cabanis, in the preface to his Memoires (1796-1802),
examines Locke's axiom that "all ideas come to be through the senses, or are the product

ofsensation" in the light of medical research (qtd. in Cabanis 4, original italics). He
concludes that "the processes of the intellect and of the will become indistinguishable at
their root from the other biological actions. The very basis of the moral sciences, and, in
consequences, these sciences themselves, would be restored to the domain of the
physical" (6). In A New System ofthe Spleen, Vapours, and Hypochondriack Melancholy
(1729), Nicholas Robinson explains that although the soul is an immaterial substance, we
can only know it through the physical body: "Our Knowledge then will be only of [the
soul's] Faculties, which are Perception, Reason, Understanding, and the Memory. These
Powers of the Soul are all organical and depend on the Constitution of the Brain, and the
regular Influences of the Senses, for the Clearness and Distinctness of their Actions"
(42).
Drawing on the science of nerves, medical works dealt with the physical effects
and causes of emotion. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century physicians Robert Whytt,
Nicholas Robinson, Richard Blackmore, and George Cheyne, among others, used
theories of sensibility in their discussions of emotional disorders such as melancholy,
hypochondria, and hysteria. The medical account of knowledge creation suggests the
potential for causality between the body and the mind. In his discussion of the scientific
significance of Robert Whytt's project, Daniel N. Robinson explains, "What Whytt is
attempting to do is provide a biological explanation for a variety of 'nervous' disorders,
many symptoms of which are primarily or exclusively psychological" (xxx). I argue that
the physical basis for psychological processes makes the Gothic heroine's trembling,
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fainting, sinking, and collapsing significant in ways often ignored by Gothic critics. 4
Once the physical basis of knowledge is established, then physical weakness or debility
undermines claims to understanding. 5 Adela Pinch's study of emotion, Strange Fits of
Passion, is particularly instructive here. Tracing the late eighteenth-century
preoccupation with the nature and source of emotion, Pinch notes that Locke's
sensationalist model of knowledge "brings feeling closer to epistemological matters:
empiricism allows emotion to be a way of knowing" (19).6 Excessive feeling, however,
also threatens the ability to know. According to Bruhm, such extreme sensitivity leads to
absolute pain, which "threatens to render us unconscious, oblivious to any sensation" (6).
Somewhere between receptivity and insensibility, then, the female subject negotiates the
connection between mind and body.
The medically constructed, causal chain for intellectual development offered by
Willis, Locke, and Cabanis has much significance for women's claims to rationality and
autonomy. For women, the physical nature of intelligence and agency becomes
significant when their bodies are defined as inferior to men's. Richard Blackmore, for
example, argues in A treatise ofthe spleen and vapours: or, hypocondriacal and

4 Bruhm is a notable exception to this claim. His considerable introduction to Gothic Bodies explains the
ways in which pain, as both physical event and aesthetic experience, draws attention to the body's
psychological activity (4, 12-13). He argues that the politics of pain include: the relationship of individual
perceiver to society; the body's subjection to political forces; imagining pain as a means of encouraging
and repulsing political sympathies (27-29). Although Bruhm's analysis sets up important theoretical
questions, his discussion of Radcliffe's novels neglects the particular dimensions I explore. One area that
we both address is the "property in the self." Yet, he fails to consider women's troubled relationship to that
property.
Kim Ian Michasiw argues that "Emily is enmeshed in a strange epistemological trap" because her senses
are inadequate "to her 'reasoned' conviction that there is a whole, a pattern" (331). However, Michasiw
fails to consider the barriers that Emily's own body poses to her understanding and knowledge.
6 In Howells' analysis, heroines' moral dilemmas over marrying their love interests are "complicated by the
possibility that feeling may for once be the only adequate criterion ofjudgement" (57).
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hysterical affections (1725) that the women's "spirits" are "more volatile and subtil [sic],

and of less Stability and Consistence than they are in ours; and therefore more receptive
of Impressions, more liable to Dissipation, Disturbance and Confusion" (251).
Blackmore continues to describe the "Fineness, Delicacy, and Tenderness" of women's
nerves, "which are not woven of such firm and robust Threads, as they are in Men" (251).
Physically weaker than men, women also have difficulty resisting impressions; in tum,
they "are driven by the violent Impulse" (251). John Mullan argues that eighteenth
century medicine held the position that "woman's body, collapsing or beyond control, is
the very register of disorder" (217). Certainly the female body (and emotional state) often
appears naturally susceptible, hysteric, and weak in medical treatises, yet Mullan's
conclusion is debatable. Intriguingly, Blackmore notes that hysterical women exhibit the
same symptoms as hypochondriacal men, loosening the gender boundaries of nervous
disorders. Furthermore, in Robinson's treatise, the "Symptoms that affect Women in the
Beginning of the Vapours, are so nearly related to those that disorder the Imagination of
Men under a Fit of the Spleen" that only a small difference in the disorder kept him from
creating one chapter for the two (211). This instability within medical discourse enables
Radcliffe to argue against the powerful cultural image of women's physical debility.
As studies of sensibility literature such as G. J. Barker-Benfield's The Culture of
Sensibility and John Mullan's Sentiment and Sociability remind ~, female physiology

and psychology occupied the cultural imagination of late eighteenth-century writers of all
stripes. Sensibility also constituted an ideology of behavior and feeling to which the
"Proper Lady" was subject. In her study The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer, Mary
Poovey argues that sensibility appeared to offer women power even while it left them
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vulnerable and passive. According to Poovey, Radcliffe offers an important assessment
of women's position:
[I]n her romances Radcliffe investigates specifically the paradoxical role
sensibility plays in simultaneously restricting women and providing them power
and an arena for action. Moreover, Radcliffe uncovers the root cause of the late
eighteenth-century ideological turmoil, the economic aggressiveness currently
victimizing defenseless women of sensibility. (311)
The figure of the Proper Lady, who is also a woman of sensibility, illustrates the
contradictions and tensions in the ideology. Similarly, Mullan argues that sensibility, as a
bourgeois construction of class solidarity, organizes the body politic, even if such class
organization is anxious, indeterminate, and precarious (239).
As a medical concept, however, sensibility organizes the body: bodily integrity
creates correspondence among organs (Mullan 228).7 Like Poovey, Mullan stresses the
ambiguous construction of sensibility. He notes, "Because of the shifting nature of
sensibility, both privilege and ailment, refinement and excess, this trembling body is
appropriated by eighteenth-century novelists, male and female, as the sign of a
sentimental extravagance which may be either stubbornly virtuous or manifestly
debilitating" (223). As Barker-Benfield explains, sensibility attributed to women special
intellectual and moral powers, while it also "betokened physical and mental inferiority,
sickness, and inevitable victimization, circumstances throwing severe doubt on the
Here, Mullan summarizes the position of Michel Foucault (The History ofSexuality) and Christopher
Lawrence ("The Nervous System and Society"). Mullan devotes much of his study to analyzing the
relationship between sensibility and sociability, or social harmony. That women are often seen as
particularly susceptible to emotional disorder, Mullan explains, indicates that women are positioned to
disrupt more profoundly the social order (223). Notably, Mullan does not address Ann Radcliffe beyond a
brief mention.

7
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effectiveness of the female will" (36). While Poovey, Mullan, and Barker-Benfield all
acknowledge an inherent instability that undermines the power of the discourse, none
locates this instability in the conflicted, consumer-driven, medical field itself. Moreover,
no critic addresses the connection among the body, sensibility, and knowledge--a
connection that seems integral to Radcliffe's complex treatment of female agency.
My study draws on the work that Alan Richardson begins in his British
Romanticism and the Science ofthe Mind. Challenging scholars of Romantic-era writing

to pay particular attention to late eighteenth-century developments in brain science,
Richardson argues that such medical works help contextualize such Romantic concerns
as ''the relation of the mind to body, the relation of human beings to the natural world, the
new emphasis on human difference and individuality, the environmental role in shaping
mind and behavior, the status of various materialist ideologies, even such staples as
sensibility and the creative imagination" (2). Indeed, Richardson contributes fresh
perspectives to the age-old "mindlbody" dichotomy: "The 'struggle' between rational
control and passionate feeling, conscious volition and the physiological rush of intense
inner emotions, manifests not a split between mind and body but the impossibility of
every teasing them apart" (102). 8 I will demonstrate that while Radcliffe acknowledges
the body's role in producing knowledge through sense impressions, she also attempts to
rework the problematic conclusions reached by eighteenth-century physicians in order to
construct a female subject who can actively claim rights. I argue that in The Mysteries of

g Here, Richardson refers to Jane Austen's Persuasion, yet this idea seems remarkably appropriate for
Radcliffe's novels. Ellena shares a remarkable similarity to Richardson's description of Anne Elliot:
"Marked by a 'strong sensibility' from her adolescence, Anne is represented not as some eviscerated or
denervated rational agen~ but as an emotive, embodied subject, uncommonly reasonable and also
uncommonly sensitive" (104).
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Udolpho Radcliffe illustrates the consequences of medical science's account of

knowledge, and in The Italian, she continues to examine the nature of knowledge,
particularly the function of "evidence," in women's experience.

Gothic Debility: The Mysteries of Udolpho
Because the senses and the nervous system create a material mind, the physical
body serves as the basis of knowledge production for both women and men. The radically
democratic potential of this medical construction indicates that women's bodies can serve
as either a locus of power or a barrier to autonomy. Assuming the relationship between
nerves and knowledge, Radcliffe clearly shows thatthe consequences of pathology
include forfeiting agency, individuality, and even sanity-and that Emily's dangerously
delicate body and mind make her vulnerable to threats. Although Barker-Benfield argues
that "novels of sensibility suggested that women's nervous disorders could be a means of
self-preservation" (32), Gothic novels contradict this conclusion. In particular,
Radcliffe's portrayal of Emily, who often falls outsidethe range of strength that medical
science claims as "normal," simply does not bear out Barker-Benfield's claim. Emily
must preserve not only her moral superiority, her "mild dignity," but also a semblance of
health as she attempts to control her emotions and body. The nerved mind thus offers a
means of establishing self-determination, while nervous disorders hinder women's
autonomy.9 Some physicians, such as Pierre Cabanis, cast doubt on women's ability to

9 In Mary Wollstonecraft's The Wrongs o/Women, or Maria the impulses of the "nerved mind" are the
means to self-determination As she argues, individuals who are "dependent on outward circumstance ...
seldom act from the impulse of a nerved mind, able to choose its own pursuit" (99).
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reason by providing a natural explanation for their deficient nerves, but Radcliffe rejects
such ideas by suggesting that women can overcome the most "natural" debility.
Hampered by her body, Emily frequently appears incapable of action and thought,
rather than modeling virtue and propriety. Robert Miles suggests, "[Radcliffe's] earlier
fiction, one might say, was locked within the logic of sensibility, whereas The Italian
breaks out of it, striving for a more general, less gender-specific, examination of its
discursive resources" (179). Miles further explains that The Italian was produced in
"conversation" with M. G. Lewis's The Monk. Lewis's graphic representation of the
passive female body prompted Radcliffe to reassess the ideology of sensibility, which
resulted in passivity and powerlessness (173-75). I argue instead that Radcliffe intervenes
in the ideology of sensibility as early as Udolpho as she examines the body's role in
creating knowledge and critiques medical opinions of women's agency. to
In Udolpho Emily is subject to medical discourse in two senses: she is a

'\

symptomatic, diagnosable object, and she is an individuated "self," the product of
medical values. Thus, her status as an individual, particularly one who struggles for selfmastery, can be located within medical discourse. ll Although the heroine's internalized
mechanisms of self-control have ties to the ideology of propriety, these mechanisms are
also shaped by medical promises of health, normality, and fitness. Concentrating on the
10 Mary Poovey's The Proper Lady provides a seminal examination of this problem. She argues that
Radcliffe's concern with propriety leads her to criticize sensibility's "disorderly" aspects. In Sensibility: An
Introduction, Janet Todd argues that heroines who are women of feeling, including Emily, "convey their
virtue through their meaningful bodies, and the most authentic emotions are signaled not by words but by
tears, blushes, palpitations, and fainting fits" (120), and Todd notes that Radcliffe paradoxically cautions
against sensibility's selfish and irrational tendencies (144). Coral Ann Howells in Love, Mystery, and
Misery suggests that Emily functions as a sensibility rather than a personality and argues that Radcliffe
demonstrates the dangers of unrestrained emotionalism (49,56).
11 Without losing sight of Emily's fictional and textual status, I would like to suggest that Radcliffe strives
for a certain level of mimesis in her descriptions of Emily as a person. In this sense, Emily is a "self' that
corresponds to the textual representations of real bodies within eighteenth-century medical treatises.
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dangers and consequences of the sensitive body, Radcliffe suggests that the healthy body
offers a potentially powerful means of self-determination and autonomy. It is Emily's
debility of body that ultimately casts doubts on her capacity for knowledge and her status
as a "knower." Emily's emotional responses and intellectual capabilities illustrate the
ways in which the female body can endanger intellectual development, legal autonomy,
and moral status. Experiencing a variety of relationships that highlight these problems,
Emily must face and defeat each danger by asserting her will to knowledge and her
ability to maintain a coherent sense of selfhood.
I first assert that Radcliffe places Emily within a discourse of disease. In

Sentiment and Sociability John Mullan states, "There is always disability.... There is no
social space for sensibility. Illness is its appropriate metaphor" (239-40). This statement,
located in Mullan's conclusion, merely hints at a new angle on a familiar aspect of

Udolpho. Indeed, the claim that illness and disability always accompany sensibility can
alter radically the ways in which we interpret Emily's sensitive body. In the novel, the
line between sensibility and illness is razor thin. While exquisite sensitivity may heighten
responses to landscapes, personal tragedies, and tales of woe, Radcliffe often replaces the
language of sentiment with a discourse of illness. Emily's condition resembles the
nervous disorders described in eighteenth-century medical treatises. In the beginning of
the narrative, 81. Aubert, carefully observing the growth of Emily's body and character,
diagnoses his daughter as having "uncommon delicacy of mind" and "a degree of
susceptibility too exquisite to admit of lasting peace" (5). The reader learns that Emily's
"sensibility gave a pensive tone to her spirits, and a softness to her manner, which added
grace to beauty, and rendered her a very interesting object" (5). Although a sensitive
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object, Emily's body needs correction and cure. Physician Robert Whytt classifies
patients with nervous disorders in tenns that sound remarkably similar to Emily's
representation. According to Whytt's Observations on the nature, causes, and cure of
those disorders which have been commonly called nervous hypochondriac, or hysteric
(1765), certain patients "though usually in good health, are yet, on account of an
uncommon delicacy of their nervous system, apt to be often affected with violent tremors,
palpitations, faintings, and convulsive fits, from fear, grief, surprise, or other passions"
(532, my emphasis). Introducing Emily with hypersensitivity as the narrative begins,
Radcliffe sets up the primary challenge that Emily faces and begins to explore the range
of responses that stem from the sensitized body.
George Cheyne's 1733 treatise The English Malady also shaped the physio
emotional territory that Radcliffe examines and rewrites through Emily's character. As
this text illustrates, the nervous system provided a framework within which to explain a
host of physical, social, and moral problems. In the mid-eighteenth century, nervous
disease was part of a phenomenon "semiotically captured by the word 'nerves' and its
cognates (nervous, neurasthenic, neurotic, etc.) [which] touched on most aspects of life
then and was not confmed to a few zones" (Rousseau, Enlightenment 11 7). Doctors like
Cheyne commented on the inclusiveness of such terminology and attempted to classify
more precisely the causes, symptoms, and cures of nervous disorders. In the language of
eighteenth-century treatises on hypochondria and hysteria, Emily appears pathologically
sensible. 12 Cheyne's "first stage" of distemper includes a host of symptoms that Emily

12 By contrast, Dale Townshend argues that Emily exhibits psychosis and neurosis in a Lacanian sense.
That is, Emily's emotional difficulties stem from her difficult transition into the symbolic realm, in which
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experiences: "Lowness of Spirits, Inappetnecy13 [sic], Inquietude, Anxiety, Melancholy,
Grief" (134). Integrating both physical and emotional symptoms, Cheyne demonstrates
that the latter are not simply psychological maladies. Instead, emotions are intimately
related to the physiological system of nerves, fibers, vessels, and circulation. The
physical basis of the mind, as medical discourse constructs it, offers Radcliffe a powerful
metaphor that she weaves throughout the novel. Describing Emily's mental and
intellectual capabilities within a physical framework, Radcliffe draws attention to the
illness, health, strength, and weakness of Emily's understanding.
At the begilU1ing of Udolpho, Emily's father works on her character in much the
same way that a physician might work on a diseased patient. 14
He endeavoured, therefore, to strengthen her mind; to enure her to habits of selfcommand; to teach her to reject the first impulse of her feelings, and to look, with
cool examination, upon the disappointments he sometimes threw in her way.
While he instructed her to resist first impressions, and to acquire that steady
dignity of mind, that can alone counterbalance the passions, and bear us as far as
is compatible with our nature, above the reach of circumstances, he taught himself
a lesson of fortitude; for he was often obliged to witness, with seeming
indifference, the tears and struggles which his caution occasioned her. (5)

phallic power and linguistic mastery are located in the Father. "Constructions of Psychosis and Neurosis in
Ann Radcliffe's The Mysteries ofUdolpho" Pretexts 9.2 (2000): 175-206.
13 That is, a lack of appetite or desire.
14 Barbara Benedict agrees that these descriptions are scientific. She explains that st. Aubert "revises
superstition as science. His knowledge of nature, both physical and human, accounts for the sources of
feelings and sights, explains Emily's experience as universal, and replaces awe with control" (373). Her
focus on St. Aubert, however, ignores the medical dimensions that I explore.
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St. Aubert does not experiment on her when he puts obstacles or "disappointments" in
her way; instead, he inoculates her against future emotional collapse by introducing small
doses of"disease.,,15 Radcliffe's emphasis on personal mastery, improvements, and
regulation fits well within medical discourse (Rose, "Medicine," 69). Further, the science
of sensibility relocates the significance of this scene from the ideology ofpropriety to the
-creation of factual knowledge. Eighteenth-century physician Nicholas Robinson shows
that a person's will has the power to overcome "the Impulse, with which the Fibres
impress external Objects upon the Passions," if one were to exert one's mind against such
impulses (49). Emily's resistance to "first impressions" becomes a resistance to her
body's passive function. Rather than accepting sensual data, the heroine must learn to
control external impressions. For Emily, managing her responses to stimuli and refusing
the impressions of outside forces enable her to participate actively in the physiological
and psychological processes of her body. Focusing on Emily's body and health, Radcliffe
explores the interdependence of physical and mental states-and carves out a space for
women's self-determination.
The primary authority in Emily's life, St. Aubert frequently, even obsessively,
insists that his daughter recognize the value of restraining sensibility and suggests that
self-command is both possible and necessary. This much-remarked aspect of Udolpho
generally serves as proof that Radcliffe rejected the fashion of sensibility. However, it
also signals a complex response to medical constructions of the self. Although her father
admits that ''there is a period when all reasoning must yield to nature" (21), Emily
15 Van Sant discusses the use of scientific language in such sentimental novels as Clarissa, explaining that
references to experiments, tests, and proofs offered novelists a new expression of identity fonnation. I
argue that Radcliffe also constructs her heroine's identity through medical language, although the particular
contours and implications are different for Emily.
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continually struggles against "nature," which Radcliffe aligns with the irrational. St.
Aubert's lessons are emphasized at length as Emily's parents sicken and die. Her parents
seem especially anxious that Emily's physical and emotional weaknesses might de~troy
completely her chances for a peaceful, happy life. As Emily's mother lies on her
deathbed, st. Aubert tells his daughter that emotion, particularly grief, can be an
"indulgence," an "excessive" luxury of body that "enervates the mind and almost
incapacitates it" (20). Here, he echoes Cheyne's discussion of the national and cultural
causes of certain emotional illnesses.
Attributing the bulk of nervous distempers to "the Rich, the Lazy, the Luxurious,
and the Unactive" (20), Cheyne suggests honest living, plain diet, and wholesome
activity as preventative measures. 16 Cautioned against emotional splurges, Emily
frequently revisits her father's injunctions after his death: "she remembered how often he
had blamed her for indulging useless sorrow; how often he had pointed out to her the
necessity of fortitude and patience, assuring her, that the faculties of the mind strengthen
by exertion, till they finally unnerve affliction, and triumph over it" (119). Like Cheyne,
St. Aubert promotes exercise or exertion as a cure for the pathological state, although in
this case Emily's father refers to a kind of emotional exercise. In both cases, activity
rather than passivity constitutes a healthy ideal for women and men. 17 Radcliffe approves
and authorizes Emily's efforts through the domestic sphere, taking every opportunity to
dichotomize the dangers of passivity and the potential of activity. Sensual impressions
16 In Rise ofthe Supernatural, E. J. Clery mentions women's long-standing association with luxury. See
also Barker-Benfield's The Culture ofSensibility for Cheyne's feminization of nervous disorder through his
discussion of luxury.
17 Benedict notes, "[S]orrow, and the indulgence of it, induce 'lethargy,' close to the 'idleness' Michel
Foucault identifies with the idea of madness in the eighteenth century" (371). Emily's "madness" poses a
series of problems explored later in this chapter.
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may occur on the body, but the nervous system and brain work to process those
impressions into knowledge. As Emily exerts herself and "exercises" her mind, she
moves toward personal agency, rejecting cultural stereotypes of sensibility and instead
embracing the potential of physiological psychology to generate personal agency.
Although the body serves as the primary means of individualism, Radcliffe also
illustrates that agency was often secured through property. Bruhm raises this significant
issue, yet his discussion of Emily ignores the complication that the female body presents
within both medical and legal discourses. I argue that Radcliffe's presentation of the
relationship between property and women's bodies fluctuates as Emily appears physically
weak or strong. As her father recognizes, Emily's ability to maintain her property
depends on her ability to control her body. St. Aubert's lengthy deathbed speeches
mention both sensibility and property, not only indicating the importance of medical and
juridical discourses in Emily's life but also exposing the correlation between the two. He
adamantly entreats, "promise... that you will never, whatever may be your future
circumstances, sell the chateau." He also insists that "whenever she might marry, to
make it an article in the contract, that the chateau should always be hers" (78). In her
article, "(In)alienable Rights: Property, Feminism, and the Female Body from Ann
Radcliffe to the Alien Films," Lauren Fitzgerald does note that the Lockean axiom that
one owns property in the self is more problematic for women; however, her argument
fails to examine the control that Emily ultimately does deploy. Fitzgerald argues, "The
final lesson of the novel, however, is that even as the Gothic heroine is self-possessed, the
mistress of her own property, this property can also be usurped because it is embodied as
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her body." Further, "the owner can all too easily become the owned, and inalienable
rights alienable.,,18
Radcliffe's savvy use of English property laws, specifically the marriage
settlements that enabled women to maintain separate property, is certainly noteworthy.19
This scene, however, demonstrates the opposite of Fitzgerald's claim. Radcliffe does
realize that, in Lockean terms, Emily's body serves as her original "property." Indeed, the
self and property can be conflated to provide women with powerful agency. Nevertheless,

8t. Aubert's fervent demand that Emily keep the chateau, mingled with his warnings
against "the evils of susceptibility," "self-delusion," and becoming ''the victims of our
feelings," emphasizes the inalienable nature of Emily's body (80). According to Locke,
inalienable rights include life, liberty, and property in the self. In this conception,
selthood becomes a new "right" that women can claim. lbrough 8t. Aubert's attention to
the danger that Emily faces through her weak body, Radcliffe demonstrates that Emily
has a vested, lifetime interest in her "property." His cautions convey the need for women
to secure property in themselves. Intriguingly, Radcliffe opposes the fungible,
transferable·quality of property with Emily's selthood, which cannot be bargained away.

8t. Aubert does not warn Emily about villains, such as Montoni, who might take her
estates, but about a proper, presumably romantic, marital relationship that serves as feme
sole's primary ambition. Her father indicates that, as long as Emily can avoid selfvictimization and self-delusion, she can maintain her "property"-in herself and in the

18 Romanticism On the Net 21 (February 2001) June 14,2003.
http://users.ox.ac.ukI-scat0385/21fitzgerald.hOOl.
19 See Amy Louise Erickson's Women and Property in Early Modern England, Susan Staves'Married
Women's Separate Property in England 1660-1753, and April London's Women and Property in the
Eighteenth-Century Novel.
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chateau. Thus, danger of delusion, which increases as the heroine exhibits symptoms of
nervous illness, potentially undermines her assertive claims. These dangers become more
apparent within the threatening environment of Castle Udolpho, but they begin after the
death of Emily's parents.
Although Emily appears physically weak: in early descriptions, her hysterical
symptoms appear only when she grieves for her mother and father. Whytt describes
hysteria as "sudden flushings of heat over the whole body," "long faintings, in some
cases, following one another, after short intervals" and "Palpitations, or trembling of the
heart" (531). Radcliffe taps into these diagnosable symptoms as she maps out Emily's
responses. In keeping with the physio-emotional diagnosis, Radcliffe describes Emily's
"greatly enervated" mind and "the infirm state of her nerves" when discussing her
wounded feelings (l02). In one scene, Emily is "lying senseless across the foot of the
bed" (87). Coral Ann Howells argues that the heroine's "anxiety often verges on hysteria
and hallucination" (Love 50). For Howells, such emotional distress simply reinforces
women's social passivity, yet Radcliffe specifically shows that Emily works to control
her always-active body, which in medical terms palpitates, circulates, aspirates, and
vibrates. Her spells of weakness thus forcefully represent the illness that she attempts to
resist. Nicholas Robinson notes in his medical treatise, "Every Change of the Mind,
therefore, indicates a Change in the bodily Organs; nor is it possible for the Wit of Man
to conceive how the Mind can, from a chearful [sic] and gay Disposition, fall into a sad
and disconsolate State, without some Alterations in the Fibres, at the same Time" (178).
Although Emily never has a cheerful disposition, it is clear that her already susceptible
body is indeed altered by her mental condition. Working within the medical discourse
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that proposes multiple stages of nervous disorder and offers refined distinctions between
degrees of capacity, Radcliffe demonstrates that while Emily can exhibit a variety of
nervous symptoms, the heroine retains the capacity to act against her physical
experiences.
After her father's death, Emily's responses and resources are tested-and the
consequences of her body clarified. In particular, Radcliffe explores the ways in which
Emily's mind, embodied in her susceptible body, might be potentially weak to the point
of complete unreason. According to Cheyne, the second stage of nervous distemper
involves:
[D]eep and fixed Melancholy, wandering and delusory Images on the Brain, and
Instability and Unsettlednesss in all the intellectual Operations, Loss of Memory,
Despondencey, Horror and Despair, a Vertigo, Giddiness or Staggering...[Fits]
of Crying, Grief and Anguish; and these generally terminate in Hypochondriacal
or Hysterical Fits (I mean Convulsive ones) and Faintings, which leave a
Drowsiness, Lethargy, and extream [sic] Lowness of Spirits for some Time
afterwards (138).
Weeping, trembling, and fainting, Emily exhibits signs of grief as well as disorder. In a
ghoulish turn, Emily believes that her father's ghost might be the "rustling sound" she
hears and the moving shadow she sees. Influenced by sad contemplations, "her
imagination respond[ed] to every impression of her senses [and] gave her a sudden terror
of something supernatural. She sat for a moment motionless, and then, her dissipated
reason returning, 'What should I fear?' said she. 'If the spirits of those we love ever
return to us, it is in kindness'" (108). In fact, "her imagination had deluded her"-the
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ghost turns out to be her dog. While this experience illustrates Radcliffe's clever use of
supernatural atmosphere, it also overlaps with the medical diagnosis that would immerse
Emily more completely in nervous disorder. The instability of Emily's senses causes a
crisis in her understanding, which Radcliffe further develops in subsequent scenes.
Emily's body and mind are tested in three related ways. First, when Valancourt
proposes a clandestine marriage, Emily's ability to retain her senses demonstrates her
ability to maintain her moral status. Second, in the mysterious and frightening castle,
Emily exhibits a propensity to sensory delusions that destabilizes her capacity for
knowledge. Although she actively resists the impressions that raise frightening
possibilities within her imagination, the threat of madness continues to loom as both a
mental and moral peril. Third, as Emily struggles to marshal her intellectual and physical
resources, she must defend her legal rights to inheritance when the villain Montoni
attempts to snatch her property from her. Calling her knowledge into question, Montoni
argues that Emily cannot comprehend her legal position and insists on his own version of
the truth. Although Radcliffe makes Emily's powerlessness and vulnerability painfully
clear, she also demonstrates that Emily's mental strength can overcome at least her
emotional responses to terrifying threats.
Under the guardianship of her wealthy and vain aunt, Emily fights against the
collapse of reason and health as she enters a confused blur of travel, danger, grief, and
terror. In fact, Emily's passionate feelings threaten her mind and body much more than
villainous plots. When Valancourt desperately attempts to persuade Emily to a
clandestine marriage, she falls into a stupor: "She spoke not; her cheek was cold, and her
senses seemed~o fail her, but she did not faint. To Valancourt's terrified imagination she
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appeared to be dying" (155). The connection among the nerves, brain, mind, and reason
is most striking here. Psychological and physiological stimuli result in a temporary
trance, as she responds to Valancourt's proposition:
After a few minutes, she drew a deep sigh, and began to revive. The conflict she
had suffered, between love and the duty she at present owed to her father's sister;
her repugnance to a clandestine marriage, her fear of emerging on the world with
embarrassments, such as might ultimately involve the object of her affection in
misery and repentance; --all this various interest was too powerful for a mind,
already enervated by sorrow, and her reason had suffered a transient suspension.
But duty, and good sense, however hard the conflict, at length, triumphed over
affection and mournful presentiment. .. and she acted, perhaps, with more than
female fortitude. (155)
This curiously gendered exercise in fortitude seems perplexing from a medical
perspective like Cheyne's. If Emily has entered a non-rational mental state, then the
triumph of her "good sense" indeed makes little sense. In this scene, as in later scenes,
Radcliffe subordinates medical discourse to moral, which in turn allows her to explore
further the juridical dimensions of Emily's experiences.
Under pressure, Emily almost loses consciousness. Interestingly, this temporary
inanity comes at a point when Emily is faced with the possibility of changing her legal
status from feme sole to feme covert. The subject that she will become, a legal non-entity,
is the subject that she actually is at that moment: an unthinking, unfeeling, and
frightening nonexistence that offers no real solution to the dilemma with which she is
faced. Although the narrator does not mention St. Aubert's cautions about Emily's

.
50

property in marriage at this point, those cautions seem oddly appropriate in this context.
St. Aubert, recognizing that women must transfer control of their property upon marriage
unless they make legal arrangements, encourages Emily to retain the chateau, almost as a
physical reminder of her individual "self." A clandestine marriage to Valancourt would
not allow her the opportunity to draw up the proper settlements that would ensure her
property ownership. Even beyond problems of separate property, however, the loss of
selfhood represented in this scene appears to be the ultimate danger.
The threat of a final loss of self appears in the frightening atmosphere of Castle
Udolpho, where Radcliffe most vividly expresses the processes of mind and body.
Emily's imagination creates her physical reality in several scenes, destablizing her ability
to know what is happening to her. In one example, Emily responds to "imaginary
terrors," which cause her to tremble and prevent her from walking or even standing (221).
Searching for her aunt, Emily speculates on the possible discoveries she might make:
"Perhaps... I am come hither only to learn a dreadful truth, or to witness some horrible
spectacle; I feel that my senses would not survive such an addition of horror" (323).
When the truth is too horrible to discover, the impressions that the senses receive become
dangerous. As Emily suggests, survival depends on her ability to absorb and process
sensory data, but she often seems too weak to withstand impressions. In her quest to find
her aunt, she can scarcely move: "Now that she was so near the sought-for certainty, she
dreaded to know it, even more than before, and had not fortitude sufficient to speak, or to
attempt opening the door" (324).
Unlike the overwhelming spectacle of the rotting corpse behind the veil, these
examples of Emily's conjectures, imagination, and fearful sensitivity demonstrate that
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she is responsible for successfully understanding the dangers that surround her. Although
Emily's belief that truth and certainty can be dreadful is entirely reasonable, Radcliffe
indicates that "positive" or empirical knowledge is difficult for Emily to establish
because her body and mind together interfere with her activity. For example, as Emily
imagines her aunt murdered, "she trembled, gasped for breath... But after she paused a
few minutes, the consciousness of her duty returned, and she went on" (323). Faced with
evidence that suggests violence, Emily cries, "She is dead! ... murdered!--her blood is
on the stairs!" (324). The narrator continues, "Emily grew very faint; could support
herself no longer, and had scarcely presence of mind to set down the lamp, and place
herself on a step" (324). Indeed, the sensitive heroine attempts "to derive from the whole
something more positive, than conjecture. But her imagination was inflamed, while her
judgment was not enlightened, and the terrors of superstition again pervaded her mind"
(375).
Emily's incorrect conclusions and her physical weakness are placed together to
illustrate the sympathy between mind and body, which thwarts Emily's attempts to
establish certainty. Indeed, women were described in some medical treatises as
particularly-even essentially-vulnerable to such irrational and incorrect impressions.
In his discussion of delirium, Cabanis writes,
In those whose minds have acquired keen and abiding habits of accuracy, such
erroneous impressions (which rarely strike all the senses at once) can be corrected
by reason. It is not always exactly the same in women. Their active and mobile
imaginations do not resist the sensations of the moment. They do not even tolerate
easily one's doubts of their chimerical nature. Their minds do not begin to
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question the accuracy of these [chimeras] until they have ceased to experience
them. (65).
Although Radcliffe's heroine exhibits a similar imagination, she does attempt to train her
mind and to resist "the sensations of the moment." Cabanis argues that women normally
have difficulty distinguishing chimeras from reality, while Radcliffe demonstrates that
Emily's particular weaknesses and debility are abnormal, problematic, and curable.
Creating moments of resistance to medical opinions, Radcliffe exerts her own power
within medical discourse.
Emily's physical vulnerability emphasizes her emotional susceptibility. The
narrator notes: "It was lamentable, that her excellent understanding should have yielded,
even for a moment, to the reveries of superstition, or rather to those starts of imagination,
which deceive the senses into what can be called nothing less than momentary madness"
(102). Madness has a significant relationship to nervous disorder. In Madness and

Civilization, Foucault explains that in madness "there is always a secret weakness, an
essential lack of resistance" (160). In the Castle Udolpho, the threat of madness appears
again, as Emily rejects her suspicions that Montoni has murdered her aunt:
[S]he was inclined to corisider these suspicions as the extravagant exaggerations
of a timid and harrassed mind, and could not believe Montoni liable to such
preposterous depravity as that of destroying, from one motive, his wife and her
niece. She blamed herself for suffering her romantic imagination to carry her so
far beyond the bounds of probability, and determined to endeavour to check its
rapid flights, lest they should sometimes extend into madness (342).
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As Emily learns after "her own credulity had so nearly betrayed her" (379), she needs
every mental and physical resource at her disposal. Montoni' s attempts to usurp her
estates show Emily that she must make every effort to repel his arguments, threats, and
tricks. Madness in the castle environment thus presents a danger to Emily's
consciousness and her ability to cling to the estates that she inherits.
Emily's experiences with Montoni allow her a chance to articulate rights that she
has no need to claim with her father. When Montoni points out the illegality of his wife's
will and thus Emily's possession of the estates, Emily "calmly" states, "I am not so
ignorant, Signor, of the laws on this subject, as to be misled by the assertion of any
person. The law, in the present instance, gives me the estates in question, and my own
hand shall never betray my right" (380). After dozens of scenes in which Emily trembles,
weeps, and faints, her moment of clarity, articulation, and strength provides a startling
contrast. Here, Emily does not even claim conscious worth or moral superiority-two
qualities that she often relies upon to sustain herself. In its entirety, this significant scene
merges the problematic female body with legal issues of property. Montoni sneers, "You
speak: boldly, and presumptuously, upon a subject, which you do not understand. For
once, 1 am willing to pardon the conceit of ignorance; the weakness of your sex, too,
from which, it seems, you are not exempt, claims some allowance; but, if you persist in
this strain--you have every thing to fear from my justice" (380). Referring to
understanding, ignorance, and weakness, Montoni clearly indicates that Emily's
knowledge has a suspiciously feeble character, which he continues to claim as he argues
with her: "I find that you are weak: enough ... to credit the idle assertion 1 alluded to! ...
Your credulity can punish only yourself; and 1 must pity the weakness of mind, which

..
54
leads you to so much suffering as you are compelling me to prepare for you" (380).
Again, the ruthless villain draws attention to the weakness that Emily has exhibited and
resisted throughout the novel.
Unlike her earlier somatic responses to danger, however, Emily's replies to
Montoni are confident and secure in this scene: "You may find, perhaps, Signor," said
Emily, with mild dignity, "that the strength of my mind is equal to the justice of my
cause; and that I can endure with fortitude, when it is in resistance of oppression" (380
381). It is my claim that Radcliffe's references to Emily's strength and weakness of mind
highlight her sustained interest in women's physical capacity for knowledge. As Emily
insists on her knowledge of laws that support her rights, which she refuses to give up, she
rejects the debility that has hampered her agency and autonomy. In contrast to previous
moments in the text, the narrator offers no reflections, no admonitions, no indications that
Emily does not see things clearly at this point. Lacking the narrator's intervention, the
scene depends on dialogue that evokes the physicality of the mind. The physical terms
deployed here reflect the essential problem of the body: if Emily cannot create
epistemological certainty, then her claims to legal rights are immediately suspect.
Radcliffe, however, indicates that Emily can claim the power of law, particularly in this
moment of threat and terror.
Although the conflict between Montoni and Emily has been addressed by critics,
much of the response has been unhistorical at best.2o For example, Kate Ellis explains

Michasiw's position most resembles mine in that she argues, "Emily employs her knowledge [and]
asserts herself' (335). Yet she believes that Emily depends on a superstitious belief in the positive power of
law. Likewise, Clery notes that Emily's earlier superstitions infect her legal references with a similar
credulity. Both critics fall into the trap that Radcliffe strives so hard to avoid. In this scene, Emily fulfills
the potential of the sensible mind, which, I will argue, The Italian more fully realizes.

20
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that the "legal system of Udolpho protected women to a degree that did not occur in
England until half a century after the novel appeared" (123). Ignoring the marriage
settlements and inheritance laws that enabled women to own and bequeath property, Ellis
relies on a general notion of coverture, which certainly placed women in a vulnerable,
disadvantaged position but which had l~gallimits enforceable in the courts of equity if
not common law. On the other hand, E. 1. Clery identifies the scene as a conflict between
two versions of law: the law of equity and common law. Identifying Emily's stance as
that of equity, Clery argues that Emily can claim only an ideal of "natural justice." Clery,
however, does not acknowledge that equity was a legal system equally as codified as
common law. In A Treatise ofEquity (1793-95), John Fonblanque explains that although
courts of equity, also called Chancery courts, attempt to enact "natural justice" and ''the
precepts of natural law," they in fact remain part of positive laws (9). As Fonblanque
notes, "But if the law has determined a matter with all its circumstances, equity cannot
intermeddle; and for the Chancery to relieve against the express provision of an act of
parliament, would be the same as to repeal it. Equity, therefore will not interpose in such
cases" (17-18). In fact, although equity might grant relief in the form of a specialized
remedy, the courts employed recognized remedies, such as trusts, that the common law
would uphold in disputes. As Judy Cornett explains, one of the maxims of equity is
"equity regards as done that which ought to be done.,,21 The significance of this scene,
therefore, does not lie within the conflict between versions of law; instead, it
demonstrates possibilities for a "weak-minded" woman. Emily's ability to claim legal

21 I am indebted to Judy Cornett for explaining the distinctions between courts of equity and common law
courts, as well as for articulating the problematic historical concerns that these critics elide.
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rights, or even to trade her rights to the estates for a more prized value, becomes a
resource that the embodied mind can deploy.
Threatened in multiple ways, Emily finds strength and power to resist oppression
and weakness, yet the narrative continues for hundreds of pages after the threat of
Montoni has evaporated. External threats, as I have shown, are only part of the problem
that Radcliffe examines. As Montoni withers away in the background, the novel returns
to the moral-emotional challenges that demand the heroine's physical and mental
exertions. Through Emily's experiences with Valancourt and her meeting with
Laurentini, Radcliffe demonstrates that rationality can be disrupted through guilt and
physical debility as they culminate in madness. Although feisty and superior with
Montoni, Emily continues to face challenges with her romantic feelings for Valancourt.
When she hears of VaIancourt's depraved Paris excursions and then encounters him at
the De Villeforts, she faints twice and weeps, even though she "exert[s] her resolution to
appear recovered" (508). Because Valancourt's corruption would degrade her, Emily
decides that she must break their engagement. As she processes the information in
private, Emily again appears disordered: "when she attempted to think, her mind refused
controul, and she could only feel that she was miserable" (509). This lack of control,
while understandable, indicates a correlation between thinking and feeling that Radcliffe
continues to present as dangerous.
In their subsequent interview, Valancourt and Emily experience a wide range of
emotions, and it is clear that Emily remains susceptible to her "agitated spirits" (512),
''the pleadings of her heart" (513), "unutterable anguish" and "grief" (515), which
ultimately leave her "with a mind, weakened and irresolute, and a frame, trembling with
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illness" (518). The conjunction of mind and body, the mental and physical processes that
result in secure selfhood, is repeated to excess. Later, anxiety over Valancourt's possible
death causes her in one instance to develop a "slow fever" (589) and at another time to
become "so much disordered" that she cannot walk and must sit down on the ground
(619). Although Emily has learned how to claim her rights and her property, her physical
state is not much improved. In medical terms, Emily's failure of health and body would
make her knowledge-especially that of legal rights, illegiJimate authority and unjust
claims-uncertain at best. Radcliffe, therefore, rejects the medical outcomes in order to
allow her heroine the capacity to think and act appropriately.
Emily does not remain in this too-sensitive state for long. Trained by her father to
exercise her will in an almost physical manner, the heroine rejects grief and masters her
feelings. As she overcomes emotional and physical symptoms, she re-enters
consciousness and subsequently avoids the final stage of nervous disorder in Cheyne's
model. Cheyne argues that a person will die from nervous condition "if not cured in
either of these two [stages], by the struggling and Efforts of Nature, joined with Art"
(138). Robinson's medical treatise outlines a similar diagnosis, wherein "the fatal Stages
... seldom cease to make upon any sudden, surprising, or unexpected Turn of Affairs, if
not timely prevented by proper Applications" (233). As she abandons this trajectory,
Radcliffe demonstrates that Emily's morality is linked to her body in positive ways-as
Emily recuperates from illness, she exercises agency over her moral status. Robert Kiely
notes, "The path which Mrs. Radcliffe's virtuous characters must try to keep winds
literally betWeen the madhouse and the graveyard-that is, between chaotic emotional
release and an inhuman absence of feeling" (The Romantic Novel, 72). The images of the
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madhouse and graveyard to which Kiely refers resonate with medicine as it seeks to cure
illness of mind and body. For Emily, self-mastery involves both her emotions and her
body, and she is ultimately successful. Yet Radcliffe does present the natural path of
nervous disease through Laurentini, or Sister Agnes.
When Emily enters the convent to find the answers to her father's mysteries, she
comes face to face with her emotional double-and encounters the possible progression
of her symptoms. Indeed, the possibility of Emily's break with consciousness and
rationality haunts the text. When she gazes on Emily, Laurentini states, "You are
young-you are innocent! I mean you are yet!-But you have passions in your heart, -
scorpions; they sleep now-beware how you awaken them! -they will sting you, even
unto death" (574). Radcliffe subtly notes that the virtuous heroine faces the danger of
guilty passion: Emily is "yet" innocent, a precarious state that depends on her continued
exertions. As Emily responds with compassionate tears, Laurentini raves,
We are sisters, then indeed.... [M]y eyes could weep-but now they burn, for
now, my soul is fixed, and fearless! -I lament no more! ... My head burns, I
believe I am not well. O! could I strike from my memory all former scenes-the
figures, that rise up, like furies, to torment me!-I see them, when I sleep, and,
when I am awake, they are still before my eyes! I see them now-now! (575).
These two women are indeed sisters in thei~ emotional likeness. Emily finds an
unaccountable familiarity in this madwoman, a familiarity that Sister Frances both
dismisses and supports: '" You have been interested by the deep melancholy of her
countenance,' said Frances, 'and its impression has probably deluded your imagination;
for I might as reasonably think I perceive a likeness between you and Laurentini'" (578).
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I assert that their likeness is most evident in the medical terms that Cheyne employs and
elaborates, in turn underscoring the difficulty that Emily faces when she must control
herself. The potential for her body to become unruly, irrevocably beyond her control,
looms as a threat more devastating than Montoni could ever present.
As Emily later learns, Laurentini was a victim of her own "ill-governed passion"
(577). After being forced into an approved marriage, Laurentini committed adultery with
the man she loved and, upon discovery, was secreted away by her father in a convent.
The conflicting demands of "love, remorse, and a sense of the duties she had taken upon
herself in [the convent]" rendered her alternately wild and melancholy. Intriguingly,
Emily enacts the same moral struggle with Valancourt. In fact, Radcliffe employs
virtually the same language to describe Emily's predicament, which is "the conflict she
had suffered, between love and the duty she at present owed to her father's sister" (155).
Missing from the above equation is "remorse." Emily is, as Laurentini notes, "innocent of
any great crime" (574). Free from pains of conscience, Emily can experience emotion
without slipping entirely into madness. Laurentini does not serve simply as the bad,
"other" woman,22 but as a person whose emotional disorder seems to coincide with that
of the virtuous heroine. Laurentini' s madness allows Radcliffe to introduce the moral,
medical, and even political consequences of guilty emotion. Like Laurentini, Emily often
"sees" the dead, although Emily's "ghosts" are benevolent and beloved. 23 With no
conscious errors, Emily need not fear the ghostly presence of her parents. After
Laurentini is led away, Emily and Sister Frances discuss Laurentini's condition:
Eugenia Delamotte's argument in The Perils ofthe Night, p. 154
See Terry Castle's "Spectralization of the Other" for further discussion of the ways in which Radcliffe
uses supernatural imagery to evoke nostalgic loyalty.
22

23
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"But how rationally she conversed, at first!" observed Emily, "her ideas followed
each other in perfect order."
"Yes," replied the nun, "this was nothing new; nay I have sometimes known her
argue not only with method, but with acuteness, and then, in a moment, start off
into madness." (575)
Emily is surprised that Laurentini can even converse with clarity and rationality.
Again, like Laurentini, Emily has moments of lucidity-even strong political
statements-but these are often followed by emotional and physical collapse. These two
women both appear on Cheyne's register of nervous disorder: they share the melancholy,
delusory images, fits of anguish, horror and despair that characterize his second stage.
The troubling connection between Emily's emotion and madness finds resolution
in the science of sensibility, which Foucault describes as a medico-moral regime. He
notes that innocence and guilt became the distinguishing features of eighteenth-century
configurations of madness, since the experiences ofthe body and of the nervous system
marked the soul (Madness 157-158). One might be innocent because the nervous system
is beyond one's control; however, one would also be considered "much more guilty,
because everything to which one was attached in the world, the life one had led, the
affections one had had, the passions and the imaginations one had cultivated too

complacently-all combined in the irritation of the nerves, finding there both their
natural effect and their moral punishment" (157). Although Emily might still faint or
even experience temporary suspensions of reason, she will not collapse into permanent
madness because her moral status is never degraded. Instead, she ultimately restrains her
impulses, her desires, and often her body.
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While critics attempt to link Emily's successful self-control with the refined
sensibility that seems to keep her from committing egregious breaches of propriety, it is
more often "sense" that comes to her aid in times of emotional derangement.- The
distinction between sense and sensibility, therefore, is frequently less clear and precise
than critics acknowledge. In medical discourse and in Udolpho the mind and its processes
are often discussed in physical terms (brain, nerves, impressions) that underscore the
connection between mind and body, thought and feeling, reason and emotion. Physicality
is both a problem for Radcliffe to solve and a potential solution, which my examination
of The Italian will explore. Robert Miles hints at the difference in sensibility, but I argue
that the issue of knowledge and the status of the female body are at stake. This abstract
concept "knowledge" has practical implications, particularly in legal discourse, where
knowledge of laws and rights has a profoundly material impact on the heroine's agency
and autonomy.

Gothic Health: The Italian
If The Mysteries ofUdolpho demonstrates the epistemological uncertainty
generated by the pathological body, The Italian demonstrates the fact-based certainty
secured by the healthy individual. As she changes her approach to sensibility through the
figure of Ellena, Radcliffe deploys a rhetoric of natural and legal rights. Robert Miles
asserts that Radcliffe does examine the "discursive resources of sensibility" (179), which
I extend to include a physical capacity for active resistance against injustice. Whereas

Udolpho rejects the "cult" of sensibility and certain medical assumptions about the hyper
sensible body, The Italian focuses on the body's successful sensory perception and
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subsequent assertions of rights. Promptly establishing Ellena's fully functional mind,
Radcliffe reclaims the potential of sensibility through the healthy body. 24 Although the
dangers of sensibility do not disappear in The Italian, they do not seem to be Ellena's
primary challenge. 25 Instead, Ellena must deploy her understanding, which she cultivates
through rational exertion and physical self-control, to resist unjust claims that others
make. As Radcliffe brings the implications of Ellena's production of "facts" into the
juridical spaces of the Inquisitorial trial, she demonstrates that personal and political
agency is possible even in the most oppressive of institutions.
Robert Miles has observed that, in contrast to Radcliffe's earlier novels, The
Italian explicitly critiques abuse of power (180). Patricia Whiting also notes that
Radcliffe's understanding of law and politics clearly informs her works (492). In
Fictions ofLaw: An Investigation ofthe Law in Eighteenth-Century English Fiction, Beth
Swan argues that The Italian "promotes a profound questioning of the legal system and
its ethics," as it "combines the concerns of romance with those of legal realism" (203).
As Swan focuses on Vivaldi's experience with the Inquisition, she notes that certain
practices were uncomfortably close to English law, such as determining prisoners'
understanding and demanding confessions (198-99). Ellena, too, experiences the effects
of legal injustices. Critics such as Miles, Whiting, and Swan represent the critical
conversation that asserts Radcliffe's investment in realistic concerns about power, law,
24 Gary Gautier asserts, "The Italian arguably resolves the contradictory needs pushing for and against
hierarchical power structures by way of its deployment of 'sensibility'" (206). Yet, he focuses primarily on
the cult of sensibility that claimed nobility and refmement were products of a sensitive mind rather than
birth. I concentrate instead on Radcliffe's use of medical concepts from which "sensibility" originated. The
implications of medical sensibility, I argue, influence women's ability to claim self-determination.
2S The problems of sensibility seem, instead, to be displaced onto the hero's body and also explored through
the villains' bodies.
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and injustice. While I agree that Radcliffe exposes women's problematic relationship to
English law, I argue that she raises the stakes of this problem with her depiction of
Ellena's body. Because the physical body processes impressions and stimuli in order to
arrive at complex ideas and knowledge, Radcliffe's construction of the female body has
distinctly political consequences, as I examined in the previous section. The Italian,
however, contrasts the body's ability to generate certainty with positive law's difficulty
in establishing proof. Creating a heroine who is subject to juridical discourse and who
manages her response to illegitimate power, Radcliffe constructs a place for women in a
discourse that often hampered female agency. Ellena's complex interaction with powerful
forces demonstrates the ways in which the embodied mind might create knowledge,
judgment, and even justice without slipping into a solipsistic individualism.
Unlike Emily's introduction, Ellena Rosalba's entry into the text comes through
the perspective of her future lover. This frame shifts The Italian away from the emphasis
on physical and emotional development within the family that guides the beginning of
Udolpho. Ellena is thus constructed as an already-complete subject. The lover's

perspective, however, eroticizes Ellena and focuses attention on the body as love object,
\

rather than the site of subjectivity. Vincentio di Vivaldi encounters Ellena through her
voice, whose "sweetness and fme expression" indicates "sensibility of character" (5).
Vivaldi next assesses Ellena's body: "her figure ... had a distinguished air of delicacy
and grace" (5) Eager to see her veiled face, Vivaldi speculates on the features he would
encounter, and his fantasies are fulfilled in excess. When Ellena's veil is blown aside, he
sees "a countenance more touchingly beautiful than he had dared to image. Her features
were of the Grecian outline, and, though they expressed the tranquility of an elegant
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mind, her dark blue eyes sparkled with intelligence" (6). As Radcliffe circumvents the
potential for Ellena's eroticisation by delaying the presentation of her body, she also
takes pains to emphasize Ellena's mental capacities. The body must be "sensible" or
sensitive in order to generate responses to impressions, but the romantic and erotic gaze
creates a body that is saturated with sexuality. Vivaldi's eager observations therefore do
not--on a narrative level-turn into a concrete description of Ellena's body, and even the
sparse mention of delicacy, grace, and outline quickly turns into a discussion of Ellena's
mind and intelligence.
In the first characterization, Ellena is partially disembodied and, consequently,
appears first as a subject. By privileging the voice over the body, Radcliffe positions
mind over physicality. She repeats the odd use of an alluring voice in Ellena and
Vivaldi's next encounter, when Vivaldi sneaks onto the Rosalba estate and hears Ellena
sighing over him. Significantly, this disembodiment of the heroine suggests a strained
relationship between the physical experience of female emotion and the intellectual
power available primarily to men. Radcliffe's use of the veil throughout The Italian
underscores this problem. In "The Character in the Veil: Imagery of the Surface in the
Gothic Novel," Eve Sedgwick argues that Ellena's veil represents the sexual enticements
and prohibitions of the hidden female form. 26 While the veil can function as a trope of
sexuality, I argue that it also displaces physicality in a way that does not excise the body
entirely from the narrative. Instead, the veil refocuses attention on the agency ofthe mind
that exercises will. Unable to dispense easily with the sensible, knowledge-creating body,
Radcliffe attempts to remove it from the reader's gaze. In so doing, she also creates a
26

See also Elizabeth Broadwell's "The Veil Image in Ann Radcliffe's The Italian."
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mysterious atmosphere, or more specifically, casts mystery on what should be an open
female self by dividing, if only briefly, the subject from that crucial physical body.
The role of the body-particularly the brain and nervous system-in creating the
rational, knowing self is always vexed in Radcliffe's imagination. Easily eroticized and
sexualized, the female body (including the fictional one) does not proclaim intelligence
and knowledge without careful narration. The ill, dysfunctional female body also presents
a perverse threat to the physical brain system's knowledge-producing capacity. When the
body is healthy and fully functional, however, the self has a far more secure position in
relation to others. Because Radcliffe creates a rational, healthy person in Ellena, she does
not have to contend with issues of superstition or credulity, as does Emily, when making
assertions of rights and expositions on justice. Although medical language is not
abandoned in The Italian, the terminology dwindles as Ellena's mental processes
supersede the presentation of her body and as she begins to develop self-assertion
through her vision ofjustice.
Before she turns her attention to abuses of power and the necessity for justice,
Radcliffe establishes the romance between Ellena and Vivaldi, which progresses quickly
under the blessing of Ellena's guardian and aunt, Bianchi. Although Ellena's pride is
wounded when Vivaldi's aristocratic family refuses to bless his attachment to a lower
class woman, Bianchi reproaches her: "This is not a time for fastidious scruples... now
that a solemn truth calls out to us. My dear girl, I will not disguise my feelings; they
assure me I have not long to live. Grant me then the only request I have to make, and my
last hours will be comforted" (38). Bianchi's cool dismissal of what normally would
seem an insurmountable barrier offers Ellena a model of morally upright, yet socially
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improper, behavior. When Bianchi dies, Ellena, like Emily, is left alone in a world none
too hospitable for the single woman. Her plan to enter a convent for a mourning period
leaves Vivaldi uneasy and uncertain about their future together. While preparing to move
out of Bianchi's home, Ellena is kidnapped by order of the Marchesa di Vivaldi, setting
in motion a series of crimes that showcase Ellena's self-assured claims to justice and
personal rights.
Thoughout The Italian, Ellena may exhibit emotional susceptibility when
contemplating Vivaldi's amorous advances or his family'S proud disdain of her, yet
experiences of terror and danger force her to marshal both physical and emotional
strength. When the three masked men break into her home, she runs until they catch her:
"Her breath and her courage were gone, yet she struggled to sustain herself, and
endeavoured to ask with calmness what was their errand" (61). When imprisoned in
various spaces, she seeks escape routes and attempts to discover her location. While not a
feisty brand of courage and resistance, Ellena's response reflects two important
principles: self-control and rationality. As Mary Poovey argues, feminine self-control
characterizes the Proper Lady, as well as provides a means of power, morality, and
determination. Notably, however, Ellena's rationality offers a more significant entrance
into the autonomous individuality that appears heavily masculinized in eighteenth
century discourses. Rejecting the feminized debility that Emily embodies, Radcliffe
offers through Ellena a sensible body and mind that work together to resist oppression.
Part of this argument appears in her depiction of Vivaldi who, like Ellena, must restrain
his passions, emotions, and body in order to function in perilous situations. Vivaldi,
however, encounters more difficulties because he is the more passionate of the two, and
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thus the one more susceptible to false impressions and superstition?7 The romantic hero
often lapses into superstition, making incorrect assumptions and mistaken judgments.
Ellena's judgment, on the other hand, is often impeccable, just as her body-a healthy
organism-is reliable in its sensory perception and its will to knowledge.
As her heroine experiences terrifying ordeals, Radcliffe reworks the cultural
image of female sensitivity and emotionality, representing Ellena as both decorous and
assertive. When she "melted into tears," Ellena appears properly feminine, but "the
weakness however was momentary, and during the rest of the journey she preserved a
strenuous equality of mind" (63). Significantly, the language of this passage presents two
possibilities for female physiology: susceptible nerves and strong mind. 28 As I argued in
the previous section, Emily exemplifies the dangers of the embodied mind; here, Ellena
offers new possibilities for female embodiment. The problem here is maintaining
composure, which is necessary to make moral choices, in the face of superior strength
and the threat of force. Although Radcliffe demonstrates anxiety over the potential
disruption of reason by the body, she establishes the necessity of the body to process
sensory data rationally and to provide a material basis for knowledge. As Richardson
explains in his discussion of "Romantic brain science," the mind's reliance on physical
processes, documented and explored by physiologists, suggested that medical

27 In one memorable instance, however, Vivaldi seems to transcend his physical condition: "The pain of his
wounds was no longer felt; it appeared as if the strength of his intellectual self had subdued the infmnities
of the body, and, perhaps, in these moments of elevation, he could have endured the torture without
shrinking" (108-109). Radcliffe indicates that like Ellena, Vivaldi can overcome bodily sensations with
mental exertions.
28 Interestingly, "equality" implies not only a sociopolitical position but also a necessary physical balance:
like the old humoral system, the new brain science also depended upon balance and proportion.
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interventions could prevent or cure mental deficiencies in ways unimagined before the
seventeenth century. 29
Ellena's powerful declaration of her individual rights appears early in the
narrative, when she is brought before the abbess to choose between an arranged marriage
and monastic vows.
"It is unnecessary," said Ellena, with an air of dignified tranquility, "that I should
withdraw for the purposes of consid~ring and deciding. My resolution is already
taken, and I reject each of the offered alternatives. I will neither condemn myself
to a cloister or to the degradation, with which I am threatened on the other hand.
Having said this, I am prepared to meet whatever suffering you shall inflict upon
me; but be assured, that my own voice never shall sanction the evils to which I
may be subjected, and that the immortal love ofjustice, which fills all my heart,
will sustain my courage no less powerfully than the sense of what is due to my
own character." (84)
Although her body might be subject to forces beyond her control, her will is not. Ellena
refuses to choose injustice or self-abnegation. The crucial conflict represented here and in
Gothic novels generally-between external, oppressive, and uncontrollable forces and
internal, emotional, and controllable resources-is also enacted in the body, according to
eighteenth-century physicians. Robert Whytt explains, "The voluntary motions are such
as proceed from an immediate exertion of the active power of the will. The involuntary
and mix'd motions ... may be aptly enough comprehended under the general

29 He includes certain scientists already mentioned in this study-Thomas Willis, Robert Whytt, and Pierre
Cabanis, for example--as well as such luminaries as Erasmus Darwin, Joseph Priestley, and David Hartley.

...a

69
denomination ofSPONTANTEOUS" (1,5). He further notes, "The power of stimuli in
exciting the muscles of living animals into contraction, is greater than any effort of will"
(14, 18). In other words, the nervous system and its subsequent effect on the muscles of
the body can be controlled by the will, but certain motions are involuntary, including
those in response to outside stimuli. In The Italian, Ellena's body and mind, responding
to external stimuli, are always assumed to be, at least potentially, under the control of her
will. Thus, even though she is not responsible for others' actions, she is always
accountable for her own reactions. In the patriarchal, moral economy of sensibility, the
so-called involuntary actions of the female body, such as fainting, shaking, or weeping,
indicate their inability to control themselves. If women demonstrate their feminine
incapacities through their weak bodies, then Radcliffe overturns this by describing Ellena
as struggling with and triumphing over her body. Ellena, even if sometimes weak,
provides the reader with a new version of sensibility.

As she depicts Ellena's experiences with adversity, Radcliffe brings together
medical and political terminology, asserting that robust women such as Ellena might
consult their personal understanding in order to resist oppression. After the abbess
attempts to force Ellena to submit to the repugnant alternatives mentioned above, Ellena
reflects on her performance:
Her judgment approved of the frankness, with which she had asserted her rights,
and of the firmness, with which she had reproved a woman, who had dared
demand respect from the very victim of her cruelty and oppression. She was the
more satisfied with herself, because she had never, for an instant, forgotten her
own dignity so far, as to degenerate into the vehemence of passion, or to faulter
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with the weakness of fear. Her conviction of the abbess's unworthy character was
too clear to allow Ellena to feel abashed in her presence; for she regarded only the
censure of the good, to which she had ever been tremblingly alive, as she was
obdurately insensible to that of the vicious. (85)
Several terms in this particular passage refer to scientific constructions of the female
body: "passion," "weakness," "tremblingly," and "insensible." To tremble or to be
insensible-both find expression in nerve science. Whytt's work demonstrates that the
"vital principle" of feeling is both involuntary and imperative (1). These terms of
physicality in The Italian, however, are placed within the realm of choice. Instead of
simply responding emotionally and physically to her captors, Ellena exercises judgment
to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate claims to authority. Against medical
formulations of the involuntary physical self, Radcliffe distinguishes Ellena by her
volition and by her active management of her body. Placed in a discourse in which
women are contesting scientific, authoritative defmitions and explanations, such scenes
symbolically disrupt scientific narratives.
Ellena relies on her own judgment to determine others' characters and to ascertain
the legitimacy of their claims. She also refuses to feel the pain of criticism when the
accuser fails to meet her criteria of legitimacy. In significant ways, the heroine's personal
judgment indicates both an assertive individualism and epistemological certainty.
Selectively responding to other people allows the female subject to maintain the positive
aspects of sensibility without succumbing to the indiscriminate acceptance of unjust
accusations, threats, and criticisms. Although as Julie Schaffer explains, the female
Gothic attempts to restore community to an otherwise isolating individualism, Ellena is
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separated from a community and, unlike Emily, has no ghostly father to remember.
Radcliffe thus invokes sociability through the discourse of sensibility, even as she
employs medical terms to establish Ellena's capacity for discrimination and rational
choice. 30 In so doing, Radcliffe proposes a medical subjectivity that does not interfere
with women's juridical status. Ellena's body is "tremblingly alive" without the pathology
of uncommon delicacy, producing knowledge that is not associated with fantasy,
uncontrolled imagination, or madness.
The implications of Ellena's epistemological certainty become clear when she is
imprisoned. Significantly, Radcliffe forms a parallel between the heroine's encounters
with the wicked abbess and Vivaldi's experience with the Inquisition. Ellena recognizes
the power of oaths and words, and she makes every effort to avoid entering a "contract"
that would make her complicit in the injustices foisted on her by villains. When the
abbess requires Ellena to choose either the veil or an arranged marriage, "either of which
would devote her, during life, to misery, and that by her own act," she refuses to choose
(85, my emphasis). Her voice manifests her will. Part of her body's functions yet
curiously intangible, the "voice" stands in for her physical presence. Indeed, the verbal
contract that she so assiduously avoids in this encounter conflates the voice, self, and
legal status. Ellena enters a juridical discourse that makes demands on her body.
Similarly, when Vivaldi is asked to swear to honesty during the trial and to secrecy
afterwards, he hesitates: "Shall I consent to my own condemnation? ..The malice of
demons like these may convert the most innocent circumstances into matter of
accusation, for my destruction" (202). When confronted with the Inquisitor's linguistic
30

See John Mullan's Sentiment and Sociability.
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machinations, Vivaldi recognizes that simple assertions of the truth will avail nothing: "I
will not suffer my assertions to be misrepresented... or my words to be perverted against
myself. I have sworn to speak the truth only; since you believe I violate my oath, and
doubt my direct and simple words, I will speak no more" (203). Both the Inquisitors and
the abbess assert the legitimacy of their power; however, Vivaldi and Ellena reject such
claims based on their individual understanding.
Although Ellena often resists illegitimate authority, one particular accusationthat she seeks elevated status through marriage-causes her "pride of conscious worth" to
buckle. Gary Gautier offers one explanation for this tension: "a defining paradox of
Radcliffe's age, and one which fmds condensed expression in the emerging gothic genre,
concerns the individual body as a set of physiological and subjective registers. Within
\

that field lies the double-pull of self-empowerment and self-abjection" (221). As she
works to determine the appropriate response to Vivaldi's parents, Ellena does feel the
weight of self-abjection, yet she ultimately relies on her body-on the knowledge
generated through her mental processes-in order to arrive at notions ofjustice, which
she uses to resist the spectacle of power deployed by her captors. Her internal debate
takes on political dimensions as she first explores the possibility of renouncing her
attachment to Vivaldi. She articulates her need "to retrieve my own esteem by asserting
my independence" (69). This very individualized sense of personal integrity is
indispensable to Radcliffe's articulation of female identity. Ellena finally decides to
marry Vivaldi without parental consent, although the agents of the Inquisition prevent her
from enacting that decision. That she receives the approbation of Vivaldi's father before
they finally marry does not undermine the power of Ellena's choice. She relies on
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knowledge of inalienable rights to determine when authority has overstepped its bounds,
and in her marriage choice, she rejects unjust claims on her behavior. Only the rational
and healthy-in Enlightenment ideology--can enjoy such discriminatory power.
Radcliffe illustrates that Ellena's healthy individualism remains intact even
though she might experience the physical consequences of intense emotion. When, for
example, Ellena refuses to take monastic vows and then perceives Vivaldi in front of her,
she faints (179). When she attempts to meet Vivaldi secretly, she almost sinks with
emotion and fear. Ellena's anxiety and fatigue threaten her physical ability when she flees
the convent. Twice she exclaims "0 if my strength should fail before I reach it!" (134),
yet she successfully escapes. Imprisoned by Spalatro (under Schedoni's direction), Ellena
surmises that she will be assassinated: "Such sickness of the heart returned with these
convictions, such faintness and terror, that unable to support her trembling frame, she
sunk again upon the mattress" (215). While Ellena's emotions do work on her body,
demonstrating the close connection between the two, Radcliffe turns this connection into
an opportunity for the sensitive woman to exercise control. Instead of wallowing in
luxurious grief, such as when she must leave her home, Ellena occupies her time with
various employments (60). Although Ellena does shed "bitter tears," she quickly dries
them since "other emotions than those of grief possessed her" (69). Furthermore, even
when she does not completely control them, Ellena's physical responses to imminent
death seem completely rational; she operates under correct, logical deductions, as the
narrative suggests.

)

Ellena's healthy body, functional brain, and intelligent judgment do not, of
course, make her infallible. Ellena's belief that Schedoni is her father is an obvious
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example. Predidated on error, her conclusion indicates the reasonable outcome of flawed
premises rather than superstitious belief or wish fulfillment. When Schedoni discovers
the miniature on Ellena's necklace, which she says is the likeness of her father, he
exclaims that she is his daughter and bursts into tears:
Ellena wept to see [Schedoni] weep, till her doubts began to take alarm. Whatever
might be the proofs, that had convinced Schedoni of the relationship between
them, he had not explained these to her, and, however strong was the eloquence of
nature which she witnessed, it was not sufficient to justify an entire confidence in
the assertion he had made, or to allow her to pennit his caresses without
trembling. (237)
Schedoni explains that the miniature she owns is his likeness, and gives her an
expurgated account of his past. Although Ellena's emotions impress upon her the
doubtfulness of her belief, her commitment to evidence and rational knowledge compels
her to accept Schedoni as father until proof to the contrary arises: "Though Ellena
perceived that many circumstances of the relations given by Schedoni, and by Signora
Bianchi, coincided, and that none were contradictory, except that of his death, she could
not yet subdue her amazement at this discovery, or even the doubts which occasionally
recurred to her as to its truth" (241). Some tension exists between competing sources of
knowledge. Ellena needs to trust her judgment, which includes both her emotional
responses as well as the evidence of her senses. Disrupting the common opposition of
emotion and reason, Ellena works through deductive reasoning and physical evidence. In
her struggle to understand what relationship she has to Schedoni, in addition to
Schedoni's moral character, Ellena considers the stories that she has been told, the
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portrait she cames, and the instinctive responses she experiences. Her doubts continue to
surface: "Nay, the very looks of Schedoni himself... renewed the impressions of alarm
and even of dismay, which she had there experienced. At such moments it was scarcely
possible for her to consider him as her parent, and in spite of every late appearance,
strange and unaccountable doubts began to gather on her mind" (250).
Ellena's struggle between different types of evidence illustrates Radcliffe's
critique of positive law. Though Ellena, Radcliffe creates a figure that mediates between
the private, domestic sphere and the public, legal sphere. A typical heroine, Ellena is
thrust out of the home into a world of danger; however, she brings with her the resources
necessary for successful negotiation with menacing powers. Through her healthy mind
and body, Ellena must determine truth and justice in her personal experience, yet her
social interactions make it necessary for her to consider the external objects that help
construct meaning among individuals. In other words, Ellena cannot retreat to a private
world of the mind; instead, she has to reconcile her own understanding with the concrete
realities that surround her. While Ellena relies on her own judgment in order to challenge
injustice, she does not depend only on her intuitive, emotional responses to arrive at truth.
In Schedoni' s case, Ellena tempers her emotions with demands for external proofs. Once
she has those proofs, she attempts to discover their meaning through reason.
Nevertheless, she does not abandon her emotional responses to that evidence. Radcliffe
here begins to introduce a subtle critique of the legal system by examining the
relationship between evidence or proof and personal judgment. Because Ellena's
involuntary revulsion is correct, Radcliffe shows how evidence can be manipulated by
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presentation or interpretation-even as evidence provides the objective proofs so
desirable in the "human science" of law.

The Italian illustrates the ways in which the "facts" of the body generate certainty,
since the body provides internal evidence that depends on perception, cognitive processes
and rational thought. Although it accepts external evidence, the embodied mind does not
fabricate such proofs. In a similar manner, the legal system operates through evidence
and certainty. The repeated emphasis on evidence or proof in the depiction of the
Inquisition sustains a set of assumptions about knowledge and justice. Just as scientific
and legal fields depend on empirical standards to retain their legitimacy, so knowledge
must be externally substantiated. Both protagonists' desire for proof and for evidence
contrasts sharply with Emily's and Valancourt's credulity. Whereas Udolpho
demonstrates the ways in which knowledge and reality can become blurred, The Italian
examines the need for reliable facts in both personal experiences and public institutions.
When imprisoned, Vivaldi asks, "Can I believe that ofwhich I have no proof?" to which
the mysterious monk replies, "Yes, there are cases which do not admit of proof; under
your peculiar circumstances, this is one of them; you can act only upon assertion" (322)
Vivaldi nevertheless remains suspicious and demands substantial proof, determining to
endure punishment rather than hand over someone whose guilt he cannot prove. This is a
proper English response to secret plots and covert trials. Because English law demands
public court proceedings as essential to democratic ideals, representations of clandestine
meetings and private judgments point to a tyrannical society.3l

That the frightening specter ofthe French Revolution influenced Radcliffe's presentation of the
Inquistion is now a critical commonplace. In Robert Miles's Ann Radcliffe: The Great Enchantress, for

31
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Even though proof seems necessary for the legal system to operate justly,
Radcliffe casts doubts on the self-evident nature of those proofs. When Vivaldi shares
the information given to him by his mysterious visitor, he urges the inquisitors to attend
to the report's speculative nature: "what I am going to relate, is a report to which I give
no confidence, and concerning even the probability of which I cannot produce the
smallest proof' (327). At this point, his examiners demand to know the authority on
which he repeated the story. Emphasizing the need for authority when producing
evidence, this scene evokes eighteenth-century legal practice. Alexander Welsh explains
that as circumstantial evidence became more common and accepted in criminal trials, the
need for lawyers to interpret, explain, or refute that evidence became more imperative
(15-17). Although the aphorism "Circumstances cannot lie,,32 indicated the certainty with
which some people viewed this kind of evidence, Welsh explains that "evidence of every
kind has sometimes been faked; and conclusions drawn from the evidence are only
probable... so it is quite possible to err without lying" (17).
Evidence, therefore, is not the ultimate authority; evidence does not speak for
itself. Instead, it is often introduced and supported by personal authority, given credence
through the status of its presenter. Unlike scientific discourse, positive law depends on a
particular brand of authorized evidence. Ultimately, what counts as evidence in (what

example, even the image of a prison in Gothic romances could serve as a veiled response to the Bastille
and, in turn, to the Revolution. Such images, however, were ambiguous: "Representations of profligate
European aristocrats or Inquisitional dungeons could be seen as patriotic British attacks on the lamentable
state ofmanners and society across the channel; or they could be seen as coded assaults on aristocracy and
institutional despotism everywhere" (71). Like many Gothic critics, Miles reminds us that the political
upheaval ofthe 1790s informed not only the symbolic topography ofthe Gothic romance but also readers'
responses to these narratives. See also Women, Revolution, and the Novels ofthe 1790s, edited by Linda
Lang-Peralta.
32 William Paley, The Principles ofMoral and Political Philosophy (1785), quoted in Welsh, p. 16.
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turns out to be) Schedoni's trial, is Father Ansaldo's story ofSchedoni's confession and
the signed confession of the assassin employed by Schedoni, also notarized by a Roman
priest. The vicar-general states: "The dying confession of the assassin is certainly of more
weight than any other evidence" (351). But when Ansaldo cannot attest definitely to
Schedoni's identity, the vicar-general refuses probabilities and presumptions, instead
asserting that immoral character can invalidate evidence. In the space where certainty
seems most imperative, most desirable, most necessary-law-we find a labyrinth of
evidence, interpretation, belief, and assertion, instead of a chain of positivist
identification and knowledge. Although Radcliffe utilizes the frighteningly arbitrary and
exotic Inquisition, she indicates here the ways in which law, as a "master science," can
prove far less reliable than the discourse admits. This openness and uncertainty provide
an ideological point of entry into law for women.
Radcliffe illustrates that law is, after all, a human science, one that demands
proofs and evidence to support hypotheses of guilt and criminality, yet one that relies on
personal character, sentiments, and morality. It is this combination of knowable truth and
unreliable humanity that allows Radcliffe to present her critiques of legal and institutional
injustices without destabilizing the authority of Enlightenment values. Indeed, Radcliffe
quite explicitly denounces those who have the power to reconcile unjust positive laws
with abstract justice. As Vivaldi watches helplessly while Ellena is imprisoned in the
abbey, he berates the Abate who states, "I make it a rule never to encroach upon that
[jurisdiction] of another person" (121). The following exchange illustrates the
responsibility of individuals in authority. More importantly, the scene demonstrates the
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problem of positive law that declares itself legitimate through an endless cycle of self
authorization:
"And can you endure, holy father," said Vivaldi, "to witness a flagrant act of
injustice and not endeavour to counteract it? Not even step forward to rescue the
victim when you perceive the preparation for the sacrifice?"
"I repeat, that I never interfere with the authority of others," replied the Superior;
"having asserted my own, I yielded to them in their sphere, the obedience which I
require in mine."
"Is power then," said Vivaldi, "the infallible test ofjustice? Is it morality to obey
where the command is criminal? The whole world have a claim upon the
fortitude, the active fortitude of those who are placed as you are, between the
alternative of confirming a wrong by your consent, or preventing it by your
resistance. Would that your heart expanded towards that world, reverend father!"
(121).

Ellena's incarceration provokes a significant discussion about the nature ofjustice. As
her body is subjected to coercive measures, she hopes for agents ofjustice to rescue her.
Vivaldi employs the foundational concept ofjustice in his argument against ill-used
power. Radcliffe suggests that positive law can enable morally vapid people to justify
their passivity in the face of wrongs; thus, law can be wrong, immoral, even criminal.
Here and throughout The Italian, Radcliffe shows that positive law can be
manipulated, that the certainty of knowledge is undermined by the need for authority and
personal interpretation, which in tum are subject to the wicked and depraved designs of
some individuals. Thus, she comes full circle to the individual who defines justice for
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herself, even if she seeks outside corroboration for her judgments. This again returns us
to Ellena's emotional and intellectual struggles. When, for example, Ellena contemplates
the obligations of family and the demands of love, she experiences a painful tension
between affective relations and personal integrity: "O! miserable alternative! -that I can
no longer act justly but at the expence of all my future happiness! Justly!

An~

would it

then be just to abandon him who is willing to resign every thing for me?" (69).
Significantly, Ellena frames her dilemma in terms ofjustice, although it takes two
forms-justice to herself and justice to her lover. Ultimately, the narrator concludes,
"love was, after all, the most powerful affection of her heart" (70). As Radcliffe brings
love within the realm ofjustice, she dissolves the boundaries between private and public.
Carol Pateman explains that love, a personal, affective response to particular individuals,
and justice, a public virtue, occupy opposite poles in political economy (20). Radcliffe's
reliance on justice, then, serves as a framework within which she examines women's
personal, embodied experiences.
Critiques of positive law are common in many eighteenth-century works, yet
female Gothic novels, as I will detail in the next chapter, typically examine issues of
justice through the female body. As Radcliffe and other women writers address the
question of where ''justice'' is located, they posit an internally developed sense ofjustice
based in the sensitive, feeling body. This notion, presented in part through Adam Smith's

The Theory ofMoral Sentiments, enables Radcliffe to present her conception ofjustice,
which is based in moral feeling-the heart that expands toward the world-as well as
rational mental activity. The "natural," healthy body, which can feel and think, becomes
the first principle ofjustice. Coupled with internal understanding and external evidence,
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this principle offers a possible cure to the real pathology presented in Radcliffe's novels:
positive law gone awry. Ellena, therefore, becomes a radical figure of health, knowledge,
and morality. She acts appropriately yet assertively, finally enjoying the delights of love
and family-and enacting Radcliffe's vision of public and personal justice.

I
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Chapter Three:
"Written on the Heart": Natural Law and Justice in the Horrid Novels of Eliza
Parsons and Eleanor Sleath
This chapter examines two of the "Horrid" novels mentioned in Jane Austen's
Northanger Abbey: Eliza Parsons' The Castle of Wolfen bach (1793) and Eleanor Sleath's
The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798).1 The two novels are typically compared to Ann
Radcliffe's work, although Wolfenbach was written before Radcliffe reached the height
of her popularity and critical acclaim.2 Like Radcliffe's novels, these texts feature
innocent, virtuous women exposed to frightening circumstances and criminal plots. In
Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine, certain scenes even resemble moments from
Radcliffe's most popular novels, The Mysteries ofUdolpho (1793) and The Italian (1797).
Because of these similarities, critics such as Bette Roberts categorically dismiss these
novels as imperfect imitations of Radcliffe. Roberts explains that Austen regarded the
Horrids "in all likelihood as typical of the very worst of the genre in their blatant
transgression of self-proclaimed moral and aesthetic standards" (90). 3 Roberts levels her

I In Northanger Abbey the naive heroine, Catherine Moreland, develops a taste for Gothic novels through
the guidance of Isabella Thorpe. As they discuss the hair-raising delights of Udolpho, Isabella exclaims,
''Dear creature! ... [W]hen you have finished Udolpho, we will read the Italian together; and I have made
out a list often or twelve more of the same kind for you." Their conversation continues, as Catherine
replies:
"Have you indeed? How glad I am! What are they all?"
"I will read you their names directly; here they are, in my pocketbook. Castle of Wolfenbach,
Clermont, Mysterious Warnings, Necromancer of the Black Forest, Midnight Bell, Orphan of the
Rhine, and Horrid Mysteries. Those will last us some time."
"Yes, pretty well; but are they all horrid, are you sure they are all horrid?"
"Yes, quite sure."
2 Wolfenbach and Orphan are grouped under "Ann Radcliffe and Her Imitators" in the recent microfilm
collection, Gothic Fiction: Rare Printed Works from the Sadleir-Black Collection of Gothic Fiction at the
Alderman Library, University of Virginia, 2003. Exerpts from both novels are also included in the chapter
"Radcliffe and the School of Terror" in the anthology, Gothic Readings: The First Wave 1764-1840.
3 Critics suggest that this list represents several strands of Gothic types, including "Radcliffean terror" and
German horror (Thompson et al. 38). Based on the representative selection, Michael Sadleir concludes that
Austen's choice "was rather deliberate than random" (9).
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objection at the disjunction between the novels' explicit disavowal of sensibility and the
novels' encouragement of readers' emotional participation, which she argues is more
jarring than in Radcliffe's works. Furthermore, these novels transgress realistic
conventions, as the most improbable coincidences and uncharacteristic repentances
extricate the heroines from danger.
Yet Roberts spends little time discussing what the novelistic transgressions might
have meant to their authors and readers. Within their aesthetic transgressions, the authors
deliberately justify the heroine's subjectivity: her lawfulness, directly contrasted with the
lawlessness around her, is upheld and rewarded, even at the expense of narrative artistry.
Radcliffe may have accomplished her happy conclusions with greater facility, but the
startling disjunctions in Parsons' and Sleath's novels allow us to see more clearly the
terrain (from horrors, crime, and vulnerability to justice, marriage, inheritance, and
security) that many women Gothic writers had to traverse in order to create a vision of
justice for women. This vision is a familiar one: the heroine marries a beloved, romantic
hero, and the villains are vanquished. Closely examining the ways in which the authors
construct this denouement, however, yields a more complex picture. I argue that Parsons
and Sleath promote a version of natural law that sometimes subverts the positive laws
that operate (or fail to operate) in the fictional worlds they have created, which oftentimes
reflect the historical realities of eighteenth-century women. Nevertheless, the aulhors also
incorporate positive law in order to usher in a utopian world of feminine empowerment
and economic stability. In their sometimes conflicting uses of natural and positive law,
Parsons and Sleath attempt to make justice their final value and solution.
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Definitions of natural law typically emphasize normative behaviors and rational
knowledge. Lloyd Weinreb explains that "the fundamental assumption of natural law was
that the determinate order of human existence is normative" (97). According to Joseph
Boyle, natural law is "a set of universal prescriptions whose prescriptive force is a
function of the rationality which all human beings share in virtue of their common
humanity" (4). Natural law does not, however, depend on the same model of power that
characterizes positive law. A. P. d'Entreves argues in his discussion of natural law, "Law
does not necessarily require the existence of a superior and an inferior. Law does not only
command.... Actually natural law teaches, according to Locke; according to Grotius it
indicates a particular quality of actions" (d'Entreves 77). Dennis Schmidt notes that the
significant difference between legal positivists and natural law theorists is the issue of
morality: "[P]ositive law theories hold that no element of law preexists an act of the state.
Consequently, the test of the validity of the law is not moral but procedural" (xv). The
moral aspects of natural law are particularly attractive to Gothic novelists, as they depict
an array of ethical "crimes" unpunishable by law. Natural law offers a general plan for
moral living that extends beyond the categories of crime and injury defined by positive
law. John Alleyne, an eighteenth-century lawyer, offers a practical definition of natural
law: "Let man so conduct himself, as to secure his own happiness, without invading the
present, or future happiness of another" (7). Alleyne argues that natural law and natural
justice should govern, for example, positive laws regarding marriage:
This relation [marriage between a widower and his wife's sister] adds to the mass
of human happiness-Nature approves and encourages it-natural law adds its
sanction, and the feeling heart laments the rigour of such positive system as
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forbids the union.... The principles of natural justice seem to be decisive in your
favour-the argument I have used brings conviction to my mind. (12)
Natural law thus provides access to natural justice, assuring a social order based on
mutual happiness and respectful individualism.
The nature and the means ofjustice occupy a central role in Wolfenbach and

Orphan. One peculiar feature of these novels is that the criminals are not subjected to the
court system. Instead of being punished through positive law, the villains typically die
"natural" or self-inflicted deaths,4 or they go into a self-imposed exile. Parsons and Sleath
locate justice in the "heart," a "natural" identification with moral principles and an
emotional commitment to moral actions. They indicate that justice can oC,cur through
feelings. For villainous criminals, such feelings include remorse and guilt, but only at the
novels' conclusions. For virtuous heroines, feelings support their moral understanding, as
the novelists return to the body as a source of moral knowledge. One significant
difference between Radcliffe and these two novelists is their treatment of the female body.
Whereas Radcliffe appears deeply suspicious of medical discourse's articulation of
women's bodies, Parsons and Sleath embrace that construction. Instead of transcending
their bodies, the heroines depend on them to provide guidance for moral behavior.
Sensitivity and reason are foundational aspects of natural law' s efficacy; that is, the
person who follows moral sensation, which leads to moral understanding, will avoid
criminal or unethical behavior. In Wolfenbach and Orphan, moral epistemology

An exception is the death of Paoli, in Orphan. One ofthe male protagonists kills Paoli, a wicked
henchman of the primary villain, when Paoli attacks him on the road. However, this type of conflict occurs
only once in the two novels, and as with other villains, Paoli repents on his deathbed.
4
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establishes the heroines' virtue and supports their assertive claims. The heroine's body
provides a means of agency, even if it also creates problems and tensions in the narrative.
The heroines, so receptive and rational, do not need positive laws to govern their
actions; they govern themselves as they follow the law of nature. Natural law thus
appears in the novels as prior and superior to positive laws. Nevertheless, Parsons and
Sleath also recognize that positive law can enact justice through arrangements of property
and relationships that are secured by the state. The novels end with such legal
transactions as inheritances and marriages. Carefully describing the legal procedures by
which women's property and social identity might be secured, Parsons and Sleath uphold
the necessity and power of positive laws. I argue that throughout the novels there exists a
dialectic between these two forms ofjustice that sometimes results in contradictions, but
which ultimately resolves itself on the heroines' own terms: the world in which they
finally begin to reap rewards appears first to be governed by natural law and also
supported by positive laws.
Although the desire for freedom expressed in the conclusion is appealing to the
modem reader, the novelists articulate their solutions to injustice within a structure that
can turn justice and empowerment into problematic concepts. In States ofInjury Wendy
Brown argues that it is "freedom's relationship to identity-its promise to address a
social injury or marking that is itself constitutive of identity-that yields the paradox in
which the first imaginings of freedom are always constrained by and potentially even
require the very structure of oppression that freedom emerges to oppose" (7). Brown is
troubled by the "attachments to unfreedom" often embedded in emancipatory politics
(xii). She suggests that "a desire for political freedom, a longing to share in power rather
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than be protected from its excesses" will enable individuals "to generate futures together
rather than navigate or survive them" (4). Brown's discussion points to an aspect ofthese
novels (and the female Gothic more generally) that troubles modem critics. Parsons' and
Sleath's heroines desire protection, by a divine lawmaker or through human laws, and the
narratives end with the heroines' survival, rather than with a clearly imagined future of
freedom and shared power. This failing does not indicate, however, a pervasive "victim"
feminism, as Diane Hoeveler claims in her study Gothic Feminism. First, the novels do
end with a vision of shared assets. The heroines enjoy the benefits of property and titles,
which are supplemented by their marriages. Furthermore, because Parsons and Sleath
conceive of positive law in multiple ways-as a source of freedom, a source of
oppression, and even a non-entity-they provide multiple redresses for wrongs. The
heroines need not identify themselves as victims in order to receive justice. 5 Indeed, the
novelists imagine justice that does not depend on external enforcement. In such a world,
the heroines would be free to pursue moral action (in agreement with their natural
understanding) without being terrorized or violated.

The Castle of Wolfenbach
The Castle of Wolfen bach begins with Matilda Weimar's desperate flight from her

uncle on a dark, stormy night. She takes refuge in a seemingly unoccupied castle that is
maintained by a couple of elderly servants. Hearing mysterious noises in one wing of the
castle, Matilda ignores the superstitious warnings of the servants and bravely investigates.
One could argue that the novels cast the heroines as victims of circumstances and wicked men, but the
heroines' claims to moral freedom indicate a measure of self-determination. Particularly in the conclusions,
the female characters do not need to claim legal retribution, which would entail their self-identification as
victims, in order to receive justice-or their inheritances.

5
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In a gloomy, dilapidated suite, she discovers the long-suffering Countess Wolfenbach.
Encouraged by the Countess's kindness and gentle interest, Matilda recounts her history,
which the reader also hears for the first time. We learn that Matilda grew up in the
country, was cared for by servants, and was left quite alone by her uncle. After a yearslong absence, Weimar returned to find that Matilda had matured into a desirable young
woman, and he began to pursue a sexual relationship with her. Much of the novel
involves Matilda's escapes from and encounters with Weimar; however, in a significant
subplot, Countess Wolfenbach escapes from an abusive husband who has imprisoned her
in the castle. The British Critic praises The Castle of Wolfen bach: "Taken as a whole, the
Castle of Wolfenbach is more interesting than the general run of modem novels, the
characters are highly coloured, and the story introduced in a manner that excites curiosity,
and in the language of drama, abounds with interesting, though improbable situations"
(199-200).6
In Wolfenbach Matilda appears to have an instinctual knowledge of the "law of
nature" that is consistent with bonum et aequum-the good and the equitable. 7 Such
moral understanding is a significant part of Matilda's character. Although Parsons
maintains the heroine's "natural" moral knowledge, she supplements it with claims to
legal protection. Parsons explores the vulnerability of the innately virtuous woman and

6 Sadleir, however, asserts of Parsons' novels The Castle ofWolfen bach and The Mysterious Warning,
"These books bear out Professor Oliver Elton's statement that the minor Gothic novelists have no style of
their own but a sort of'group-style,' as though they were writing mechanically to pattern and according to
models approved and consecrated by public favor" (13).
7 This notion comes from the Roman conception of natural law, or ius naturale, which emphasizes the
universal character of "law," as well as its reasonableness. Instead of equating force and command with law,
the Romans (drawing on the Stoic model) viewed natural law as the way to fmd the essence oflaw. Unlike
later natural law theorists (starting with the church fathers of the Middle Ages), the Romans did not view
natural law as a "higher law," to which positive law was subordinate (d'Entreves 23-34).
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indicates that she must develop multiple strategies of resistance when pursued by a
calloused villain. Thus the narrative trajectory is one of education. While Matilda does
!

not learn virtue, she does learn to deploy positive law to her advantage. The heroine
moves through a series of three encounters with Weimar, her guardian and uncle, which
mark her progression as a self-conscious juridical subject, one who refers to both natural
and legal rights in order to resist unjust power. Parsons creates a tension between the
innate understanding of natural law and the process of learning positive laws, which is
ultimately resolved in the conclusion.
In her conversation with the Countess, Matilda reflects on her inability to respond
to her uncle's inappropriate sexual advances: "I began to be extremely uneasy at
freedoms I scarce knew how to repulse" (12). This first articulation of her rights is vague
and intuitive. Indeed, her rights only emerge as Weimar's "freedoms" violate her.
Matilda's rights thus appear to be configured in opposition to "wrongs." In Towards a
Feminist Theory ofthe State, Catherine MacKinnon argues that "the private is the

distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal"
(168). MacKinnon sees the "special protection" ofwomen through positive law as
another means of reducing women to the status of perpetual victim. In Matilda's case, she
has no need to call upon legal or natural rights until she experiences an encroachment on
them. On the one hand, such an example might support the notion that women's rights
are typically constructed within the wrongs of men or positive laws. However, as Lloyd
Weinreb argues, "Rights do not require that they be exercised... [and] the right itself is
not any indication at all that one ought so to act" (''Natural Law and Rights" 282-83).
Furthennore, freedom "reflects only the interpersonal aspect of rights and has to do with
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being free from unjustified constraints imposed by others" (283). Weinreb suggests here
that natural rights do not depend on violation; they have an objective reality within
natural law, which exists beyond a binary opposition. Furthermore, the passive
construction of this freedom suggests that freedom "from" repression has an equally
important role as freedom "to" act. Similarly, Parsons complicates the passive "woman as
victim" equation as the novel progresses, particularly as she constructs Matilda's natural
virtue.
An early discussion of Matilda's "nature" occurs as Matilda recounts her

experiences with her uncle. Weimar presents her with his drawings, which are most likely
pornographic. As she explains to Countess Wolfenbach, "[They] were very beautiful, but
the attitudes and want of decent drapery confused and hurt me, for although I had never
received any particular lessons on delicacy or modesty, yet there is that innate virtuous
principle within us, that shrinks involuntarily from any thing tending to violate that sense
of decency we are all, I believe, born with" (12). In a departure from modem versions of
natural law, Parsons claims that Matilda's ideas of morality are innate. s For Matilda, the
knowledge that her body provides, a sensitivity to morality and justice, is described as
natural and in-born. Countess Wolfenbach comments, "You are truly good and amiable
[and] born with sentiments of virtue... [N]atural understanding pointed out the right path
to happiness" (19). Matilda innately knows and rationally accepts the obligations of
natural law; her body and mind are in a "natural" state that, unlike Hobbes' frightening
"state of nature," provides moral understanding independent of education and
Parsons also conflates delicacy, modesty, and virtue in this passage, which feminizes morality in
interesting ways. For this study, however, I will focus primarily on the "virtuous principle" that Parsons
claims as innate. It is this construction that most illuminates the novel's dependence on ideals of natural
law.

8
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environment. Natural law theory, according to Joseph Boyle, views moral principles as
inherently knowable, "the naturally known principles which are written on the human
heart" (11). Although the application of such principles might involve complex reasoning,
Boyle continues, most people are assumed to be capable of appropriately applying them:
[A] person must be able to evaluate and control his or her emotional responses to
the particularities of the alternatives available if his or her actions are to be
completely in line with what is good. This evaluation and control presupposes that
one possess the relevant moral virtues, namely, the character traits through which
emotional responses are integrated into a morally upright personality. (13-14).
As I explained in the previous chapter, medical discourse identified the brain, nerves, and

senses as the starting point for epistemology. The body experiences sensory impressions
that are processed cognitively, and in turn generate knowledge and ideas.
Although moral epistemology, in early modem conceptions, works much the
same way, Parsons departs from the modem versions of natural law that account for
moral knowledge without depending on innateness. In Ofthe Law ofNature and of

Nations, Samuel Pufendorf(1632-1694) asserts that it is not "necessary to maintain, that
the General Principles of Natural Law, are Innate, or imprinted as it were upon Mens
Minds from their very Birth, in the manner of distinct and actual Propositions; so as to be
readily express'd and utter'd by them" (105). He does not abandon the argument for
innateness altogether. He further explains, "altho' we reject the Notion of those Innate
Propositions, yet the Knowledge of the Law of Nature is truly and really imprinted on
Human Minds by God, as he is the first Mover and Director of them" (Law ofNature
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105).9 This God-given imprint, as Pufendorf explains, is the capacity for reason: "Thus
far most are agreed, that the Law of Nature is to be drawn from Man's Reason" (Law of

Nature 104). Later he mentions, "Therefore when we acknowledge the Law of Nature to
be the Dictate of Right Reason, our Sence [sic] and Meaning is this, that the
Understanding of Man is endued with such a Power, as to be able from the
Contemplation of the Human Condition, to discover a Necessity of living agreeably to
this Law" (105). Pufendorf argues that we acquire ideas of natural law through
experience and reason in the same way that children acquire language. It is clear to
Pufendorf that natural law is not innate because children have no concept of it
(Hochstrasser 86-87).
John Locke agrees with Pufendorf: "[M]oral Principles require Reasoning and
Discourse, and some Exercise of the Mind to discover the Certainty of their Truth. They
lie not open as natural Characters ingraven on the Mind; which, if any such were, they
must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to
every Body" (Essay1.29-30).lO Locke takes pains to argue that, although we might have
inclinations toward certain impressions, no moml ideas or virtues are innate:
Virtue generally approved, not because innate, but because profitable. Hence
naturally flows the great variety of opinions concerning moral rules which are to
be found among men, according to the different sorts of happiness. they have a
Jeffery Stout notes that most versions of natural law depend on a "promulgator" that must be sufficiently
authoritative to "overrid[e] any particular legal or moral code devised by human beings" (73). For Aquinas.,
God promulgates etemallaw; for Enlightenment thinkers, reason supplied the place of quasi-divine
authority; for Kant, "our own self-legislating capacity as rational agents" takes the place of divinity (73).
10 Locke distinguishes innate from acquired ideas and principles by applying the principle of universality:
"universally received without doubt or question" (1.30) "carries its own Light and Evidence with it, and
needs no other Proof' (1.32).
9
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prospect of, or propose to themselves; which could not be if practical principles
were innate, and imprinted in our minds immediately by the hand of God. (Essay
1.32)
However, Locke notes that "sometimes the Mind perceives the Agreement or
Disagreement of two Ideas immediately by themselves, without the Intervention of any
other: And this, I think, we may call intuitive Knowledge. For in this, the Mind is at no
Pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth, as the Eye doth Light, only by
being directed toward it" (2.131). Locke's discussion does not dispense with natural law,
but it does address the problem of knowledge. For Locke, all feelings of certainty depend
on intuition; in turn, even moral knowledge stems from the mind's immediate grasp of
truth. Whether innate or intuitive, Matilda's knowledge stems from cognitive and
perceptual abilities that need no outside influence to direct them. Matilda thus appears to
be a "natural" subject, immediately apprehending moral knowledge and virtuous
principles.
Matilda acts appropriately, even when her "virtuous principle" compels and
justifies an apparently transgressive action-fleeing from her uncle, her legal guardian.
When she overhears him plotting with a servant to enter her room, Matilda is horrified.
Even without a worldly education, she understands that Weimar has transgressed sexual
boundaries by caressing her. She further understands the implications of the plan she
overhears-strangely, since her sexual innocence would imply a complete ignorance of
such transgression. Natural understanding, therefore, supplies the knowledge that Matilda
needs to avoid immoral situations or behavior. She resists Weimar through her choice to
flee, which subsequently puts her in contact with women who educate and empower her.
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Matilda's acquaintance with Countess Wolfenbach sets in motion the education that will
enable Matilda to resist Weimar in new ways. Countess Wolfenbach approves of
Matilda's courage, which has given her strength to leave Weimar. Matilda's bravery also
allows her to reject superstitious fears and to explore the castle. The Countess states,
"your courage ... proceeded from a right principle ... and I hope, my dear Miss Weimar,
you will never want resolution on similar occasions; judge always for yourself, and never
be guided by the opinions of weak minds" (19). Here, the Countess encourages Matilda
in her first moves toward an individualistic reliance on her own understanding. Natural
law theory holds that one can behave morally, even if one's environment-institutions,
cultural practices, community norms---does not conform to moral principles. Thus,
natural law promotes the "independence of moral knowledge" (Boyle 15). The Countess
supports such independence. Matilda's inherent abilities, however, must be supplemented
with education that enables her to understand the ways in which positive law can and
cannot protect her. Innate virtue offers little protection, as Matilda learns from her first
encounter with Weimar, and natural understanding cannot substitute for legal rights, as
the Marquis and Marchioness de Melfort later demonstrate. Although Matilda's
vulnerability exposes certain insufficiencies of natural law, the conclusion indicates that
there can be no other remedy for the deficiencies of positive law except a conversion on
the part of the transgressor and acceptance of the principles of natural law.
While Matilda rests at the Castle of Wolfenbach, the Countess writes her sister,
the Marchioness de Melfort, to make arrangements for Matilda's protection. When the
heroine enters the Countess's bedchamber several nights later and fmds it blood-spattered
and empty, she experiences overwhelming horror and fear both for the Countess's
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apparent death and her own perilous situation. Yet she bravely follows the Countess's
instructions, leaving the castle and traveling to the Countess's sister, the Marchioness de
Melfort, who protects and adopts her. Early in her stay with the Melforts, Matilda notices
her need for social knowledge: "Matilda was in a new world: the polite and sensible
conversation she now enjoyed was so different from every thing of the kind to which she
had been accustomed that she was mortified at her own deficiencies, and most
assiduously endeavoured to profit by the good sense and elegant manners of her
protectoress" (37). The Marchioness in particular serves as a role model for Matilda. I I
Not only is this noblewoman generous, sensitive, and sophisticated; she is also fully
knowledgeable about the laws that most concern her daily life. Likewise, Matilda must
expand her understanding beyond innate moral principles to include legal knowledge.
When the Marquis and Marchioness hear of the Countess's mysterious
disappearance, they discuss their legal options. As the Marchioness tells Matilda, they
had long desired to bring legal action against Count Wolfenbach:
"The whole affair is certainly very strange: often has the Marquis vowed to apply
either to the Count or courts ofjustice; but the letters we received were never
written by her, we could adduce no actual proofs of his guilt, and she continually
warned us to take no steps without her permission. Thus, in a most unaccountable
manner we are prohibited from doing her justice, whilst all the world believes her
dead" (48).

II If, as Roberts suggests, the Melforts are "role models of happy parents and families" (102), then they are
also role models ofjuridical subjects who claim rights.
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By articulating both the need for justice and the means of achieving justice through law,
the Marchioness brings the force of positive law into this private, familial relationship.
Moreover, Parsons reveals a tacit approval of such measures, both here and later in the
novel, as Matilda increasingly demands her rights. Through the Melforts, Matilda learns
the power and necessity, as well as the deficiencies, of law. The Marchioness draws
attention to two elements that enable the law to perform its intended purpose. First,
"actual proofs" or evidence must corroborate suspicions or accusations. Second, the
victim of personal crimes must cooperate with the legal system. Because the Countess
wishes to protect her child, as the reader later learns, she refuses to identify herself as a
victim, choosing imprisonment instead. Because the Melforts can supply neither
prerequisite for legal action, they are unable to assist Countess Wolfenbach. As they all
know, the Countess does suffer through her husband's actions. However, positive law's
basic principles appear to prevent it from enacting justice for the Countess. This muddled
depiction indicates Parsons' conflicted attitude toward positive and natural law. She
shows that neither positive nor natural law condones women's exploitation and
oppression; however, each "type" of law has flaws that allow (if only temporarily) abuses.
Justice is at the heart of Wolfenbach's plot, as Parsons works through various
means of arriving at a satisfactory conclusion to women's persecution. David Hume
argues that justice is a public virtue based on utility and necessity, which would be
unnecessary if people were benevolent and generous enough to care for others without
self-interest (409). After considering extreme states of necessity and lack, Hume asserts,
"[T]he rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and condition, in
which men are placed, and own their origin and existence to that UTILITY, which results
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to the public from their strict and regular observance" (410). Since society typically falls
within the two extremes, Hume concludes, "ideas of property become necessary in all
civil society: Hence justice derives its usefulness to the public: And hence alone arises its
merit and moral obligation" (411).12 Parsons does not imagine a golden age or its savage
counterpart (as does Hume) in which justice is a useless concept; instead, she envisions a
state in which justice operates on an individual level. A personal commitment to natural
law would thus entail doing justice to others and to oneself.
In her second encounter with her uncle, Matilda begins to rely on the language of
justice and rights as she resists Weimar. When he finds the Melforts and Matilda in Paris,
he tells the Marquis that he is not her uncle after all, simply a kind-hearted soul who took
in an abandoned orphan. (Later, he confesses that this was a lie designed to entice
Matilda into marriage.) The Marquis listens to Weimar's explanations and encourages
Matilda to have an interview with Weimar, even though the idea frightens her: "Poor
Matilda dreaded the interview, and the power he might exert over her, yet it was ajustice
due her own character and friends, that she should confront him" (59). In this as in later
passages, Parsons employs rhetoric that places justice on a personal, domestic level. In A

Theory ofMoral Sentiments, Adam Smith notes that "we are said to do injustice to

12 Hwne here defines justice by its utility in society. In particular, he finds that the necessity for justice
depends on material lack and conventions of ownership. Impressions ofjustice, while natural themselves,
are actually impressions of something artificial. Indeed, Hwne believes that man's natural passions will
lead to injustice. One way that Hume introduces the "law of nature" is by insisting that once rules ofjustice
are established, "the sense of morality in the observance of these rules follows naturally, and of itself'
(Treatise ofHuman Nature 533). According to Jonathan Harrison in Hume's Theory ofJustice, Hwne's
utilitarianism does not provide a consistent concept ofjustice: "[Hume] has not articulately formulated a
general utilitarian theory about what makes an action right or what makes it a duty, as opposed to what
makes a personal character trait a virtue" (33). Hume's notions ofjustice generally refer to ''the institution
or system ofrules, of adjudication concerning them, and their enforcement" instead ofto personal virtues
(33).
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ourselves when we appear not to give sufficient attention to any particular object of selfinterest" (425). For Matilda to do justice to herself, she must act in a self-interested
manner. The sense of equity and rights evoked by ''justice'' therefore becomes a
significant part of Matilda's experience here, signaling a new aspect of legal existence.
Instead of remaining a passive victim of others' injustice, the heroine is called to a non
victim status.
As Parsons begins to express Matilda's need for personal justice, she indicates
that women can behave within an ethical framework without sacrificing their sense of
individual rights. According to John Finnis, "practical reasonableness" characterizes
natural law: that is, the freedom to direct one's own actions and to behave responsibly
within a community of other free individuals. Matilda notes that she owes herself and
others justice. This obligation emphasizes the significance of female individuality, which
exists comfortably within a community. Parsons attempts to negotiate the divide between
private and public justice in this scene, as well as in the conclusion. Matilda struggles to
answer Weimar's proposal of marriage because she is horrified by her utter lack of family
connections. Roberts rightly notes that Matilda's response here reflects an older
hierarchy of value, in which noble birth equals moral worth (103). This narrative moment,
however, allows Parsons to construct another kind of community. The Marchioness,
seeing Matilda's dilemma, intervenes by stating, "I have adopted you, I love you as a
child, and will protect you; in me you shall fmd the mother you have lost: fear not
therefore, my dearest Matilda, to decide as your heart and judg~ment shall direct" (62).
The Marchioness creates new "bonds of kinships" that undermine Weimar's guardianship
and claims, and she promotes Matilda's individual decisions. As the Marchioness
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undennines unjust claims through adoption, she also disrupts the aristocratic privilege
and entitlement that, in Gothic novels, generally signals lawless individualism.
After the Marchioness offers her support, Matilda refuses to marry Weimar. She
initially tells him, "I have no right to refuse, nor any way of discharging the obligations I
owe you for the care of my early life, but by the sacrifice of the maturer part of it" (68).
Natural law provides Matilda with notions of obligation, 13 but it does not demand
sacrifice, which is never obligatory and is always voluntary. Referring to the marriage as
a "sacrifice," Matilda implicitly critiques Weimar's proposal, even though she exhibits a
sense of obligation and duty towards him. Yet she later insists that she will become a nun
rather than marry Weimar: "I solemnly declare I never will be your wife" (68).14
Although still concerned about her orphaned status, Matilda refuses a sentimental sense
of duty to Weimar for his early care. The Countess and the Marchioness have encouraged
Matilda's decisions, her natural understanding, and her reliance on reason. In this scene,
their encouragement begins to shape Matilda's responses to Weimar.
When Weimar pursues his claims in another direction, he raises problematic
positive laws: "[Y]ou have no right to dispose of yourself without my pennission; you
were committed to my care, doubtless by your parents; you may one day be reclaimed; I
am answerable for the trust reposed in me, and with me I shall insist upon your remaining
till those to whom you belong appear to claim you" (68). Parsons, an Englishwoman,
imaginatively invokes laws of guardianship and trusts. Although set in France and

An example of this is the "natural" obligation ofa father to provide for his children.
It is clear that the convent would provide a welcome haven for Matilda. However, her romantic feelings
for Count de Bouville indicate that marriage will be the eventual "reward" for the heroine. At this point,
only marriage with the wicked Weimar is repulsive.
13

14
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Germany, the novel creates a rhetorical echo of English law in such moments. IS The
English treatise, The Laws Respecting Women (1777), describes the ages at which a
woman receives various legal rights:
A female at seven years of age may be betrothed or given in marriage; at nine is
entitled to dower; at twelve is at years of maturity, and therefore may consent or
disagree to marriage; and if proved to have sufficient discretion, may bequeath
her personal estate; at fourteen is at years of legal discretion, and may choose a
guardian; at seventeen may be executrix; and at twenty-one may dispose of
herself and her lands. (424-425)
The treatise's author notes that modem women enjoy advantages over ancient Greek and
Roman women, who ''were never looked upon as of age, but were subject to perpetual
guardianship unless they married" (425). Englishwomen "of age," particularly unmarried
women, are thus independent legal subjects. Although Matilda is a minor, Parsons
indicates that Weimar's guardianship is limited, as English law makes clear and as her
readers would have understood.
Interestingly, as Weimar pursues those rights, the Melforts indicate that he acts
inappropriately and unjustly_ The Marquis states, "Without the smallest intent of
contesting your rights, Sir,. _.you certainly have too just a sense ofwhat is owing to
yourself' (69), and then requests that Matilda reside with them for a short time. Parsons'
word play here indicates the exacting nature of law as well as the limits ofjustice through

IS In Sterne, the Moderns, and the Novel, Thomas Keymer discusses a theory of intertextuality which
allows readings that need not be tied to specific allusions, but instead picks up on "a subtextual presence
that, however large in structural impact or pervasive in thematic significance, may never disclose itself with
the solidity of verbal echo" (5). Here, the "verbal echo" of English law seems stronger, although this
reading largely depends on the "structural impact" of legal discourse.
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positive law. Indeed, "too just" becomes unjust. Most significantly, the Melforts show
Matilda how to make gestures to others' legal rights, while maintaining her own
judgment. Immediately afterwards Matilda reflects on her situation: "If Mr Weimar chose
to exert his right over her, she saw no one to whom she could appeal," so she resolves to
herself, "if he persists to-morrow in exerting the authority he claims over me, I will fly to
[the convent] for protection" (70), revealing her self-determined choices and resistance to
claims she will neither recognize nor concede. The law might declare Weimar's
"ownership" of Matilda, but she resists his authority by claiming her right to property in
herself. Through the Melforts, Matilda learns that she might claim such rights-a lesson
that her "innate" virtue makes her capable of learning. The legal and ideological problem
in this scene is the "property in self." Matilda asserts her "self' as inviolable when she
refuses to degrade herself by marrying a man she does not love or respect.
The Melforts further encourage Matilda's resistance by traveling to England
before Weimar can manipulate French law against her. Indeed, their suspicions that he
might use the mysterious lettre de cachet to imprison her prove true; they leave France
immediately before officers come to claim Matilda. Such covert and sinister legal
realities are contrasted with English law, 16 which is earlier praised by the French
romantic hero, Count De Bouville:
"I consider the English as the happiest people under the sun: they are naturally
brave, friendly, and benevolent; they enjoy the blessings of a mild and free

16 Helen Maria Williams details such abuses in her Letters from France. In what she claims is a true story,
Williams poignantly describes a young married couple tom apart by the husband's father. The father uses
the lettres de cachet to imprison his son for years before the young man is able to escape. Williams's gothic
tale seems to be echoed in Matilda's story. In Wolfenbach, the lettres are equally unjust, as Weimar uses it
to attempt to keep Matilda with him against her will.
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government; their personal safety is secured by the laws; no man can be punished
for an imaginary crime, they have fair trials, confront their accusers, can even
object to a partial jury; in short, as far as human judgement can be deemed
infallible" (51).
Parsons explicitly promotes English law as a model of human justice, a patriotic
commitment to the ideals of law. Here the novel presents the best possible outcome for
the lawful subject: integration into a body politic that is healthy, happy, and free. In this
optimistic vision, impartial positive law has an unmatched transparency that creates a
near-perfect system. The implication is that continental law does not encourage such a
political state. The alternative for Parsons-as the conclusion indicates-is a state in
which individual adherence to natural law will result in a non-coercive social order. Yet
she does suggest that positive laws have the potential to facilitate and protect freedoms.
For example, one female character explains to Matilda, "[Weimar] must prove his right to
you before he can take you from us.... [T]he laws will protect you from injury" (95). In
fact, the German Ambassador in England explains that Weimar might be "the natural
protector of the young lady ~ but could not oblige her to marry him-neither could he
prevent her retiring to a convent, though she might be accountable to him for her choice
of [convents]" (100). Even German laws, as presented in this example, allow Matilda the
right of refusal. While the novel never overtly rejects conventional notions of parental
authority, Matilda often hears that Weimar is subject to laws that limit his asserted power.
Indeed, as the Melforts' interactions with Countess Wolfenbach illustrate, positive law
should be deployed when "authority," whether that of guardian or husband, has exceeded
its bounds. The domestic sphere should not be a refuge, an impenetrable haven, for
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criminal activity, and positive laws should protect that sphere. Parsons, however, does not
naively assume that positive law can prevent or rectify all injustices.
Countess Wolfenbach's story clarifies the problematic relationship between
personal and social justice, between the private family and the public legal system. The
Marchioness earlier explains that she and the Countess were subject to a tyrannical father
who arranged marriages for both his daughters. Separated from a beloved but poor suitor
and forced into marriage, the Countess tried to remain emotionally faithful to her husband,
but found him an unfeeling, jealous man. When her former suitor attempted to contact her,
she tried to hide his presence from the Count, even though she had done nothing immoral.
However, the Count discovered and murdered the suitor. The Countess, protesting her
innocence, was spared the Count's murderous rage, but he shut her up in the castle,
circulated stories that she had died, and kidnapped their son. In order to sustain his power
and to ensure her compliance, the Count uses the threat of harm to their son as blackmail.
The Marchioness knows only part of the Countess's story. Even though the
Countess does reveal that her husband murdered a servant and clearly intended to murder
her before she escaped, she hints that she still holds a vow of silence that the "inhuman
monster" extracted from her (79). The Marquis de Melfort exclaims, "I think, my dear
sister,...'tis a justice you owe yourself and friends to institute a process against this
monster," to which the Countess replies, "I shall think of it. .. but I have many
objections" (82). As with Matilda, Parsons makes justice an individual as well as a social
matter. The Countess's case is far more complicated. Although the Count has violated
natural and positive law through murder, the Countess is reluctant to apply to the courts.
The Countess may call her husband "an inhuman monster," yet she hesitates to use legal
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resources to bring him to justice. Her reluctance touches on the problems English women
faced through coverture. According to A Treatise o/Feme Coverts (1732), women still
retain some rights to their person: "And though our Law makes the Woman subject to the
Husband, yet he may not beat her, but she may pray the Peace against him; and he shall
find Surety that he shall neither do nor procure to be done to her, any Bodily Damage,"
although this claim is undermined by the subsequent clause, "otherwise than appertains to
the Office of a Husband, and for lawful Correction" (81). In Wolfenbach, as in many
Gothic novels, crimes against women are made so heinous that no such "lawful
correction" clause can be applied, even as their virtue makes it clear that they are in no
need of correction.
Not only do the Countess's sister and brother-in-law encourage legal action
against her wicked husbands; they also gently criticize her for not pursuing justice
through the courts. They indicate that the Countess owes herself this justice, and that she
will be doing justice to her friends by instituting legal processes against her husband.
Notably, real women did in fact "pray the Peace" against abusive husbands. In a case that
sounds much like a Gothic plot, Anne Gregory "appeared to have been very ill used by
her husband; and to have thereupon fled from him, and come to the defendants [her
mother and uncle] for security and protection." Anne Gregory was "ready to swear, and
actually did swear the peace against him. ,,17 Justice Francis Buller explains that "the wife
is always permitted to swear the peace against her husband," and she may testify against
him should he "attempt to take her away by force after articles of separation" (287).
Although articles of separation had no place in the Anne Gregory case, the Court upheld
17

Rex v. Brooke (Anne Gregory's Case), 98 Eng. Rep. 38 (K.B. 1766).
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her request and "would not order her to be delivered to her husband, as his counsel
demanded: but on the contrary, told her: 'She was at liberty to go where she thought
proper.'" Further, the Court provided a constable or bailiff to "secure her from any insult
in her return to her friends."
As in the fictional case of the Countess, such legal action proved highly
problematic for a number of reasons. One issue is present in Anne Gregory's case. As a
feme covert, she could not plead for herself, as Viner explains: "[I]nfants and feme
coverts ought to find surety by their friends, and not to be bound themselves" (20.107).
The case of Earl Ferrers demonstrates the importance of this restriction. Laws Respecting
Women mentions that two writs of habeas corpus were issued commanding the Earl ''to

bring up the body of his countess"-that is, bring her to court so that she might receive
protection if she chose to swear the peace against him-which he promptly ignored.
Because this husband was a member of the peerage, there was some debate about
whether the King's Bench could enforce such writs. The wife's brother, Sir William
Meredith, "judged it prudent to petition the house of lords for their leave to proceed
against the earl," and with Lord Mansfield's and Lord Hardwicke's support, a resolution
was passed February 7, 1757 and confirmed on June 8, 1757: "[N]o peer or lord of
parliament hath privilege against being compelled by process of the courts of
Westminster-hall, to pay obedience to a writ of Habeas Corpus directed to him" (56).
After the resolution was confirmed, the Earl produced his wife, who subsequently
"exhibited articles of the peace against him" (56). This case illustrates the barriers to
women's ability to swear the peace, as well as the necessity of relatives and friends who
will pursue legal means. The wife's access to the courts was further impeded by her
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husband's rank, which required extraordinary measures to overcome. 18 As a nobleman,
Count Wolfenbach embodies the historical problems that women of rank encountered
when attempting to "swear the peace."
Sarah Chapone in her 1735 treatise The Hardships o/the English Laws in

Relation to Wives offers an important critique \ Chapone makes two primary objections to
the notion that a wife's ability to "swear the peace" safeguards her from a cruel husband.
First, Chapone explains, the husband has the "Power to lock up his Wife, and so prevent
her Complaint" (32). Second, even if a wife was successful in her suit, she would subject
her family to additional hardships. Chapone writes, "[I]t exposes her to the Resentment of
her Husband at his Return Home, without abating his Power, which is so great, that he
may revenge himself a thousand Ways not cognizable by the Law" (32). Further, losing
the husband's income, especially in the merchant and working classes, would subject the
entire family to poverty (32). In Wolfenbach, the Countess has another reason to avoid
the court system: the Count continually threatens to kill their son if she takes any action,
even that of divulging to her family that she still lives. Although the Countess ultimately
has no need to take legal action, the idea that personal redress of grievances should be
pursued through legal means challenges the privacy of abusive domestic arrangements
and gives Matilda a powerful model of individual rights. The Melforts' insistence on
Countess Wolfenbach's taking legal action against her husband teaches Matilda to value
not only sentiment but also justice. Nevertheless Chapone's objections remain significant,
and signal a potential reason for the narrative's ultimate neglect of legal measures.
18 In an unusual case, a Quaker woman, whose faith prohibited her from "swearing" oaths, was thus unable
to "exhibit articles of the peace against her husband," and thus could not be protected by the COurts. 18 The
author notes, "[P]erhaps Mrs. Gumbleton, as she goes in danger of her life, may dispence with the strict
rules of her sect, and may be persuaded to swear likewise" (70).
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The tension between positive law and the abuses of authority embedded in that
law becomes clear as the narrative progresses, especially when the law finally forces
Matilda to return to Weimar. Back in France, in a convent she intends to join, Matilda is
told by the mother superior, "Alas! my dear child, I have received an order from the king
to deliver you to a Mr Weimar, and another gentleman, waiting to receive you" (141).
This disconcerting move emphasizes the uncertain protection that the law provides
women. 19 Yet in this third and last encounter, Matilda takes a noticeably frrmer stance
with regard to her personal rights. Weimer declares himself her "true and natural
protector" and· the one who "placed" her in the convent. Parsons' savvy placement of
argumentS of nature enables her to contrast abuses of natural and positive law. Matilda's
uncle invokes nature in order to solidify his claims on her, yet Matilda refuses to
recognize these identifications:
"It [entering the convent] was my own voluntary choice, Sir, and very distressing
to my friends, that I persisted in choosing a retirement from the world. .. [Y]ou
know my motives for quitting your house, and for the subsequent offer of your
hand, if you really were sincere, I must confess I think circumstances more than
inclination prompted you to it. How you mean to dispose of me, or by what right
you assume to yourself to be master of my destiny, I know not; but of this you
may be assured, no force shall prevail upon me to act contrary to my own
inclinations and judgement; and since I am not your niece, you have no legal
authority over me" (142).
19 Parsons again seems to contrast French tyranny with English law, since Matilda has returned to France.
While the lettres de cachet are a specifically French abuse, the vulnerability of women to unjust positive
laws seems most important in this scene. The legality of Weimar's claim rests on his. authority as male
guardian, an authority to which English women could well relate.
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In an exciting display of rhetorical resistance, Matilda raises several key points. First, she
notes that her decision to enter the convent was entirely her own, without Weimar's
involvement. Although her choices are obviously limited, Matilda insists on her right to
select her residence and refuses to allow Weimar to take credit for the decision. Also, in
rejecting Weimar's marriage proposal yet again, she bluntly exposes his improper
motivation. Finally, Matilda denounces Weimar's authority through explicitly legal
references. Depending on law and on personal judgment, Matilda asserts her right as
"master" of her own destiny. She presses Weimar to exert his power illegitimately,
thereby showing that force characterizes their relationship.
Indeed, only by sheer force is Weimar able to conduct his schemes, as he refuses
to let her contact the Melforts and states, "I will not part with you, but where I propose
carrying you, shall be entire master of your destiny.... You are now safe in my
possession... I'm sorry you made force necessary" (143). Although he previously
denied their family relationship, Weimar still retains a semblance of patriarchal power.
Zomchick explains that "the family looks back to a pre-social history in which
associations were imagined to be natural, mutual, and reasonable. The recuperations of
masculine authority that succeed the originary moment are suspended if not cancelled"
(14-15). In other words, the family is a "natural" space in'\.Vhich masculine authority has
no need to reveal itself through force. At this point, however, Matilda has internalized the
juridical discourse that allows her to assert natural and legal rights, which puts Weimar in
the position of exposing his manipulative appeals to familial obligation. Because Matilda
resists Weimar's claims on her person and affections, Weimar must use force to restore
his lost authority. By physically removing Matilda from her new friends, Weimar reveals
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the coercion upon which his authority is based. For it is not "natural" affection and
"natural" authority that govern their relationship, but a system of manipulation and
physical controls that is unmasked only when Matilda refuses to participate voluntarily.
As they sail from England, Matilda and Weimar initially appear threatened by a
band of Turks or Barbary Corsairs who capture their ship. In desperation, Weimar stabs
both Matilda and himself, although neither fatally. The pirates, however, tum out to be
generous and protective toward Matilda, who explains that Weimar kidnapped her.
Weimar, believing that he is about to die, makes a full confession on the boat in the
captain's presence. In this scene, Weimar demonstrates the conviction of wrongdoing that
enables the law of nature to guide human action. He acknowledges his villainy without
being subjected to the sanctions, the force, or the commands of positive law. This is a
significant return to the issue of innate knowledge and moral epistemology. Matilda, at
the beginning of the novel, is depicted as innately virtuous, but there appears to be no
corresponding "innateness" in the wicked Weimar and Count Wolfenbach. Instead, these
two men demonstrate a self-interest that leads them to greed and crime. While Parsons
leaves this problem unsolved, natural law theory does address the issue of "moral
diversity and disagreement" (Boyle 18). First, human reasoning is fallible. Also, complex
moral problems can generate a number of potential solutions that, in tum, people might
disagree over. Finally, diverse cultural and social contexts results in varying applications
of moral principles (Boyle 19). Boyle argues, however, that natural law's dependence on
moral knowledge is not undennined by moral diversity and disagreements. Furthennore,
simply knowing moral principles does not mean that one will obey them, a weighty
matter that touches on free will, detenninism, and human nature. The novel indicates that
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Weimar's feelings of guilt and remorse are natural, that they are the logical consequence
of criminal or immoral behavior. His effusions of sorrow and remorse stem from an
internal sense of blame. Although Parsons does not explore the means by which Weimar
corrupts his innate sense of virtue, it is certainly clear from Weimar's actions that innate
does not mean compulsory. Only in the conclusion does the villain exhibit an obligation
to obey the law of nature and finally learns to act morally.
Parsons does not neglect the role of positive law in this scene of repentance.
Weimar stops his story to say, "Before I proceed any further, ...'tis fit an instrument
should be drawn and signed by me and proper witnesses, proving that I acknowledge
Matilda to be the only child and heiress to the late Count Berniti' s estates, which I have
unjustly withheld" (147). At this point, Weimar confesses that he lied about his
relationship to Matida; he is indeed her uncle, her father's brother. The return to blood
ties establishes inheritance, which in turn satisfies Matilda's need to be the social equal of
her beloved. Recovering from the nearly successful suicide attempt, Weimar voluntarily
exiles himself to a strict monastery. Blackstone would call this a "civil death": "The civil
death commences if any man be banished the realm by the process of the common law, or
enters into religion; that is, goes into a monastery, and becomes there a monk professed:
in which cases he is absolutely dead in law, and his next heir shall have his estate" (I:
128). Weimar's act serves a dual purpose: it fulfills the debt of death that he owes society
for murdering Matilda's father (his elder brother) and for kidnapping Matilda as an infant,
and it releases his property to the rightful heirs. 2o

20 This scene seems to anticipate The Italian. In both novels, the heroine's family is Neopolitan; the
younger brother murders the elder; and the heroine is nearly killed by her uncle. Parsons' novel, however,
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Countess Wolfenbach also receives justice at the end of the novel. Count
Wolfenbach's death, brought on by a life of dissolution and profligacy, becomes a
judgment of "nature" in the Countess's case. Illness thus works as a natural agent of
justice in the conclusion. Death or exile may provide natural and providential retribution
for the crimes; however, only legal confession will restore these women to full possession
of their property rights, and Parsons is meticulous in describing the procedure for such
restitution, thus underscoring the importance of legal claims. On his deathbed, Count
Wolfenbach tells the Marquis, "I sent for you, my Lord, not only to hear my confession,
but to direct me in what manner I must do my wife justice" (138). This justice involves
drawing up papers that confess his crimes and secure the estates in her name; it also
involves making those papers legal through the signature of government officials.
Matilda also receives legal documents to support her claims to title and estates, as noted
earlier. Importantly, Parsons interrupts emotional deathbed confessions with clear
directions for lawful restoration of property. She indicates that although the law of nature
'1.eaches" people that crime demands remorse and repentance, positive laws protect social
arrangements such as inheritance and property ownership. The ending moves beyond
affective responses (guilt, repentance, forgiveness) into legal procedures. The relationship
between natural and positive law appears incongruous at fIrst blush, but gains coherence
under the general principle ofjustice. Matilda and Countess Wolfenbach are protected
from further violation with the persecutors' deaths, and their property is returned to them

graphically depicts the uncle as both a sexual and physical threat to the heroine. As a result, the function of
law becomes even more significant. Justice for such violent acts, she indicates, can be served by self
punishment as well as by legally restoring property.
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through legal procedures. Both forms ofjustice serve to empower and liberate women
who have been vulnerable through much of the narrative.
In The Castle ofWolfonbach, we find tentative moves to empower women with
legal discourse, including,the "natural" understanding of moral action and the acquired
knowledge of legal rights. Parsons particularly explores women's need for positive laws
to maintain their natural rights. In The History of Women (1779), William Alexander

argues,
Such privileges and immunities as the French and Italian women derive from the
influence of politeness, the British derive from the laws of their country. Flowing
in this channel, though they are perhaps accompanied with less softness and
indulgence, they have the advantage of being established on a firmer foundation;
and being dictated by equity and humanity, are less liable to be altered and
infringed, than ifthey depended on the whim and caprice which influences
gallantry and politeness. (313)
Alexander argues that social custom, such as "politeness," requires continual indulgences
to remain effective props of privilege. Positive laws, on the other hand, have a
disinterested firmness that depends on justice. What Alexander polarizes, however,
Parsons unites. She shows that the moral knowledge of natural law (the determinate order
of humanity) can enable people to act equitably without the force ofpositive law, even
while positive law remains an integral part of the social order. Parsons ultimately presents
a picture ofjustice that is natural and divine, as well as legal and social: while the
criminals in this story are punished outside the court system, the women recover their
property and social identities through positive law. In her fairy-tale conclusion, Parsons
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subsumes the tension between legal positivism and natural law theory under an imagined
justice that supports, protects, and rewards virtuous women.

The Orphan of the Rhine
In The Orphan ofthe Rhine (1798), Eleanor Sleath develops a vision ofjustice
that supports-or even exists through-the Gothic female subject. This novel is unusual
in its proliferation of plots, all of which intersect at various points in the narrative. In fact,

Orphan does not focus on its primary heroine, Laurette, until the middle of the second
volume. Sleath incorporates several stories, including that of Julie de Rubigne, another
beleaguered heroine who takes in and mothers the orphaned Laurette. The elaborate and
interconnected narratives add complexity and depth to the female heroine plot that
Radcliffe creates in The Mysteries ofUdolpho. Even The Italian does not layer stories in
such profusion. 21 E. J. Clery argues that the female Gothic's "bizarre coincidences"
illustrate "a higher supernaturalism that ensures every 'accident' has its rightful place in
the schema of Divine Justice" (Rise 112). She explains that the final explanations "reveal
the world to be a transparent medium of divinity; material existence is suffused by
religion" (113). What Clery does not address is why women in particular would desire
such divinity and would depend on a series of coincidences in order to create justice in
their narratives. Only by examining women's relationship to law-both positive and
natural--does their reliance on religion and Providence become understandable. David

introduction to the 1968 reprint of The Orphan ofthe Rhine, Devendra Varma states, "Although
[Sleath] cannot claim the same degree of fme and feminine skill which Mrs Radcliffe displayed, there is
still something subtle in her art of character-drawing and some polish in her style" (ix). Vanna notes that
The Critical Review (November 1799) "condemned [Orphan] as 'a vapid and servile imitation' of 'the
creative genius and the descriptive powers of Mrs Radcliffe, '" a conclusion with which he disagrees (x).
211n his
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Rume argues that property laws and customs ultimately facilitate ''the interest and
happiness of human society. Where this enters not into consideration, nothing can appear
more whimsical, unnatural, and even superstitious, than all or most of the laws ofjustice
and of property" (416). I argue that Orphan's conclusion attempts to envision a social
order that does indeed facilitate "happiness"-tbat is, the moral feelings and emotional
rewards of active virtue. Sleath locates justice outside the codified rules of society, even
as she maintains the need for positive laws to define social relationships and to defend
property ownership.
As Julie de Rubigne and the "orphan" Laurette sensitively obey the moral
obligations of natural law, the villains operate unchecked by conscience or punishment.
Unlike Parsons, however, Sleath rarely refers to positive laws that might limit the
villains' power. In Orphan, legal mechanisms of the state are largely absent. Whereas
Matilda finally learns to assert her legal rights in her discussions with Weimar, Julie de
Rubigne and Laurette, the heroines of Orphan, do not make similar claims. Julie and
Laurette make appeals to heaven as the fmal arbiter in the crimes against them, and the
villains eventually suffer for their wickedness. 22 The novel ultimately validates the
heroines' faith and virtue with a conclusion that punishes their adversaries and provides
restitution. By ignoring positive laws throughout most of the novel, Sleath is able to
imagine justice that punishes all sorts of "secret villainies," not only breaches of positive
law. Sleath's use of natural law, however, is complicated. Although the best means of
ensuring women's rights appears to be a universal commitment to principles of natural
Laura Hinton's article "The Heroine's Subjection: Clarissa, Sadomasochism, and Natural Law" addresses
similar issues. She convincingly argues that Clarissa uses natural law to defend her rights. My approach
differs from hers-not only by examining different novels but also by focusing on the various critiques of
natural and positive law presented in the texts.

22
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law, she does not create a world in which only natural law operates. Sleath, like Parsons,
turns to positive law as she creates a happy ending for her heroines, particularly as she

introduces documents that will enable Julie and Laurette to claim property. In the final
scenes, she introduces the state and its laws to uphold the villains' emotional return to
morality. Although her final solution appears hackneyed and trite to the modem readerand perhaps to the original reader as well-it is in fact a complex response to the
contradictions of legal discourse.
The heroine of The Orphan ofthe Rhine is ostensibly Laurette, yet the novel
devotes much space to the story of Julie de Rubigne, also referred to throughout the novel
as Madame Chamont, who takes in Laurette as an infant at the Marchese de Montferrat's
insistence. Once Laurette's early history is established, Julie's tale is provided in several
chapters. An orphan herself, Julie is placed under the care of her heartless, ambitious
aunt after her parents die. Although Julie's mother had cautioned her not to marry outside
her Catholic faith, the a~t insists on Julie's marrying a wealthy, Protestant suitor.23 As
her protests go unheeded and as her suitor becomes frighteningly aggressive, Julie
escapes by marrying the Marchese de Montferrat. Eventually, the Marchese repudiates
their clandestine marriage and abandons her with their son Enrico, only providing a small
sum for their quiet, country life. Julie, like many Gothic,. heroines, is sensitive yet
restrained: "She had endeavoured to reconcile herself to her misfortunes, and to check, as
much as in her power, the natural sensibility of her disposition, which she was convinced
was too acute to admit of lasting comfort" (11). Later, Julie teaches Laurette to reject
Unlike many Gothic novelists, Sleath does not evoke wicked intrigues through her use of Catholicism.
Varma observes that Sleath's Catholicism reveals "a contemplative tum of mind and a high sense of
religion" and that Sleath's novels "suggest that, to her, peace could be felt only in the solitude ofa cloister,
in holy retirement" (ix).
23
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sensibility. Julie shapes Laurette's mind, emotions, and understanding, as well as
monitors Laurette's reading habits. In one passage, sensibility is described as passive,
debilitating, and undesirable: "[Julie] discountenanced in her young pupil that unlimited
indulgence, in the passive feelings of sensibility, which inevitably unfits the mind for any
undertaking that requires firm and vigorous exertion; she knew that, when deeply
affected by tales of imaginary woe, the mind too often sinks into imbecility" (147). The
result of such mental incapacity would be a lack of "active benevolence" that could
provide relief for real problems (147)?4
Sleath struggles with the issue of passivity throughout the novel. Julie and
Laurette reject the bodily sensations and mental imbecility of sensibility; however, their
bodies provide the foundation for moral understanding. Sleath's most explicit statement
about innate morality comes in the conclusion, when she states, "[The Marchese's] love
of virtue, of which it was evident he possessed no larger a portion than what is
inseparable from, and inherent in, our natures, was ... weakened by a long course of
debauchery and immorality" (237). Sleath depends on innateness to make her argument
for the universality of natural law, yet she notes here that understanding of virtue and
natural law can be corrupted or strengthened through education and reason. Merely
hinting at the interplay between innate understanding and the acquisition of moral
knowledge, Sleath turns her attention to the effects of maintaining or corrupting that

Published after Udolpho and The Italian, this novel clearly relies on the same suspicion and critique of
sensibility present in Radcliffe's novels. However, Sleath's emphasis on religion, in contrast to Radcliffe's
vague, protestant deism, is offered as a substitute for sensibility. While Sleath also advocates reason against
unrestrained emotion, she places much value on religious faith. She therefore promotes the Providential
purpose that, in her view, underlies the law ofnature.

24
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virtue. In the characterization of Julie and Laurette, the author demonstrates that exertion
and activity must shore up inherent virtue.
Reason becomes a significant element of this mental exertion toward virtue. Like
her foster mother, Laurette, the true orphan of the Rhine, is sensitive and emotional, as
well as intelligent and rational. Her body and mind correspond in "intelligent looks"
(124), and although she is not a "perfect beauty," the "peculiar elegance of her mind,
which her amiable monitress had refined and cultivated with unceasing attention, was
finely portrayed in her features, which were soft, pensive, and interesting" (123). Indeed,
Laurette guards "against that intellectual weakness, which is sometimes dignified with
the name of sensibility" and exercises "an undiminished fortitude" instead (145). Her
romance with Enrico, whose military profession enforces long separations, particularly
demonstrates her struggle to control her emotional responses. Bette Roberts' argument
that the "Horrid" women are static characters is nowhere more evident than in Laurette,
who remains effortlessly good as she continues to follow her understanding of morality.
Unlike Matilda, Laurette does not learn about her legal rights, nor does she become
progressively more assertive. This stasis allows Sleath to explore women's relationship to
natural law, particularly their vulnerability in the face of danger.
Before she introduces Gothic terrors, Sleath develops the emotional spirituality
that ultimately supports her heroines in their most perilous states. For example, as Julie
matures, the "warmth of her affection led her to indulge in that glow of religious
enthusiasm, which elevates the soul beyond every earthly pursuit, and renders it
susceptible of the most worthy impressions" (11). The impressionist discourse here
overlaps natural law theory's account of moral epistemology. Religion also provides
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Sleath with access to an older version of natural law articulated by Thomas Aquinas.
Aquinas illustrates the relationship between natural law and religion, between reason and
revelation, between philosophy and theology. In Summa The%gica, he states,
[O]f all others, rational creatures are subject to divine Providence in a very special
way; being themselves made participators in Providence itself, in that they control
their own actions and the actions of others. So they have a share in the divine
reason itself, deriving therefrom a natural inclination to such actions and ends as
are fitting. This participation in the Etemallaw by rational creatures is called the
Natural law. (qtd. in d'Entreves 43)
As rational and moral creatures, the heroines consistently exhibit just such a "natural
inclination" to appropriate behavior and purpose. Although Aquinas's version of natural
law was largely displaced by Grotius's, considerations of religion in natural law theory
lingered into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 25 In Samuel Pufendorf's
discussions, a divine force (God, Providence, Creator) sets forth rules to which humans
respond; thus, Pufendorf explains, religion is "the utmost and firmest bond of Humane
Society" (60). Without belief in a "divine power," only the threat of death can deter the
malicious, the wicked, and the criminal, although once they shake off that fear, nothing
can sway them from the path of destructive actions. And should that wicked person be in
a position of power, Pufendorf explains, "he may easily persuade himself that his

25 Starting with Grotius (1583-1645), natural law took on a more rationalist character, in which the law of
nature was knowable and obligatory without God's direct intervention. Pufendorfhere is explicit about the
role of religion and God in natural law. Hochstrasser, however, asserts, "Pufendorfs locating of natural law
in the social instincts and calculations of the individual left little role for religion at all in human life" (71).
Nevertheless, even if the logical extension of his philosophy makes God irrelevant, it is clear that, to
Pufendorf, religion played a necessary part.
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enterprise is just" (62). Positive law, with its emphasis on external, observable actions,
cannot easily manage such evildoers: "for the proceedings in humane Courts of
Judicature being govern'd by Proofs of Matter of Fact all those Wickednesses and

Villanies which could be secretly acted and without Witnesses, if any thing were to be
gained by them, would be accounted Dexterities of Wit" (62).
Pufendorf concludes that "without Religion there will be no Conscience, it would
not be easie to discover such secret Villanies; they being such as mostly are brought to
light by the incessant prickings of the Conscience and internal horrors breaking forth
into outward Indications" (64). Here we see the ways in which feelings and emotion
create a normative order, in which immoral actions are punished internally. Natural law
places much emphasis on the individual, on personal judgment and on self-government.
Indeed, such internal control is the most significant aspect of natural law. According to
Pufendorf, positive law is limited by its reliance on objective standards of evidence, a
point illustrated in Wolfenbach when the Melforts cannot prosecute the Count because
they have no proofs. Although Orphan does not represent the limitations of positive law's
empirical demands, the novel clearly demonstrates the power of conscience. Particularly
in the conclusion, the "internal horrors" of feeling are solely responsible for the villains'
confessions, which in tum enable positive law to restore the heroines' property.
Although Sleath's vision of natural law is closely tied to religion, she does not
ignore the importance of reason, which enables people to construct social institutions that
will protect and enforce natural rights. In keeping with Pufendorf's and Locke's
discussions ofthe law of nature, Blackstone explains that reason offers the best means to
uphold the ultimate goal of natural law: human happiness. According to Blackstone,
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reason is God's primary gift to mankind, enabling individuals to create laws that will
protect man's ability ''to pursue his own true and substantial happiness" (1: 40). Because
human reason is not "clear and perfect, unruffled by passions, unclouded by prejudice,
unimpaired by disease of intemperance," natural law cannot be the sole guide for human
behavior (1: 41). Blackstone's emphasis on reason and his critique of emotion offer a
rationale for positive law. While he pays little attention to natural law beyond a cursory
introduction, Blackstone at least gestures to the law of nature as he begins his
monumental Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland. As Rommen argues, "Whoever was
desirous of representing something as good and worth while had now to make of it a
requirement of the natural law, and to show that it is a conclusion of reason and that it
existed in the state of nature" (107). Sleath enters the discourse by depicting women's
rational, cognitive abilities as well as their religious feelings. The combination of reason
and emotion produces an active female subject who does not just accept impressions
passively.
When their domestic sphere is disrupted by the Marchese, Julie and Laurette
exhibit a continued commitment to appropriate emotion and rational self-control. In a
thrilling scene, Julie is kidnapped by the Marchese's accomplices as she attempts to assist
La Roque, a man who was persecuted and then imprisoned by the Marchese. Misled by
the Marchese's servant, Paoli, Laurette believes that Julie has been kidnapped by banditti.
She suspects that Paoli might be involved in the crime, but she does not dwell at length
on that possibility. When the Marchese de Montferrat moves her to another home,
Laurette "endeavoured to reconcile herself to a destiny which, from the unlimited power
which the Marchese possessed over her, she considered as unavoidable" (149). Later,
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Laurette prepares to meet calamity, and "by opposing the most vigorous efforts of her
fortitude, to endure what could not be remedied, and to gain at least, by her most
strenuous endeavours, the applause of her own heart" (220). Although Laurette is clearly
sensitive, and some might argue, a woman of sensibility, Sleath avoids the weakness that
sensibility connotes through Laurette's calm responses to unpleasant or even dangerous
situations. Because Laurette's reason is "unimpaired by the disease of intemperance"
(Blackstone I: 41), she retains an unhampered relationship to the law of nature. Sleath,
however, waits until the end of the narrative to vindicate her heroine. At the midpoint of
the novel, Laurette suffers anxiety and fear, even if she is not entirely overcome by terror.
Indeed, she is threatened by villains who make "the state of nature" their justification for
criminal acts. Laurette's faith in the underlying purpose and order of natural law contrasts
with the villains' belief in a world governed by self-preservation and self-interest.
In Orphan self-preservation is ultimately responsible for the violent assertions of
men over women, the rights of the powerful against the rights of the weak. The wicked
Paoli, for example, espouses the law of self-preservation. Intriguingly, he seems to be a
"natural" villain, "a wretch, whose mind, as well as aspect, indicated him a villain,
marked and selected by Nature for the accomplishment of the most daring and bloody
purposes" (263). Whether Paoli corrupted any initial virtue or has been destined for evil
acts, his argument for self-interest raises a significant issue. When Laurette rejects the
Marchese's amorous advances and marital designs, Paoli advises him to act with decisive
fmality:
"Do you cease to remember, my Lord, that self-preservation is one of the first
laws of Nature, that it is wisely interwoven with our existence for reasons too

......

r
123
forcibly to be rejected, and becomes the master-spring of all our actions? If a
venomous insect assaults us, do we not annihilate it? Who, but a maniac, would
feel the sting of a serpent, and not endeavour to release himself from its grasp? 
Would anyone, not divested of reason, endanger his own life by listening to the
plea of humanity?" (253-54).
The rhetorical appeals to nature, reason, and humanity, all part of natural law, have a
logical consistency that is persuasive and seductive. 26 In fact, most modern versions of
natural law, as well as social contracts, included a discussion of self-preservation,
although most thinkers tempered this notion with theories of mutual interest or sociability.
Grotius's principle of sociability offered one way to explain the obligations ofjustice.
Ernst Bloch explains Grotius' s basic argument: "Injustice is that which conflicts with an
ordered community of individual rational beings, and all that does not come under the
rubric of injustice is just. ...Justice is all that belongs to the natural instinct of
sociability" (49).
In Pufendorf's discussions of natural law, self-preservation is the foundation of
human nature:
[Man] accounts nothing dearer than Himself, that he studies all manner of ways
his own Preservation and that he endeavours to procure to himself such things as
seem good for him, and to avoid and keep offthose that are mischievous. And this

26 Intriguingly, this scene is reminiscent of The Italian when Schedoni tempts Vivaldi's mother with legal
convolutions and rationalizations in order to justify Ellena's assassination.
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desire of SelfPreservation regularly is so strong, that all our other Appetites and

Passions give way to it. (38i 7
In the later Enlightenment, this notion lingered. Blackstone, changing the tenn slightly to
indicate a more immediate threat to one's person, notes, "Self-defence therefore, as it is
justly called the primary law of nature, ... [cannot] be in fact, taken away by the law of
society" (11104). Adam Smith notes, "Every man, is no doubt, by nature first, and
principally recommended to his own care ... Every man, therefore, is much more deeply
interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what concerns any other
man" (181). Although Pufendorf, Blackstone, and Smith would no doubt be repelled by
the manipulation of this principle demonstrated by Paoli, it is nonetheless significant that
Sleath would refer specifically to "natural" principles here. For Sleath, the law of nature
does not become a state of nature-that is, a Hobbesian vision of savage lawlessness.
However, she recognizes the power of Hobbes' theory.
She indicates that the villains see the world as a Hobbesian "state of nature," in
which self-preservation justifies any action. In Leviathan (1651), Hobbes writes,
The right of nature, which writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the liberty each
man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own
nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which,
in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means
thereunto. (64)

27 Hochstrasser argues that, according to Pufendorf, concern for self-preservation is not incompatible with
Grotius' sociability thesis (63).
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Hobbes, unlike Pufendorf, finds in this principle an explanation for the "condition of
Man...which is a condition of War" (64). Hobbes qualifies this "right" of nature by
discussing laws of nature that bind the individual to others. As people transfer their right
to preserve their lives by any means necessary to the state, they secure mutual peace and
security. He states that "the first, and Fundamental Law of Nature [is] to seek Peace, and

follow if' (64). The second law of nature and social contract is "that a man be willing,
when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it
necessary, to lay down this right to all things" (64). For Hobbes, the state protects people
from the savage rule of "jus naturale." However, Pufendorf's 1672 treatise On the Law of

Nature and ofNations argues that the state's positive laws cannot prevent or punish many
"secret villainies" and that only an individual's commitment to the law of nature (as they
conceive it) can lead to active virtue and prevent injustices. Sarah Chapone taps into this
conflict as she criticizes English laws:
For since we seem to be hastening into a State of Nature, in which there can be no
Appeal but to the Laws of our Country, and the Authority of Scripture is going
down, which directs a Man to erect a private Court of Equity in his own Breast,
what shall restrain the Strong from oppressing the Weak, if the Laws of our
Country do not, they being in such a State the only established Rules of Society?
(3)

Chapone sees no redeeming features in the Hobbesian explanation of "nature," which
results in legal positivism and leaves women with no appeals to a higher law or to
religion. Sleath, as well, finds positivism troubling. She looks to natural law to justify and
vindicate her heroines.
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Laurette's resignation and pious fortitude counters the Marchese's wicked self
interest. After she rejects him, the Marchese begins to follow Paoli's advice and
imprisons Laurette in a secluded house. Her inexorable reasoning leads her to eliminate,
one by one, the possibilities of escape or rescue, so she waits for death:
A deep and mournful stillness seemed to reign throughout the mansion, and being
in hourly expectation of her murderer, she betook herself to prayer, that she might
prepare her mind, as much as possible, for the awful change that awaited her, by
soliciting the protection in the moments of dissolution [... ] then throwing herself
upon the bed, endeavoured to await, with something like resignation, the doom
which she considered as inevitable. (257)
Her plans to flee are thwarted by locked doors and utter solitude. Here, emotional
fortitude or collapse is the only choice left to her, and she responds with a stoic display of
courage. Even though Laurette makes attempts-futile though they may be-to escape,
her situation demonstrates women's physical inability to protect themselves. More
importantly, her appeals to heaven indicate the failure of positive laws to protect her. She
determines "to wait with humility for the interposition of Providence in her behalf'
~

because she believes in "an Omnipotent Power who governs the world with wisdom and
equity" (251). Laurette's helplessness and her complete vulnerability to the villains raise
the problem ofpassivity. Although the previous depictions of natural law emphasize
active virtue, cognitive abilities, and rational processing of impressions, Laurette now
seems stripped of agency. Sleath celebrates her heroine's fortitude and faith, but leaves
her passive role unexamined. Instead, Laurette is rescued through coincidence. Sleath
saves her most significant exploration of natural law' s efficacy for the conclusion.
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For Sleath, natural law provides a discourse ofjustice in which right triumphs
over might, reason over pure will. While scenes like the above illustrate women's
paradoxical position in relation to both natural and positive law, Sleath does promote the
desirable aspects of each to construct a happy, though conventional, resolution. Natural
law offers an authority based in divinity and human reason that circumvents, at times, the
authority of positive law. In particular, the individual can rely on the law of nature as a
means of critiquing society's laws. For example, when Julie is kidnapped, her son Enrico,
swearing to find the ruffians, boldly exclaims, "There are laws, and if they cannot be
enforced, I have a sword, never yet drawn but in the exercise ofjustice, but which shall
be raised against the heart of the oppressor, in the cause of defenceless innocence" (209).
Enrico uses justice as the guiding principle for his actions, even if they do not correspond
to the laws of the land. The individual thus can look higher than positive law in certain
circumstances. In the novel's conclusion, La Roque allows the Marchese's wicked
henchman to go free after extracting a promise that he will never commit such crimes
again. The rationale for this action is surprising:
The punishment for capital offences by the German laws, being so much worse
than death itself, was held in utter abhorrence by his lenient accuser, the wretch

who has committed them being doomed to wear that external brand of infamy
which precludes, through a miserable existence, the possibility of a return to
virtue; that probably, had he been instigated by no primary consideration, he
might have been tempted to have declined a prosecution without reflecting that by
this clemency he would be espousing the cause of vice, and violating the laws of
justice. (297)
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Implicit in this description is the notion that positive law can facilitate a return to virtueor it can serve immoral ends. Sleath proposes justice outside the courts when they do not
correspond to natural law and, instead, deliver unfair punishments. The governing
positive laws, in conflict with natural justice, can be abandoned at the discretion of the
individual. The protagonists, like the villains, operate through their own economy of
justice. It may be in accordance with English principles, yet in this fictional world, such
justice is simply a part of their nature. According to Weinreb,justice incorporates notions
of desert (the individual's moral responsibility) and entitlement (the general application
of a rule): "Justice is fulfilled when persons get what they deserve and deserve what they
get; an unqualifiedly just rule entitles those who deserve and no others" (Natural Law

and Justice 10). Creating a "natural" sense ofjustice in her characters, Sleath authorizes
their rejection of positive law.
Both women are rescued through the efforts of the heroes. Enrico searches for
and finds Laurette in a ruined castle, where Paoli keeps her prisoner for the Marchese.
Later, Paoli is killed in an attack on La Roque, but he lives long enough to confess his
crimes. Paoli reveals that Madame Chamont was placed in a prison-like convent. Both
rescues are facilitated by coincidence and are easily accomplished. Sleath reserves the
dramatic tension for the lovers' tender reunion and the Marchese's surprising repentance.
The ways in which Sleath dissolves the threat and creates justice for her heroines are
crucial to her vision of law. In Orphan, as in Wolfenbach, the feeling heart ultimately
creates justice. Laurette and Julie offer mercy, while the Marchese suffers under selfcondemnation. After Enrico and La Roque find the Marchese violently ill with guilt and

.
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remorse, Laurette and Julie enter the chamber and stand by his bed. Offering forgiveness
and compassion, the two women relieve some of the Marchese's wildness:
They, indeed, appeared like two ministering angels come to offer consolation to a
soul bowed down with the weight of its own irremediable crimes....Their
countenances were irradiated by innocence, whilst his was depressed by guilt; and
now that adversity had brought conviction to his heart, he experienced the
weakness, the imbecility of vice when opposed to the innate dignity of virtue.
(329)
In this scene of guilt and forgiveness, of punishment and vindication, Sleath shows
women participating in legal discourse. As Laurette prays for Heaven to "soften the
rigour ofthy justice with the effusions of mercy," Julie attempts "to convince the
Marchese that she came to offer him her forgiveness" (329). These women need not
punish or accuse their persecutor because he is dying a "natural" death, and thus fulfilling
the demands ofjustice. Importantly, however, the Marchese de Montferrat must first feel
guilty and repentant before he confesses and restores legal order.
Orphan illustrates that internal conviction is a necessary element of legal
restitution. With the Marchese's repentance, Sleath demonstrates a deep faith in-or
desire for-the juridico-moral dimension of social life. She depends on a law of nature
that is written on the heart in order to construct a resolution that satisfies the needs of
positive law. Enrico tells Laurette and his mother,
"The Marchese has already entered into a full confession of his crimes. He
seemed, on our introduction, to endure much internal affliction; for never did I
behold remorse and acute anguish more forcibly delineated than when his eyes
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met those of Della Croisse [La Roque]. This self-condemning conduct induced us
to proceed in the affair with as much gentleness as possible, though we did not
omit the necessary information relative to the legality of his first marriage, and
Laurette's providential release from captivity and expected death!" (327)
Clearly the Marchese suffers for his criminal activity-without the assistance of positive
law. His internal sense of guilt and the internal punishment that accompanies it
correspond to the principle of natural law that posits certain innate qualities, such as
reason and moral sense. Because he feels repentant, he desires to restore the fortune he
has stolen and repair the social identities he has disrupted; thus, he turns to legal
procedures in order to make restitution.
There are two ways in which this conclusion functions. First, death appears to be
the natural and appropriate punishment for crimes, especially the Marchese's, since it
removes the threat that he represents. Second, the narrative's emphasis on the mind and
emotions creates a new model of punishment that goes beyond physical force. Real
punishment is not enacted on the body but through the body, in the mental anguish of
self-condemnation, which in tum often causes physical pain and illness. For the Marchese,
death results directly from his recognition of and emotional response to his guilt. His
body absorbs the cost of his debauchery and his emotional repentance. What is "natural"
here is the personal experience of remorse, guilt, and repentance. Indeed, the Marchese's
fortuitous death circumvents the need for legal proceedings altogether. Instead of
providing a complete escape from juridical discourse, however, such an ending suggests
the interdependence of positive and natural law. Although positive laws might secure
property and even punish crime, they inadequately ensure moral behavior. Instead,
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individuals must be attuned to the moral-legal dimensions of their nature-a nature that
cries out for order, reason, and right. In Orphan moral epistemology begins with the
individual, whose sensitivity, impressions, and reason enable her or him to act and think
justly. The narrative affIrmS the individual's rational and natural propensity for justice
and moral living-a propensity, furthermore, that does not stay buried in selfishness, but
moves outward to others. The conclusion in particular demonstrates that knowledge of
and commitment to natural law is the only way that true justice can operate.
Importantly, the law of nature is always universally just, unlike positive law,
which can 'sometimes be unjust. Pufendorf explains that justice can be either "universal"
or "particular": "The first is, when every Duty is practiced and all right done to others,
even that which could not have been extorted by force, or by the rigor of the Law. The
latter is, when that Justice only is done a man, which in his own right he could have
demanded" (35). Particular justice, therefore, is enforceable by positive law, whereas
universal justice cannot be coerced. Sleath's heroines find particular consolation in the
notion of universal justice because they obey the law of nature rather than only positive
law. They make individual choices to enact justice in whatever capacity they can. The
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others' conscious guilt as much as they depend on their own conscious worth. In the
former rests all their hopes for the failings of positive law. Indeed, such representations
indicate the necessity offeeling as the primary means of lawfulness since externally
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imposed law can always be manipulated for the use of the powerful. David Hume argues
that "it is not any relation of ideas which gives us this concern, but our impressions and
sentiments, without which every thing in nature is perfectly indifferent to us, and can
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never in the least affect us. The sense ofjustice, therefore, is not founded on our ideas,
but on our impressions" (70).
In bringing about a "just" ending for her heroines, Sleath does not wholly discard
the necessity of positive law. Positive law demands restitution, and the central problem of
natural law is its inability to impose force on criminals who reject feelings of guilt and
repentance. The law of nature can bring about only personal change, individual
commitments to justice, internal feelings of guilt and shame. In Orphan, this law works
very well: since "nature" punishes the Marchese, the court system is unnecessary. Also,
because he repents his wickedness, he does not need to be forced by society-through
positive law-to make restitution. Although Sleath does not discuss criminal law, she
takes care to address property laws in the conclusion. As she creates justice for her
heroines, she clarifies the legal procedures that will uphold Julie's and Laurette's claims
to titles and property. Although the law of nature has a close relationship to ideals of
justice, positive law can protect property in ways that natural law cannot or does not.
Thus, in Orphan, the denouement is encapsulated in the packet of documents created by
the Marchese de Montferrat. These documents include: testimony and proof that Julie
was his legal wife, deeds that supported Laurette's claims to usurPed estates, a will that
bestowed upon Julie his considerable personal property ("after a proper arrangement of
the landed property" 335). Even though justice in relation to personal crimes-abduction,
murder, theft-has been arranged through the desires and preferences of the "good"
characters, positive law regulating marriage, legitimacy, and property cannot be
abandoned. The novel therefore constructs justice through natural law and through
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positive law. Like Parsons, Sleath shows that legal documents are absolutely necessary in
order to restore fortunes and reputations.
The moral with which the reader is left is hackneyed: Laurette and Enrico "were
blessed with a numerous offspring, lovely as themselves, and presented, in the whole of
their lives to the reflecting mind of the moralist, a striking instance ofthe imbecility of
vice, and ofthe triumphant power of virtue" (360). This fantasy ofjustice, as Sleath and
her audience surely recognized, can only take place in a narrative that uses the
proliferation of character, detail, and coincidence to uncover mystery and resolve crime.
Nearly every person introduced in the story plays a significant role in creating or
uncovering crime. No character is superfluous; apparent chance meetings abound; no
event is left unrelated. A tight economy indeed, and one that clearly can exist only in
fiction. Yet, such strict control over the narrative also reflects a desire for corresponding
economy in a Providence-guided world. In a world governed by natural law, no
randomness or injustice can occur. Sleath's desire for natural law indicates a level of
dissatisfaction with a system that cannot protect women's vulnerable bodies. Natural law
provides a means of critiquing injustice-including the injustices of positive laws. As
d'Entreves puts it, "A law which lacks authoritative sanction may yet be law" (77).
Nevertheless, the heroines' dependence on natural law seems, at times, ineffectual and
problematic. For women, the problem is twofold: there is no unmediated access to natural
law, and positive law is real and necessary for modem governance. Thus, the advantages
ofpositive law become an integral part of the novel's conclusion.
In Wolfenbach and Orphan-novels that have previously been dismissed as vapid
imitations, blatant transgressions, or faddish entertainment-.there exists an important
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argument about women's access to justice. The issue of empowerment and resistance
becomes a significant one in these Gothic novels. In Foucault's model of power,
resistance always occurs within and against power structures, and it does not always
subvert those structures. As Wendy Brown notes, theories of empowerment that "locate
an individual's sense of worth and capacity in the register of individual feelings"
consequently "risk establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) empowerment
and an actual capacity to shape the terms of political, social, or economic life" (23).
Because feelings or emotions are significant means to moral knowledge and thus natural
law, there is a concomitant danger of delusion?8 Parsons and Sleath suppress this danger
by aligning the heroines' desires with positive law and social custom. The authors also
lavish unexpected luxuries on the heroines at the conclusion as rewards for their
resistance to villains and their continued moral faithfulness. 29 Parsons and Sleath elide
the problems with and critiques of natural law by introducing positive law in the novels'
conclusions, where it ratifies the inheritances, relationships, and confessions that have
already been set in motion without legal mechanisms and state intervention. The
heroines' feelings of empowerment, therefore, are upheld in the conclusion with social
power: the. women receive estates and titles that solidify their claims to self-determination
and justice.

That is, one could "feel" it just to kill a person who thwarts one's desires or pleasures. The rationalization
of action based on feeling might indeed lead to mUltiple injustices.
29 Women's property ownership was not a complete fantasy, of course. As eighteenth-century law
illustrates, women often did own estates in their own right. Even if their husbands had access to the fees
and rents to those estates, they could not sell or transfer the property. Parsons and Sleath therefore propose
an ending that is at once idealistic and pragmatic.

28
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Chapter Four
Knowing Looks: The Problem of Perception in Regina Maria Roche's The Children
ofthe Abbey and Clermont
In the previous two chapters, I examined the body's role in creating knowledge,
as articulated within sensationalist psychology. The senses take in impressions, which are
transmitted through the nervous system to the brain. In turn, the material mind processes
sensory data, exercising rational faculties in order to produce ideas. As Locke explains,
impressions, reason, and cognitive processes also establish an individual's relationship to
the world and sense of self. For Radcliffe, I argue, this medical construction of perception
shapes her presentation of Emily and Ellena, even though she resists problematic
implications of such a construction. In Parsons' and Sleath's novels the sensitive body
serves as the basis of moral epistemology in a less ambivalent way, although each author
clearly draws on similar concerns regarding the vulnerable body. This chapter extends
my discussions of sensory impressions in order to address the cultural crisis that
surrounded the most common, significant means of taking in impressions: vision.
Whereas the physical act of seeing is a natural phenomenon, perception is a cognitive
event structured by cultural discourses. Consequently, visual evidence becomes tenuous,
a philosophical dilemma shaped by aspects of medicine and law. As I will demonstrate,
Regina Maria Roche's novels The Children ofthe Abbey (1796) and Clermont (1 798)
provide a complex response to this epistemological crisis through themes of mystery and
secrecy. I argue that, while they portray the power that visuality exerted over women's
lives, these novels tap into the uncertainty of perception that medical and legal discourses
only partially acknowledged. As a result, Abbey and Clermont implicitly critique
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techniques of perception that lead to moral judgments regarding women's social
transparency and that hamper women's ability to turn personal experiences into
knowledge.
Since knowledge seems to be the highest value of Enlightenment ideology, which
seeks to shed light on previously dark, mysterious subjects, the means of establishing
knowledge is a significant concern for eighteenth-century discourses. In The Historical

Roots o/Cognitive Perception, Theo Meyering describes the shift in perception from
Aristotelians to Cartesians. For the former, "whatever was transmitted to the senses ...
contained the real essence of the objects of perception and not mere images thereof. To
disregard the evidence of the senses, therefore, or to distrust it systematically, was to
distrust the essential manifestations of nature which she, nature herself, by some physical
process delivered at our very doorsteps" (15). The advent of Newtonian optics and
Cartesian philosophy created a radical break between vision and knowledge: empirical
science examined the objective nature of optics, while philosophy concerned itself with
the subjective qualities of perception and cognition (6). Because sight and perception
were considered distinct (though related) processes, one could not depend on vision to
transmit an objective reality to one's mind. Instead, the brain provided a personal
understanding of the world that mayor may not correspond to others' knowledge. This
crisis in epistemology led to "the radical conception of knowledge as something of our
own making for which we ourselves may be responsible" (18). In this sketch of vision's
problematic nature, two issues related to my project emerge. First, although the evidence
of the senses is described as tenuous, eighteenth-century medical and legal discourses
incorporated techniques of seeing that posited the dependable nature of vision. Second,
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while the individual's central role in knowledge-making may lead to self-determination,
there remains a concomitant danger of oppression. In particular, women appear
vulnerable to the imposition of others' "knowledge." The radical notion that Meyering
describes, therefore, can provide women with a powerful sense of individuality, or it can
support unjust conditions.
Roche's novels address these concerns through mystery, imaginatively reflecting
anxieties about knowledge and the visual means of attaining knowledge. As the female
characters create mysteries through secrecy or probe others' mysteries, these anxieties
become gendered, coalescing around medical and juridical versions of the "gaze." While
visual perception and scopic techniques might not establish certainty, they do generate
power, which is figured as the social gaze. Visuality, then, provides a powerful metaphor
and a structural reality for Roche as she creates novels of mystery, crime, and romance.
Amanda Fitzalan in The Children ofthe Abbey and Madeline Clermont in Clermont are
mysterious yet open in ways that underscore their self-determining nature. For both
heroines, however, autonomy comes at a price. Although Amanda and Madeline
experience multiple moments of self-assertion and resistance, they also suffer from the
villains' oppressive power. Amanda finds herself alone, ill, and vulnerable; she must be
rescued, suddenly and fortuitously, by a male friend. Madeline goes temporarily insane
with anxiety and grief; she also must be rescued at the eleventh hour by her suitor.
Roche's novels take up the problem of women's transparency in order to illustrate
the power of the gaze. In Abbey the heroine's secrecy implies illicit sexuality, yet Roche
undermines the cultural assumption that women's virtue must be on display. She
demonstrates through Amanda's experiences that such openness can be dangerous and
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that thwarting the gaze of others may protect her from villainous plots. In Clermont, the
heroine initially discloses her secret thoughts, demonstrating impulses to be transparent to
others. Once Madeline's internal surveillance turns outward, as she encounters
mysterious, terrifying events, she struggles with the need to close off her transparent self.
In both legal and medical discourses, transparency eliminates mystery-from the social
body and from the physical body. Visual processes, whether literal or symbolic, enable
these two discourses to operate effectively. Mystery cannot exist in legal relationships, or
the distribution of property and punishments, for example, becomes unjust. Likewise, the
mysterious nature of the body must be precisely uncovered, again for good reasons such
as the prevention and cure of disease. As I will demonstrate, transparent subjects also
support the moral norms constructed within these discourses. In turn, the novels become
surprisingly unconventional when Roche depicts her heroines as moral agents who
embrace secrecy.
As I will develop in subsequent sections, both medicine and law structure
perception through discursive practices. In Body Criticism, Barbara Stafford explains that
eighteenth-century medicine and art "were devoted to a discriminating observation of
signs and symptoms, to a contextualized pattern recognition, to an informed and refined
sensory judgment of appearances or looks" (39). Furthermore, she continues, "This
deeply shared awareness of operating within an empirical field of experience
increasingly dominated by, and subtly attuned to, the evidence of individual sight-was
demonstrated through a performative interaction between viewer and viewed" (40). In
the first part of my analysis, I will outline the theoretical and cultural framework that
organizes my approach to Abbey. Concentrating on clinical perception, I argue that Abbey
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portrays a heroine who experiences the painful consequences of dominant techniques of
observation but who undermines the judgment that such techniques engender. In the
second section, I will discuss the juridical gaze, another discursive articulation of
perception. Like medicine, law constructed modes of observing one's self and others,
which create moral norms. As David Punter puts it, "[T]he law is not absolute, it is a way
of seeing things" (3). Continuing the work of Foucault's Discipline and Punish, John
Bender argues that the image of the penitentiary, which structurally allowed "a maximum
of light and visibility" and "a maximum of inside-outside penetration," influenced the
cultural imagination in important ways. He notes, "The ideal of transparency is, in other
words, fully embodied up to the technical limits posed by the need to confine. Structures
of feeling, as they take material form in different spheres of production, are subject to the
technical requirements of each sphere" (216). As a result of these technical structures,
individual citizens functioned within a regime of light and transparency that encouraged
the surveillance of self and other. In Clermont, Madeline exhibits just such a structure of
feeling, yet her vulnerability, as well as the novel's complex criminality, create a
significant dilemma that the juridical gaze can only partially solve.
In Clermont and in The Children ofthe Abbey, perception and power go hand in
hand. Medical and legal discourses reinforce the social gaze through techniques that turn
the individual into a self-diagnosing, self-policing subject. Both discourses emphasize the
individual's normative behaviors and construct a framework by which to see, interpret,
and judge others. Insofar as these novels acknowledge these constructions, however,
there remains a substantial critique of unjust uses of the gaze. Further, although my
analysis often refers to discourses and their techniques in poststructuralist terms of a
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constructed, indeterminate self, Roche clearly assumes a "true" or authentic self that
exists against unsuccessful perception. In order to continue Gothic articulations of natural
law, the novel posits a real self that, in turn, may exercise agency. The differences
between the poststructuralist and the novelistic versions of the self create a productive
tension in this analysis, which enables me to explore the complexities and consequences
of perception, knowledge, and reality.

Clinical Perception and the Social Gaze in The Children ofthe Abbey
Promoting a way of seeing based on visual evidence, medical discourse enables
the perceiver to diagnose external symptoms and signs. Yet what starts as medical
discourse, which reads the body for signs of disease, ends as moral discourse, which
reads women's bodies for signs of desire or transgression. In The Children ofthe Abbey,
clinical perception provides a discursive structure through which various characters
understand and judge the heroine's actions. In a society that demands transparency, the
heroine's body should display unequivocal signs of her moral "health." Because the
heroine's openness exposes rather than protects her, however, secrecy becomes a
necessary if problematic option. As part of its representation of visual power, Abbey
l

demonstrates that transparency and concealment form twin threats in women's lives. In
turn, the disparity between others' perception of the heroine and her own understanding

1 In Disease, Desire, and the Body in Victorian Women's Popular Novels, Pamela K. Gilbert addresses a similar
theme. Discussing sensational novelists M. E. Braddon, Rhoda Broughton, and Ouida, Gilbert argues that their
novels "feature women characters whose bodies are defined by degrees of openness and contamination, whose
identities are defined by mystery and mutation, whose locations, within the logic of the text, are marginal and
indeterminate" (13). Likewise, the heroines in Roche's novels are in danger of social and moral contamination
because they keep secrets.
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of her "self' signals a crisis of representation that threatens her integrity. 2 Amanda's
secrecy generates power, since she retains her personal integrity, and anxiety, since
women's secrecy typically indicated illicit sexuality. As a consequence, the heroine's
experiences with the "gaze" position her as an autonomous yet conflicted individual.
Even though Amanda's secrets threaten her emotionally, physically, and socially, she
rejects the gaze of society-and consequently, society's validation-as she follows an
internal, moral order that resembles the natural law of The Castle ofWolfenbach and The
Orphan ofthe Rhine. Roche repeats a pattern throughout the novel: Amanda's secrecy,
Mortimer's misinterpretation, and the couple's reconciliation. Through this pattern, I
argue, the novel critiques the public gaze and modes of perception fostered by medical
science, while it celebrates Amanda's unusual choice to hide aspects of herself from that
gaze.
The term "clinical perception" provides a way of talking about the semiotics of
the body, about surface and depth, about symptoms and signs, without necessarily
referring to literal diseases, cures, or techniques. As Michel Foucault details in The Birth
ofthe Clinic, eighteenth-century medical discourse introduced a new method of
perception, which created a "new alliance ... between words and things, enabling one to
see and to say" (xii). The body's language, its visible signs, needs to be interpreted; its
surface potentially indicates depth and truth. 3 Late-eighteenth century medicine

Roche demonstrates that although secrecy is frequently associated with villainy through metaphorical
masks and disguises, it can be a legitimate response to threats. Fitzalan willingly exchanges social visibility
to protect his daughter's sexual purity and to avoid imprisonment. And for Amanda to be open is to be
exposed to Belgrave's sexual advances.
3 Eve Sedgwick, in "The Character in the Veil: Imagery of the Surface in the Gothic Novel," argues that
because character is often displayed on the surface (i.e., character inscribed on the countenance), identity is
conceived as relational rather than private. Recognition by others thus becomes the primary means of
2
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privileged "the marvelous density of perception," which can determine truth through the
"careful gaze" and "empirical vigilance" (xiii). This articulation does not acknowledge

,

the crisis of perception but does reflect the authoritative stance of medical discourse.
Thomas Osborne argues that Foucault's version of the gaze is a "particular, historically
substantive, style of perception" (34). The clinical ideal, Osborne explains, is "a mode of
patient, laborious, qualitative description that is simultaneously a 'way of saying' and a
'way of seeing'; a form of discourse and a particular kind of gaze" (34). The body thus
speaks a language that one can see, making diagnosis a prominent feature of the
eighteenth-century's scopic regime. In Patients, Power, and the Poor in Eighteenth-

Century Bristol, for example, Mary E. Fissell writes, "Concern with the surface of the
body continued to be a significant theme in vernacular and professional ideas about
health. In the eighteenth century, popular health texts and practices reiterated that a
person's external self, his or her body surface, revealed important inner truths, just as
plants revealed their healing virtues in their outer forms and colors" (30).
By emphasizing Amanda's physical signs, Roche evokes medical discourse,
which demystifies the body in order to control and cure it. I argue that Lord Mortimer,
Amanda's erstwhile suitor, depends on such perceptual assumptions as he assumes that
Amanda's body can be decoded visually according to a moral rubric. In Abbey, the
"diseases" of the heart seem as observable (and diagnosable) as the diseases ofthe" body.
In his discussion of Foucault's The Birth ofthe Clinic, Rose notes the shift in perception
that allows such consonance between physical disease and moral corruption:

establishing seltbood. I argue that Amanda, as one example of the Gothic heroine, does not fit neatly into
this model. Indeed, it is the very tension between surface and depth, appearance and reality, that structures
Amanda's social identity and personal sense of self.
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The underside of disease-illness--comes to light, offers itself to the gaze, to
language and to the practice of the cure in the same moment as it distributes itself
in the enclosed but accessible volume of the body. This mutation [of medical
thought traced in The Birth ofthe Clinic] has epistemological and ethical
dimensions which are not confined to the territory of illness. (68)
The techniques of observation generated within medical discourse thus could be exported
into other fields of perception. Although the term "clinical perception" implies a
disinterested objectivity, the moral tendencies of the discourse indicate what Foucault
describes as "a normative posture, which authorizes [medical treatises] not only to
distribute advice as to the healthy life, but also to dictate the standards for physical and
moral relations of the individual and of the society in which he lives" (34). Such
tendencies are evident in many domestic medicine publications, as perception and moral
judgment blend together. 4 The spate of publications directed at women included such
titles as The Female Physician: or, Every Woman Her Own Doctress; The Female
Physician; and Every Woman Her Own Physician; or, The Lady's Medical Assistant.
These treatises, which inform my analysis of perception in the novel, encourage
individuals to develop a medical gaze in order to police one's own body or others'
bodies.

The medical gaze is also a policing gaze, sharing similarities with the juridical gaze, which I will explore
through Clermont. As Foucault explains, clinical perception migrated into social consciousness: "[M]edical
space can coincide with social space, or, rather, traverse it and wholly penetrate it" (31). Through the
dissemination of domestic medicine books, the home became another medical sphere. It is important to
note here that the hospital is the new medical space. Indeed, illnesses and deaths historically were managed
within the home. However, domestic medicine books published by physicians were a technology that
bridged the gap between hospital and home. Individuals were encouraged to apply the new modes of
perception and diagnosis, developed in the clinic, within their household.
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A. Hume's treatise, Every Woman Her Own Physician; or, The Lady's Medical

Assistant (1776), offers one example of the ways in which women were encouraged to
develop such a gaze:
It may perhaps be said that infants cannot communicate a knowledge of their
complaints, as they cannot acquaint a Practitioner with their symptoms. But
though young children do not speak our language, yet they have one which we
should contrive to understand; nay, every distemper may be said to have a
language of its own, which an attentive person will easily learn, and which the
fond mother or nurse should use their utmost endeavours to comprehend, so as to
avoid and cure the few and simple disorders to which they are subject. (92).
Hume makes a value judgment as he explains that the loving caregiver will cultivate an
attentive, interpretive gaze. s The body and illnesses have a language that requires only
careful comprehension, which is accessible to the layperson. This example brings
together medicine and morality as a cultural configuration that becomes incorporated into
such popular works as Abbey. This visual process could be considered a form of power in
that women are authorized to "read" others' bodies. Importantly, the medical regime
creates new ethical obligations for caretakers, typically women, as it demands accurate
perception as part of their nurturing role.
In Abbey the ethical dimensions of clinical perception become clear as Amanda
serves as the object of others' gaze. As various characters exercise a medicalized
perception, they underscore the interpretive process that enables them to arrive at what
Roy Porter explains that the eighteenth-century physician relied primarily on sight rather than touch in his
physical examination: "[S]ystematic and disciplined use of the senses, apart from the eye, for diagnostic
purposes had not advanced far. As late as 1800, it was exceptional for a doctor to tap the body with his
finger... or listen for tell-tale evidence" (Patient's Progress 74).
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they believe is the "truth" of Amanda's exterior signs. 6 Her body is "enclosed but
accessible" to those who carefully inspect her. Instead of being the object of a nurturing,
caring gaze, however, the heroine experiences the oppressive power of observation and
diagnosis, especially because the signs that others read become equivocal as Amanda
hides the truth of her situation. She participates in the destabilization of sight through her
secrecy and suffers from misinterpretation. According to Meyering:
Since phenomenal experience distorts not only occasionally but systematically, it
is best regarded as a veil which hides reality rather than revealing it. Thus the
mind, not the eye, has the sole power of discernment: it alone truly discriminates
between real and merely apparent 'infonnation.' However, this implies that the
mind in its turn may impose its structures upon reality as perceived. (3)
That reality can be the product of an individual's mind via perception is especially
dangerous for Amanda, who cannot remain transparent to others. She understands that
her concealments promote perceptual misconstructions. Creating a gap between
appearance and truth, between seeming and being, the heroine participates in the
epistemological crisis previously described. In tum, she becomes a disruptive force that
must be contained by the moral nonns of medical discourse.

Similarly, Julie McMaster argues in Reading the Body in the Eighteenth Century Novel, "As the trained
physician observes the body and interprets its symptoms in order to procure health for the patient, so the
infonned reader of a novel observes characters in their speech and bodily actions in order to arrive at
sympathy, understanding, and moral judgement" (24). Although her discussion of diagnosis is a productive
one, McMaster does not examine Gothic texts. When she does acknowledge the elements of terror and
threat in her discussion of Camilla, she focuses primarily on the tragic ways in which Camilla's body
language is silenced yet judged. Amanda undergoes a similar experience; however, I argue that Abbey
explores more thoroughly the cultural problem of women's transparency and the epistemological crisis of
perception.
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For women, secrecy is the symptom of moral disease. As domestic medicine
treatises articulate, women's secrecy can indicate guilt or shame. For example, in The
ladies dispensatory: or, every woman her own physician (1740), masturbation is the illicit
secret that must be eliminated through the self-surveying medical gaze. The anonymous
author devotes the first chapter to this subject, inteIjecting moral warnings and social
commentary into the medical discourse. He asserts that venereal disease, caused by
"secret Vice," poses the greatest threat to "the Preservation of Human-kind in general"
because it "strikes at the very Root of Fertility" (3). The illicit sexual activity that leads to
disease includes, according to the author, masturbation. Among the reasons that women
might masturbate is its secret nature: "There must be another Party in all other Acts of
Uncleanness, but in this [masturbation] there is neither Partaker nor Witness" (4-5). He
continues,
When Women, who are apparently of a sanguine and amorous Constitution, shall
betray no Inclination to Venereal Embraces, and even refuse advantageous
Matches; to what other Cause can we impute it, but their being capable of
pleasuring themselves in this private Way, and keeping up a Shew of Chastity,
while they are abandoned to the most irregular Lusts? (5)
Because no laws regulate "Self-Abuse," women have another inducement to this solitary
pleasure. Whereas intercourse might produce a child, "a living Witness of their Crime,"
self-gratification has no "Punishment but Self-Consciousness" (5-6).7 That he intended
this chapter for a female audience is clear: "Every guilty Female, who has read thus, far,
The author cites a list of cases in which the women suffered an array of symptoms, from itchiness to
infertility to death, as a result of masturbation. In one noteworthy case, the patient's clitoris lengthened
until she could have been mistaken for a man or a hennaphrodite (10).
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and finds in herself any of the dismal Symptoms there enumerated, will not readily forget
what so sensibly affected her" (13). Thus, women's secrets, even in medical works, are
linked to dangerous sexuality that the social and internal gaze must contain. 8
The conflation of immorality and concealment begins early in Abbey. In the first
scenes, Amanda Fitzalan, at her father's insistence, returns to her childhood home in
North Wales for recuperation and protection because Colonel Belgrave, a married man,
had attempted to seduce her. After Amanda rejected his sexual advances and fled from
him "as if from a m.onster," Belgrave became vicious: "Having thrown off the mask, he
determined no longer to assume any disguise" (24-25). The narrator notes that Belgrave
wears the mask of gentility, of morality, of humanity-and that he employs subterfuge to
hide corruption. Relating secrecy to villainy, Roche acknowledges the need for
transparency, which should expose dangerous people to the social gaze and, in turn,
neutralize their threats. During the novel, however, this formulation breaks down. With
his "mask" now stripped away, Belgrave begins to persecute Amanda and her father
through Fitzalan' s financial obligations, offering to trade debt for sex. Although she
escapes his initial threats, Belgrave returns throughout the narrative, "like an evil genius"
(218). Amanda's response to the villain's presence evokes descriptions of the
supernatural in other Gothic novels. Like heroines who tremble and faint when they
experience what appears to be ghostly occurrences, Amanda feels "horror and surprise"

In her treatise The Compleat Midwife, Jane Sharp frequently refers to female genitalia as "the Secrets of
Women" or simply "the Secrets." For example, she states, "There are three Diseases in this Part of the
Secrets; either the Mouth is too strait, or too wide, or sometimes there hangs forth the Yard of a Woman"
(166). Sharp discusses "Warts in the Secrets" (170), "Ulcers in the Secrets of Wombs" (172), and "Secrets
[that] are full of Pimples, or very rugged" (157). This designation is largely absent from published domestic
medicine books, such as John Ball's work, but it indicates the ways in which medicine and cultural
assumptions work together to produce a sense ofwomen's secretly sexual nature.
8
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whenever Belgrave appears: "The terror his presence inspired was too powerful for
reason to conquer, and raised the most gloomy presages in her mind. She believed him
capable of any villainy" (218, 219). Roche concentrates the Gothic atmosphere in the
figure of Belgrave, who embodies all the terrors that Gothic heroines experience. 9 In this
novel, Belgrave also functions as a kind of "pathogen," making Amanda display signs of
moral "illness" and forcing her to become an object of the attentive gaze because she
cannot remain transparent.
The narrative demonstrates that women dare not display their vulnerability to
sexual advances because it might imply a "weak constitution" or a pre-disposition to
desire seduction. Amanda struggles with this construction as she meets Lord Mortimer.
Her obvious concealments and mysterious hints cause Mortimer to doubt her sexual
purity. From the beginning, Mortimer's suspicions cause tension in a narrative already
loaded with threats and danger. When Mortimer probes the mysterious circumstances of
Amanda's life, "Amanda, with blushes, always shrunk from the subject; sickening at the
idea of his knowing that her father depended on his for future support" (46). Not only
does her family's financial dependence make her feel "sickened"; she also experiences
embarrassment over her knowledge of sexuality. Although Belgrave does not seduce her,
he makes it clear that he wants sex, forcing her to acknowledge her potential sexuality.
Attempting to manage these problematic experiences, Amanda remains silent when
Mortimer questions her, which provokes Mortimer's curiosity about the mysteries she
hides. Roche thus places her heroine in a position to be interpreted. It is my claim,
however, that Roche rejects the visual construction of the self because it oppres'ses
9

Kate Ellis notes that Belgrave's name, "beautiful grave," connotes the dangers facing Amanda (99).
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women, whether unintentionally (as with Mortimer, his sister, and aunt) or maliciously
(as with Belgrave and the Roslins).
Mortimer's doubts about Amanda's sexual purity intensify when a young
clergyman, who also wishes to court her and who fears that Mortimer will corrupt her,
delivers a sermon on seduced women. After the church service is over, the narrator notes:
To see so young, so lovely, so elegant a creature an inmate of a sequestered
cottage, associating with people (in manners at least) so infinitely beneath her; to
see her trembling and blushing, if a word was dropped that seemed tending to
inquire into her motives for retirement; all these circumstances, I say, considered,
naturally excited a suspicion injurious to her in the mind of Lord Mortimer. (49)
The suitor's initial suspicions survive throughout the narrative and become the basis of
much misunderstanding. For Mortimer, Amanda's body displays observable signs of her
morality (or immorality). In so far as her "delicacy" has been compromised, Amanda
indeed is symptomatic of moral illness when she is confronted by the gaze of the curious.
Even as Roche indicates that Mortimer's doubts are natural, she also critiques his
inability to perceive Amanda properly.
Such incompetent diagnoses were a significant concern in medical discourse,
which described the dangers of misperception. Since every feature becomes suffused with
potential meaning if the body is continually under observation, the "reader" must be able
to monitor the body correctly. John Ball's The Female Physician teaches women to
recognize meaningful symptoms of abnormal menstruation, for example. Explaining that
"excess" of discharge must be measured in comparison with "former periods, accidents,
preceding diet, and other circumstances," Ball shows that contextual evidence is crucial
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(36). In turn, he encourages women to maintain a scientific detachment in their diagnosis.
The consequences of inaccurate conclusions, misreading normality for pathology, might
be fatal: "[M]any women of timorous dispositions, have ruined their constitutions by
stopping lO what was but a natural quantity, and proper for their health, under a notion of
its being a dangerous excess" (36-37). Women must therefore interpret without emotion
as they diagnose physical symptoms.
As in Ball's example of the timorous women, Mortimer's misinterpretations are
emotionally conditioned and dangerous. Condemning Amanda, the suitor puts her in a
vulnerable position. First, when he believes she is "impure," he suggests a sexual affair
instead of proposing marriage, inflicting emotional pains on the heroine: "Belgrave had
insulted her purity and offended her pride, but he had not wounded the softer feelings of
her soul; it was Mortimer alone had power to work them up to agony" (60). Second, his
misinterpretations increase her vulnerability to Belgrave, as later events prove. Finally,
Mortimer insinuates that Amanda is responsible for his conclusions. He chides her,
"[W]hy... did not prudence teach you to shun a conduct which could create suspicion?"
(158). When Amanda does not explain herself, Mortimer leaves the country certain of his
perception: "I witnessed her agitation, her embarrassment, this morning, when I hinted at
[my doubts],' (167). Mysterious and unexplained, Amanda's actions leave a lingering,
corrosive doubt in Mortimer's mind for most of the narrative.
Although the body stands as a privileged set of signs, Mortimer believes that
Amanda disrupts the correspondence between external signs and internal truths. What

10 Although Ball does not specify the means by which women might "stop" their menstrual flow, it is clear
that "stopping" indicates an unhealthy obstruction of the body's natural processes. See p. 24.
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Mortimer and others see is both dependable and unreliable-an epistemological crisis.
They assume that Amanda cannot be trusted, but they also believe that she displays
dependable signs of such unreliability. The blush encapsulates this apparent paradox.
Mary Ann 0' Farrell, in Telling Complexions, argues, "The blush can seem... to partake
of both body and language-supplementing language with an ephemeral materialityand novelistic usage would even suggest that, by means of the blush, body and language
are identical and simultaneous in function and effect" (3-4). In tum, as O'Farrell explains
in her reading of Pride and Prejudice, "innocence... is compromised by the knowledge
that raises the blush" (18). When Amanda blushes, Mortimer reads Amanda's body as
displaying "the glow of shame and guilt" and becomes convinced that Belgrave "was the
occasion of all the mystery which had appeared in her conduct" (237). Amanda's blush
marks her countenance with embarrassment, which in tum suggests guilty knowledge. 11
Mortimer's belief in Amanda's shame and guilt is supported by a cycle of
evidence that begins with her verbal evasions and continues with her body's language.
Although it appears as if Mortimer is merely "reading" the signs of Amanda's illness, he
is in fact producing those signs. Without his gaze, there would be no blush for him to
read. By producing the blush, he reproduces common knowledge about women: all
women would embrace sexual experiences if they could get away with it. Although
Amanda recognizes that she should be transparent and that Mortimer should be able to
view her innocent actions, she consistently refuses to disclose all the circumstances in

II By contrast, Janet Todd argues in Sensibility: An Introduction, that heroines who are women of feeling,
"convey their virtue through their meaningful bodies, and the most authentic emotions are signaled not by
words but by tears, blushes, palpitations, and fainting fits" (120). Abbey demonstrates that this equation is
by no means universal. As I argue, the inability of people to read Amanda's body language-and the
instability of meaning-form the central problem of the narrative.
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which she is involved-a decision that she makes partly in obedience to her father and
partly according her own moral sense. Caught within an emotional conflict, she blushes
regularly throughout the novel. Because Amanda appears both innocent and guilty,
Mortimer's judgment of Amanda's worthiness fluctuates. He frequently changes his mind
about courting and marrying the heroine, from their earliest encounters to the novel's
conclusion.
As he misconstrues Amanda's behavior, Mortimer reflects a deeper problem with
perception. Although he appears to rely on visuality and the evidence of his senses,
Mortimer instead relies on cultural asswnptions about women's secrecy: "[H]e had been
tempted to think she was involved in mystery: and what but impropriety, he thought,
could occasion mystery" (49). These asswnptions enable him to resolve the conflicting
signs of Amanda's body_ Roche critiques Mortimer's dependence on social cues by
juxtaposing Amanda's moral virtue with his faithless suspicions. Reading the innocent
heroine as symptomatic of moral corruption, Mortimer represents a dominant mode of
perception. He sees signs that she is virtuous, but he knows that signs can be
manipulated. Roche hints at the problem: "Lord Mortimer saw Amanda wore (at least)
the semblance of innocence: but this could not remove his suspicions, so often had he
seen it asswned to hide the artful stratagems of a depraved heart" (50). As he considers
her inexplicable actions, the hero dreads "some fatal mystery-some improper
attachment (experience had rendered him suspicious), which neither she nor her father
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could avow" (149).12 Even another suitor believes wicked Belgrave's insinuations that
Amanda has only "a specious appearance of innocence" (221). Their senses are
unreliable, the novel suggests, because they continue to equate women's secrecy with
illicit sexuality.
After he abandons his initial suspicions in the first volume, Mortimer begins to
hint at a marriage proposal, much to Amanda's delight. However, Fitzalan forbids the
relationship because Mortimer suggests a clandestine marriage, which Fitzalan believes
would damage her reputation. Amanda thus struggles to conceal her romantic feelings
from Mortimer-a simple, rather common, concealment. Yet in the Gothic novel even
banal interactions become loaded with sinister possibilities. Already under suspicion for
illicit attachments, Amanda continues to thwart Mortimer's attempts at visual penetration.
The implications of her secrecy become clear when the two meet at a ball after their
separation:
She looked up, and the first eyes she met were those of Lord Mortimer...fastened
on her face with a scrutinizing earnestness, as if he wished to penetrate the
recesses of her heart, and discover whether he yet retained a place in it. She
blushed, and looking from him perceived she was an object of critical attention to
the marchioness and Lady Euphrasia. (148)
Their reciprocal gaze has important implications. This scene is, first, a continuation of
Mortimer's misreading. The tropes of vision used by Roche here indicate the cognitive
activity that characterizes perception-Mortimer's eyes fasten, scrutinize, penetrate, and
12 Interestingly, Mortimer gothicizes Amanda's secrecy. While not used literally, the term "fatal" raises the
horror of impropriety instead of death, which in Clermont, a more conventional Gothic novel, is a real
possibility for the heroine.
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discover. Furthermore, the highly sexualized nature of his gaze correlates to his
suspicions about her sexuality and to the ways in which he produces the visible signs of
her guilt. The scene also incorporates the gaze of Amanda's villainous maternal relatives,
the marchioness and Lady Euphrasia, who wish to discover whether there is an
attachment between Amanda and Mortimer that would thwart their plans. 13
Amanda's status as an object of others' gazes reflects the tension between
objectification and subjectivization within medical discourse. I assert that the ball
represents a public arena of power in which Amanda operates with notable agency.
Foucault explains in The Birth ofthe Clinic that the patient, imbedded in a field of visual
interpretation and power, is subjected to the doctor's articulation of the ill body's
meaning and his curative abilities. As Roy Porter argues, however, eighteenth-century
English medicine encompassed a far more fluid set of power relations than Foucault's
model suggests. The practitioner and patient together established a relationship that
demanded a mutual effort to reach a cure or relief (Patient's Progress 72-95).14 Further,
as Fissell explains, "For medical practitioners, one of the most significant aspects of [the]
attention to body surface was the power that it gave to the patient. ... Ifillness' meaning
were to be read from the body's surface, anyone [including the patient] could be the
reader" (Fissell 31). Putting Amanda in this framework, we see that she also rejects the

13 Amanda's maternal relatives, desiring a match between Lady Eupbrasia and Mortimer, suspect his
attachment to Amanda and determine to discover her feelings. Acting as a spy for the Roslins, Lady
Greystock carefully observes Amanda: "Delicacy sealed the lips of Amanda and guarded her secret. ... But
though she could command her words, she could not her feelings, and they were visibly expressed in her
countenance" (171). Roche describes the limits of Amanda's concealments in order to show the reader that
Amanda is not guilty of utter duplicity.
14 For example, patients could argue with the doctor's diagnosis, disobey his instructions, and refuse to pay
for unsatisfactory service. More benignly, the patient also controlled the information with which the doctor
worked by giving him a history of her condition.
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objectifying gaze of others. She never remains passively observed and diagnosed, but
continually works to regulate her appearance, which others read. By hiding her emotion
from penetrating eyes, whether friend or foe, Amanda exercises the power ofvisuality,
much like the power a patient exercised in the clinical experience. Relying on her moral
understanding to resist pressures to reveal her secrets, the heroine also participates in the
sense of agency that heroines such as Matilda and Laurette demonstrate. There are,
however, limits to her power, which appear later in the narrative when the villains
deliberately manipulate appearances against her.
Because secrecy is such a problem for women, Roche cautiously distinguishes its
appropriate use. Mortimer, pressing Amanda for a clandestine marriage because his
father insists on a financially advantageous match with Lady Euphrasia, argues, "The
peculiar circumstances I have just mentioned will, I trust, induce my Amanda to excuse a
temporary concealment of it, till beyond the power of mortals to separate us-a private
and immediate union ... The eye of suspicion has long rested upon us" (211).
Transferring the suspicious, oppressive gaze to others, Mortimer proposes further
secrecy. Such concealment, however, repels Amanda. Obeying the "dictates of reason,"
she recognizes that it would be "guilt and misery" to marry clandestinely (212). In this
instance, Amanda rejects concealment through her rational understanding, providing in
turn a connection to my previous analysis of moral knowledge. Like the heroines of The

Castle of Wolfe nbach and The Orphan ofthe Rhine, Amanda distinguishes between

social proprieties and moral duties. Here, the two types of obligation coincide; thus, it
may be tempting to view Amanda as a figure of the "proper lady." This heroine, however,
follows a moral order that mayor may not overlap social demands, particularly those of
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transparency. As Roche once more links concealment to immorality, she clarifies the
motives that would enable Amanda to embrace secrecy without self-condemnation, the
true peril for the moral woman. Paradoxically, even Amanda's desire for openness comes
under suspicion because Mortimer cannot differentiate between the secrecy of a
clandestine marriage and that of a mysterious past. He believes that because Amanda
embraces secrecy in the latter instance, she will accept his proposal. Thus her refusal
generates more misperceptions, leading Mortimer to judge her guilty in the next
ambiguous situation.
When Amanda's relatives and Belgrave carefully orchestrate circumstances in
order to destroy her chances with Mortimer, the narrative shows that Amanda cannot
control others' perception or interpretation, has no defense against invasion by the
pathogenic man, and is thus always vulnerable to the suggestion that she is always
already defiled in some way. First, Amanda unwittingly participates in their plans by
equivocating in order to conceal an act of charity, which she believes would appear
"ostentatious." Mortimer, who knows she is not telling the complete story, gazes at her
"with the most scrutinizing earnestness," which causes her to blush and look away (236).
In concealing her charity, Amanda also hides her reason for staying home from the ball,
although she promises to tell Mortimer the following day. Far from being comforted,
Mortimer only believes that she will reveal her guilty association with Belgrave: "He
began to think her reluctance to a clandestine and immediate marriage might have
proceeded from some secret attachment" (223). The juxtaposition of Amanda's charitable
actions with Mortimer's suspicions creates an even more powerful gap between truth and
perception, reflecting in turn the problem of visual evidence. Although one might
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produce knowledge through perception, the novel demonstrates that conflicts between
different "knowledges" frequently place women at a disadvantage. The devastating
consequences of visual misinterpretation and differences in understanding, especially for
women, become increasingly clear in this episode.
When Amanda is left alone in the house, Belgrave enters unobserved. In a scene
of near-violence and imminent threat, Amanda, feeling "horror and surprise," tries to run
for the door, but he catches her, and "forcing her back to the sofa, rudely stop [s] her
mouth" (240). Her resistance heightens the atmosphere of terror and danger: '''Monster!'
exclaimed Amanda, beholding him with horror... 'Cease to torment me,' she continued,
'lest, in my own defense, I call upon those who have power, as well as inclination, to
chastise your insolence'" (241). Her attempts to escape only emphasize Belgrave's
dominance, and she finally begs him to desist, promising to "pardon and conceal what is
past" (242). The struggle here has physical dimensions-running, touching, grasping,
seizing-that shows the female body at its most vulnerable. Although he does not rape
her, Belgrave physically and emotionally torments her. As he invades the physical spaces
that the heroine occupies, the villain contaminates her, first by assaulting her body and
second by rendering secrecy her only bargaining tool. Transparency, the social openness
that should protect her, poses a particularly gendered threat when Amanda offers her
silence for safety, which she values more than potential misinterpretation of conduct. 15

15 When Amanda demands an "immediate inquiry" so that a "full discovery" might be made, the marquis
refuses: "Had not Colonel Belgrave been voluntarily admitted he never would have been concealed; no,
madam, you would have rejoiced at the opportunity our presence gave you of punishing his temerity"
(246). That Roche attributes the logic of the social gaze to the scheming villains creates a subversive
condemnation.
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The danger changes when Amanda's scheming relatives and Mortimer arrive
home early. The threat of physical violence dissipates, while the threat to Amanda's
reputation intensifies. Having contaminated the heroine with the possibility of moral
"disease," Belgrave now imperils her relationship with Mortimer. Although openness
should make Amanda less susceptible to Belgrave's infectious presence, instead it makes
her more so. She instantly recognizes that all the circumstances leading to that moment
would confirm in everyone's mind her guilt and complicity. Although the consequences
of Belgrave's presence in the house might have been the same in either case, Amanda's
decision to hide Belgrave in a closet becomes damning evidence against her. The moment
of revelation contains all the emotional extravagance of any supernatural Gothic scene:
At the mention of the closet, the blood ran cold through the veins of Amanda; but
when she saw Lady Euphrasia rise to enter it, had death, in its most frightful form,
stared in her in the face, she could not have betrayed more horror. She looked
toward it with a countenance as expressive of wild affright as Macbeth's when
viewing the chair on which the specter of the murdered Banquo sat. (244)
At once theatrical and physical, the heroine's reaction corresponds to the model of
emotionality that I explored through The Mysteries ofUdolpho. Amanda feels the
affective, bodily effects of danger as Roche takes the ghostly aspects of the Gothic and
turns them, as well as the emotional response, into realistic threats. Drawing on the horror
and terror of the supernatural, Roche makes the consequences of Belgrave's intrusion and
Amanda's secrecy all the more significant. In this particularly Gothi'cized moment,
destroyed reputations and death are conflated in ways that rape and death are not. That is,
the moral woman sees Belgrave's discovery in the closet as frightening as death. In
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consequence, the villain's association with the deadly "illness" that Mortimer believes
marks Amanda's body becomes even more pronounced.
Amanda's "symptoms" are equivocal rather than clear. When Belgrave kidnaps
the much-tormented heroine on her way to rejoin her father, Mortimer observes Amanda
in the carriage, "reclining on the bosom of Belgrave" (256). The devastated Mortimer
resigns all hopes of reconciliation. What Mortimer sees, however, is Amanda in a faint.
Mortimer reads what he needs to read in order to reduce Amanda to his image of
women's sexuality and secrecy. The equivocal nature of signs becomes an important part
of Am'Ulda's argument against Mortimer's problematic perception. When the plucky
heroine escapes from Belgrave, she returns to her father only in time to witness his death.
Alone and violently ill, Amanda finds refuge in a convent, where Mortimer offers
Amanda financial assistance but not marriage.
Their encounter at this point enables Amanda to defend herself more fully.
Amanda first tells Mortimer, "You shake your head, as much as to say you cannot think
me [innocent], after the proofs you have seen to the contrary." She declares that his
experience of the situation had been manipulated: "[T]he proofs were contrived by malice
and treachery, to ruin me in the estimation of my friends, and by perfidy to force me into
a crime of which I already bear the appearance and the stigma" (288). The evidence of
Mortimer's senses is ultimately unreliable because Amanda's enemies have constructed
false appearances and also because he is unable to control his passionate responses. His
perception, conditioned by her "appearance," is flawed. The novel demonstrates that
there is a truth to be grasped, perceived, and known, but constructions of perception
interfere with this process. When possible, the heroine fights the constructing effects of
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others through a sense of morality, individual integrity. Her "semblance of innocence" is,
in fact, no semblance at all, since she attempts to display her virtue with utmost
transparency and honesty. Nevertheless, she often conceals various experiences and, at
times, even her social identity.
As Amanda insists on her innocence, Mortimer exclaims, "[Y]ou would almost
convince me against the evidence of my own senses." This statement signals the crucial
problem for others who see the virtuous woman incorrectly, as well as the conflict that
"interested" parties might experience. First, Mortimer identifies his own senses as
uniquely individualized: they belong to him as property, and they provide a unique locus
of knowledge. The basis of knowledge is the particular individual through the physical
senses, and then through cognitive perception. Also, he separates himself ("me") from his
senses, as ifhis consciousness or self were unattached to his sensuous experiences.
Finally, Mortimer also indicates a kind of disinterested objectivity. He depends on his
own senses as deeply reliable, scientifically verifiable, and objectively true.
Amanda, however, challenges this self-conception. She replies to his comment, "I
see, my lord, you are determined to disbelieve me. But why, since so prejudiced against
me, have you come hither?" (288). The novel's most important critique comes through
this pointed question. Significantly, Mortimer's inability to "read" Amanda properly
stems in part from his previous experiences, described by the narrator as "prejudice." The
problem is that Mortimer's experience has shown him how little the body is to be trusted;
however, he still depends on Amanda's body to reveal truth. Attempting to deploy a
disinterested, almost scientific, gaze in his encounter with Amanda, Mortimer
corresponds with medical discourse's objective aims. Nevertheless, the heroine
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recognizes that Mortimer works from an assumption of guilt based on her secrecy and
from manipulated appearance. Furthermore, she asserts that prejudices have no place in
his "objective" inquiry into her guilt. His powerful position undermined, Mortimer finally
concedes: "I do not, 1 cannot believe you would deceive me. There is an irresistible
eloquence in your words that convinces me you have been the victim of treachery, and 1
its dupe." Mortimer is finally "convinced" only through an act of his own will rather than
through his senses, which have told him that the object of his affection is not purely his.
Amanda acknowledges that he only acts from love: ''Notwithstanding appearances were
so much against her, he was willing to rely solely on her own asseveration of innocence,"
and she tells him, "I can scarcely wonder at your entertaining [suspicions] when 1 reflect
on the different situations in which 1 was found" (289). She then proceeds to tell him her
entire story, which supports his act of will-albeit on most tenuous grounds as
subsequent events later prove.
Mortimer continues to attempt to generate certainty through external proofs. With
new-found conviction, Mortimer searches out all the servants and lower-class people
involved in the plot against Amanda. He questions each and puts their confessions in
writing. Having assembled evidence that proves Amanda's innocence, he returns to her
and insists that her reputation is cleared through incontrovertible proofs. At this point,
corroborating evidence allows him to believe her without hesitation. Mortimer's efforts
should create verifiable truth, but Roche complicates such activity. As Fissell notes,
"[D]irect experience, often tainted by superstition, had to be replaced by controlled and
progressive experience characterized by rationality" (184). Manipulated once before, the
hero knows that evidence can be fabricated; thus, his conclusions only weakly convince
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. him. In this manner, he can depend on his own senses, yet abandon the evidence when it
no longer suits his notion of Amanda's sexual purity.
The narrative trajectory parallels a scientific mode of inquiry: hypothesis,
evidence, and conclusions. But Roche continues the novel for another volume by
introducing a fresh threat. As Amanda and Mortimer make wedding plans with Lord
Cherbury's blessing, Belgrave's threats seem entirely dissipated. This also seems to be
the end of the narrative trajectory: the happy couple prepares to live happily ever after.
Mortimer, having gathered proof of his beloved's innocence, enjoys the certainty that
Amanda's mysteries are solved. However, the night before the wedding, Cherbury
privately reveals to Amanda his sordid tale of greed, self-indulgence, and deception.
Cherbury explains to Amanda that he had embezzled an inheritance entrusted to him and
that, should his crime become public, he would have no choice but suicide. Since
Cherbury's only hope is his son's marrying an heiress, he entreats Amanda to leave
Mortimer immediately and secretly. Horrified at his unsolicited disclosure and the threat
of suicide, Amanda most unwillingly agrees to relinquish Mortimer and to keep
Cherbury's secret. Attributing the situation in part to fate, Amanda also observes, "I am
completely the victim of Lord Cherbury-the cruel, perfidious Cherbury." She considers
ways in which she can "clear herself of an imaginary crime," but concludes that she
would only "commit a real one-since to save her own character Lord Cherbury's must
be stigmatized." Ultimately, Amanda chooses to "save" Cherbury because "not only by
the world, but by her own conscience, she should forever by accused of accelerating his
death" (337).

a
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Amanda's response is intriguing. Here, Amanda's moral sense, her desire to
follow her conscience, and her reliance on principles of natural law become most clear.
Roche indicates that, for the heroine, following her conscience is more important than the
transparency demanded by others. This is a kind of self-determination, yet it also
involves sacrifice and suffering. Thus, Roche writes a scathing indictment of Cherbury' s
manipulation and blackmail. Roche further demonstrates that Amanda's secrecy will
again lead her betrothed to judge her actions morally criminal. Later, when Cherbury
writes to thank her, Amanda remarks on his unworthiness of her sacrifice. She calls him
an "[u]nfeeling man," whose "ostentatious gratitude" disgusts her and "whose treachery
and vile deceit have ruined [her] happiness" (357). By obeying her conscience, Roche's
heroine exhibits self-determination and autonomy. Conscience is shorthand for the
system of values, beliefs, and convictions that Amanda perceives to be her "self." And
she will not violate her conscience-her "self"-for anyone, even the much-beloved
Mortimer, who does not trust her motives. Amanda instead follows the law of nature
mapped out in Gothic novels such as Wolfonbach and Orphan, refusing to preserve her
romantic relationship at the expense of human life, even a human as worthless as
Cherbury. Such considerations place Amanda above any social dictates that would cost
her moral self-approbation. This complication forces Mortimer to reevaluate his
conclusions in an endless spiral of evidence and interpretation. What else can he believe
but that she is criminally unfaithful? Based on earlier experience, he could conclude that
appearances have been contrived, that the same outside force has compelled Amanda to
behave so mysteriously. Yet her fiance asserts that she is "the slave, the prey of vice" and
that she "has deceived, inhumanly deceived" him (358).
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Months later, when Amanda again encounters her beloved, she experiences a new
crisis. First, Roche suggests that the conflation of seeming and being is a real danger for
women. When Mortimer and his party enter the room, she worries about her expressive
countenance: "Oh! Let me not by my confusion look as if I really was the guilty thing I
am supposed to be" (403). Nevertheless, she is noticeably timid, trembling, and agitated.
Amanda responds emotionally to this epistemological problem. Before, when Belgrave
appears from the closet, the heroine also experiences a sense of complicity, but here she
appro~ches

the problem in a different way.

Second, Roche complicates Amanda's perception of herself as she sees herself
through others' eyes, which "she most dreaded to encounter" (403): "She now, for the
first time, considered the strange appearance she must make among the company, if she
did not collect and compose her spirits" (404). Amanda understands that others'
perception of her appearance has the force of reality. Her manner and expressions reflect
her worry that she will appear guilty, which in tum confirms the suspicions that she fears.
Introduced by her assumed name, Amanda hears "how sad a confirmation did it
convey-that every suspicion would now be strengthened" (403). She upbraids herself,
"Ah! why, why... was I tempted to take this hated name? Why did I not prefer incurring
any danger to which my own might have exposed me, rather than assume anything like
deceit?" (403). Danger, the reason for her secrecy, at last fails to justify it. Instead,
Amanda begins to doubt her actions. She fears that appearances rather than motives or
beliefs can create reality, that she is indeed guilty because she appears so. In this moment
of doubt Roche makes Amanda a complex character, replacing the simple pattern of
virtue with a conflicted character who self-reflexively examines herself and others'
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perception of her-and who comes out with a renewed commitment to her own
conscIence.
Nevertheless, as Roche illustrates, the consequences are difficult to bear. Amanda
is "anxious to do anything which could keep her from encountering the eyes that she
dreaded" (406). Repeating this phrase, Roche emphasizes the invasive, shaming function
of the gaze. Although in other passages she celebrates Amanda's valiant martyrdom,
Roche also acknowledges that rejecting social approbation is a painful experience. The
narrator notes, "Oh! how forcibly was Amanda... convinced, if indeed her pure soul
wanted such conviction, of the pain, the shame of deception, let the motive be what it
may which prompts it" (405). The heroine, however, does not divulge her secrets and
returns to London to claim her inheritance, which exposes her to Belgrave for the fmal
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time. Belgrave discovers her identity and turns her acquaintances against her. She is in
the most perilous and vulnerable state at the end. Then all is resolved-quickly and
easily. Once turned out of her lodgings, Amanda wanders in the streets, where a friend
finds and rescues her. She awakens from a fever to find Mortimer, sorrowful and
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apologetic, at her side. The resolution to her dilemmas occurs in a narrative flashback.
Mortimer learns of Amanda's sacrifice from his repentant father, and several of the

I

villains die through accident and illness. Restored to inheritance along with her brother,
Amanda confidently marries Mortimer.
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The romantic ending, however, seems oddly unstable because Mortimer never
develops unwavering trust in Amanda's innocence and virtue. He remains trapped in a
mode of perception that always assumes women's unruliness. In tum, Amanda's rejection
of such visuality enables her to construct a powerful subject position based on personal
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values. Thwarting the gaze of others, Amanda relies on a sense of personal justice that
validates her secrecy. As the reader knows, Amanda is virtuous, innocent, and brave.
Roche creates a sympathetic bond between the reader and heroine, which in turn,
generates a new problem. The reader, typically represented as a young, middle class
woman,16 shares Amanda's secrets and her innocence. However, Mortimer's suspicions
of "guilty knowledge" also become a part of the reader's experience. The reader's
sympathy for Amanda places her (or him) in a precarious position of identification-and
encourages a similar subversion of social transparency. As Roche subverts Mortimer's
gaze, perception, and interpretation, she also critiques the cultural gaze that demands
virtue on display. Although the power deployed by perception is significant, Roche
destabilizes the certainty and thus the power of the external gaze. Since women's secrecy
is often associated with sexuality, Roche illustrates the potential dangers and
complications of Amanda's choices. Ultimately, however, Roche neutralizes the romantic
and sexual dangers, supplying instead a self-assured, vindicated heroine who is rewarded
with marriage and inheritance.

Legal Perception and the Juridical Gaze in Clermont
In my analysis of Clermont I continue to examine the cultural concern with
perception, turning to legal discourse in order to map out a separate, though related, set ofproblems. Like The Children ofthe Abbey, this novel demonstrates the dangerous
potential of secrecy. Although Madeline Clermont also decides to keep secrets for others,

16 See Jacqueline Pearson's Women's Reading in Britain, 1750-1835: A Dangerous Recreation. Pearson
documents cultural anxieties over women's reading, although men also read romance novels (cf.
Northanger Abbey's Henry Tilney).
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however, Roche focuses more on the discoveries of this intently curious, perceptive
heroine rather than on her concealments. This change in focus has two effects. First,
Madeline serves as the subject rather than the object of observation in most scenes. In
consequence, she does not experience the same struggle to resist the oppressive gaze of
others. Second, Madeline's discoveries draw attention to the problem of crime that
structures the Gothic genre. Addressing legal crimes more than moral transgressions,

Clermont shifts the problem (and power) of perception to the juridical gaze. Surrounded
by mystery, Madeline continually interprets potentially meaningful signs in order to
understand her own place in the world, yet her perceptual assumptions are not
conditioned, as are Mortimer's, by the physical evidence of her senses. Instead, she
processes what she sees through a sense ofjustice, obligation, and rationality.
In Clermont the juridical gaze structures the heroine's first articulations of guilt
and innocence. A self-policing subject, Madeline Clermont also appears to be a docile
body, ready to recognize and condemn her own illicit desires. I argue that this
internalized gaze has a surprising corollary. Because Madeline has a "natural" ability to
judge her own behavior, she has the authority to judge others. The internal gaze moves
outward as Madeline experiences the mysteries and terrors that others' secrets have
created. She finds herself involved in a number of threatening, mysterious events and
becomes an instinctive if reluctant detective. Her intelligence and curiosity, however
disciplined and docile, enable her to penetrate such mysteries. Uncovering others' secrets,
sometimes purposely and sometimes inadvertently, Madeline must make the choice
whether or not to keep those secrets. Her decisions ultimately reflect her complex
relationship to positive law and her dependence on ideals of natural law.
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The novel begins with a typical pastoral scene. Madeline lives in a rustic
mountain cottage with her father, whose mysterious and painful past piques Madeline's
curiosity and her compassion. The narrative tension, for the first several chapters, comes
from Clermont's secrets, which generate Madeline's internal conflict. Initially, she
demonstrates curiosity about her father's sadness and reluctance to discuss his past. As
the plot develops, the heroine realizes that Clermont's history includes violent crimes.
Finally, she learns that her father murdered his half-brother. 17 Throughout the novel,
however, paternal authority inhibits Madeline's perception, adding another layer of
power to the already problematic nature of the female gaze. In Abbey, the exchange of
looks and glances occurrs mainly among lovers and enemies. In Clermont, Roche uses
the father-daughter relationship to work through the implications of the female gaze. To
begin with, Madeline suffers guilt when she considers spying on Clermont. Also, she
listens to his stories with a mixture of skepticism and belief. Futhermore, she is
blackmailed with the "truth" of his past. Finally, she chooses to hide his crimes, even
fearing the "agents ofjustice" that the wicked d' Alemberts call on to punish Clermont.
Early in the novel, Madeline attempts to suppress her desire to discover
Clermont's past, yet she contemplates actions that provoke guilt and self-punishment.
When an old acquaintance of Clermont's, Countess Merville, accidentally comes across
their cottage, Madeline's curiosity leads her nearly to eavesdrop on her father's (rather
17ln a [mal twist, the reader learns that Clennont did not kill his brother, although he did attempt murder.
After Clennont stabbed Phillipe, the villainous D'Alembert finished the crime. Thus, Clennont believes
(until the last scene of the novel) that he is a murderer, and this is the secret he attempts to hide from his
daughter. Clennont's self-identification as a criminal is a crucial difference between Clermont and
Udolpho, in which Emily also suspects her father ofa "crime" (adultery). In Clermont Madeline's
suspicions coincide with her father's (false) beliefs about his past. Further, although she too polices her
desire to know more about her father, Emily does not demonstrate the continuous curiosity that Madeline
does.
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suspicious) pre-dawn rendezvous with Merville. After momentarily considering this
possibility, Madeline thinks, "Fie, fie, Madeline, what a wretch art thou! how unworthy
of his goodness! [...] I am resolved I will punish myself for it; henceforward I'll never
express the smallest curiosity to be acquainted with his affairs" (30). The narrator
comments, "Oh, Innocence! first of blessings! how tasteless without thee would all the
pleasures of life appear to a heart of sensibility!" (30-31). Although guilt and innocence
are not exclusively juridical, these feelings have a clear link to natural law, which
emphasizes moral sensitivity, as well as to postmodern constructions ofjuridical
subj ectivity. Roche creates a heroine who has no need for an external judge because she
is a self-regulating, self-punishing subject. In this moment, Madeline splits herself in two:
the guilty self that has transgressed moral boundaries and the lawful self that functions as
the "internal spectator."
As Adam Smith explains in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments (1759), selfapprobation can come only through viewing one's actions as an "impartial spectator":
The man who has broke thro' all those measures of conduct, which can alone
render him agreeable to mankind, tho' he should have the most perfect assurance
that what he had done was forever to be concealed from human eye, it is all to no
purpose. When he looks back upon it, and views it in the light in which the
impartial spectator would view it. .. [he] is abashed and confounded... and
necessarily feels a very high degree of that shame which he would be exposed to,
if his actions should ever come to be generally known. (251)
By imagining an external viewer, Smith explains, the moral individual can guide his own
actions. Smith depends on a model of sympathy, in which one can enter almost
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completely into another's emotional or physical state, to make his claims about the nature
of human morality. In his discussion of Smith, John Bender states, "The breath of
sympathy animates the whole system, which always remains, fundamentally, a matter of
self-judgment and self-inflicted punishment" (223). Bender argues that the penitentiary
operated along similar lines, yet more effectively and with a wider scope:
Citizens at large function, in imagination, as the beholders of penitentiary
punishment, picturing themselves at once as the objects of supervision and as
impartial spectators enforcing refonnation of character on the isolated other. The
essence of the Panopticon lies, as with Smith's impartial spectator, in its
construction of an impersonal beholder.... [I]nspection is not so much a physical
condition as a way of living in a transparent world. (228)
Focusing on legal technologies of discipline, Bender argues that the reciprocal gaze
within the penitentiary spread into the cultural imagination and provided a powerful
incentive to regulate one's own behavior.
Although Foucault and Bender identify the juridical gaze with penitentiary
structures, eighteenth-century laws regulating evidence also suggest a way of seeing and
explaining others' actions. In The Law ofEvidence (1795-96), Sir Geoffrey Gilbert
explains that evidence must be judged according to a scale of probability. Careful and
impartial perception can generate "legal certainty." The "degrees of evidence" range from
"perfect Certainty and Demonstration, quite down to Improbability and unlikeliness; even
to the Confines of impossibility" (56). Gilbert also asserts, "All Certainty is a clear and
distinct Perception: and all clear and distinct Perceptions depend upon a Man's own
proper Senses" (57). What witnesses provide, according to Gilbert, is a perception of
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events that jurists can evaluate: "[W]hen we cannot see or hear any thing ourselves, and
yet are obliged to make a judgment of it, we must see and hear by Report from others:
which is one step farther from Demonstration, which is founded upon the View of our
own Senses" (58). Testimony concentrated on first-hand, eyewitness accounts and
illustrated that every person could be a potential witness. Gazing, observing, and
perceiving, witnesses provided important evidence in law. Although Gilbert asserts that
the best witness is not materially involved, he does state, "[T]he [injured] Party may be a
Witness, where there is a Fine to the King, and no private Advantage arising to himself,
'immediately or consequentially,' from the Prosecution," but not if the party would
receive "private Benefit" from the case (215). Thus, criminal cases allowed injured
parties to testify for themselves.
Gilbert raises significant issues in this passage. First, his explanation that the ideal
witness is impartial sets up a dichotomy between private interestedness and public
disinterestedness, which supplements the impartial spectator theory articulated by Smith
and referred to by Bender. Not swayed by self-interest, the private citizen can support
civil society, as well as the legal system. Although a crucial part of the judicial system,
however, the witness also becomes an unstable aspect because the nature of perception
always biased, always interpretive-renders the gaze imprecise. Gilbert notes, "The first
and lowest Proof, is the Oath of one Witness only... Now that which sets aside his
Credit, and overthrows his Testimony, is the Incredibility of the Fact, and this
Repugnancy of his Evidence: for if the Fact be contrary to all manner of experience and
observation, it is too much to receive it upon the Oath of one Witness" (257). Legal
commentary reiterates that the evidence of an individual's senses is unstable, tenuous,
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uncertain--even while it must be definitive, believable, reliable. One way out of this
conundrum is the presence of others, of corroborating evidence: "The Second Degree of
Credibility, is from the Oaths of two several Witnesses" (258). Because credible,
impartial witnesses enable the legal system to operate within degrees of certainty,
surveillance of others becomes a social, legal, and moral imperative. Indeed, as Henry
Tilney states in Northanger Abbey "every man is surrounded by a neighbourhood of
voluntary spies" in England (156).
This policing gaze, however, is more problematic for women, as the novel
demonstrates. Madeline is the perfect juridical subject, one who can imagine the
guiltiness of her future actions and who feels remorse before she even commits
transgressions. Seeing herself through the eyes of the other, she responds properly to
private, illicit temptations with an open display of repentance. After confessing to
Clermont her momentary weakness, Madeline receives a stern warning not to attempt to
penetrate the mysteries of his life. He intones,
"[J]udge of the horrors which ever attend misconduct, and strive to avoid them by
ever resisting inclinations that side not with your duties: to oppose our passions, is
finally to conquer them [...] and no victory can be so glorious as one obtained
over them; 'tis applauded by our reason, sanctioned by our conscience, and
applauded by him who records the smallest effort in the cause of virtue." (31)
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For Clermont, the internal gaze is reason and conscience, which will enable Madeline to
behave properly. The external gaze is God, who will reward Madeline's virtue. 18 Roche
also introduces Gothic emotion, horror, into what seems a fairly tame incident.
Significantly, Clermont warns his daughter about the dangers of seeking
forbidden knowledge-not, as one would expect, about the dangers of emotional excess
that supposedly accompanies sensibility. Her "passions" and "inclinations" are simply
curiosity, intelligence, and desire for information about her father's past. In Anthony
MandaI's analysis, however, sensibility and emotion continue to dominate the heroine's
characterization: "The essential difference between Udolpho and Clermont is that the
sentimental preponderances of the Rochean heroine are not perceived to be dangerous or
excessive in any way.,,19 MandaI's observation, while somewhat useful, ignores the
difference in the heroines' fathers, which in turn differentiates the dangers that their
daughters face. For Madeline, intelligence is potentially far more dangerous than
sentimentality because her discovery of her father's criminal past, as I will explore,
initiates a nearly unbearable conflict between familial interests and juridical obligation.
Emily, on the other hand, cannot find her father guilty of any crime and thus can remain
the obedient daughter. Because Roche shifts the source of danger from emotion to
intellect, we get a novel that explores the conflict between sentiment and reason in its
juridical dimensions. Although Madeline's early perfections appear to leave no room for

18 Bender writes, "Formal institutions merely enforce and regulate the juridical construction of self as the
focal point of inspection by a potentially infinite number of imagined spectators" (223). Interestingly,
Clermont's pastoral beginning, similar to that of many Gothic novels, eliminates the "formal institutions"
and numerous spectators. Roche then replaces social inspection with a divine witness.
19 Anthony MandaI. "Revising the Radcliffean Model: Regina Maria Roche's Clermont and Jane Austen's
Northanger Abbey", CardiffCorvey: Reading the Romantic Text 3 (September 1999). Online: Internet
(February 18, 2004): <http://www.c£ac.uk/encap/corvey/articles/cc03_n03.html>.
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growth, Roche changes the implications of Madeline's self-discipline by introducing
Gothic horrors. What becomes increasingly clear is that the second aspect of the gaze
policing others-has a crucial but complicated place in Madeline's experience.
Through her experiences with de Sevignie, the sensitive young man with whom
she falls in love, Madeline learns that she should uncover certain mysteries, and
subsequently, she learns to deploy the external gaze, to act as a judging spectator. Briefly
introduced at the beginning, the secretive suitor provides a counterpart to Clermont's
reticence. When Clermont makes inquiries about his background and family, de Sevignie
departs abruptly from their home, leaving Madeline sad and wan. After Clermont sends
her to live with the wealthy Countess Merville, whom she comes to regard as a mother,
de Sevignie returns to the narrative. To Madeline's dismay, their reunion is marred by his
strange reserve and by his inexplicable responses. In one encounter impassioned and
adoring, in another cold and formal; de Sevignie provides yet another mystery to unravel.
Madeline surmises that her beloved might have financial embarrassments that prevent the
match, a supposition she mentions to the Countess. Recognizing that poverty can be a
barrier to marriage, Countess Merville explains her intention to leave Madeline a
settlement generous enough for a comfortable living. De Sevignie's odd behavior,
however, demands an explanation. She counsels Madeline:
"Inform him then [ ...] that you have made me your confidant, also what I said
concerning him, and my intentions; if he can give the required explanation; but
remember Madeline, you tell·him, that it must be an explanation so clear,--so full,
that not a shadow of doubt shall remain after it; that, except every thing
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mysterious is fully elucidated, Madeline Clennont and he, must in future be
strangers to each other" (104).
Encouraging Madeline's curiosity and reasoning, Merville authorizes, even insists upon,
Madeline's active attempts to uncover de Sevignie's secrets. Unable to bear her scrutiny,
de Sevignie leaves without explanation once more?O Madeline, confused and unhappy,
agrees with the Countess that full disclosure alone would have enabled their romance to
continue.
As in Abbey, mystery implies guilt or impropriety and creates a barrier to
romance. In Clermont the hero rather than the heroine must remain open to the gaze of
society (even a society as small as an intimate family circle), yet this gender inversion
does not disrupt the need for social transparency, which enables romantic relationships to
flourish. What does change is the nature of the heroine's gaze. Although Madeline
observes, speculates, and reasons in order to understand de Sevignie, she does not read
her beloved's body for signs of truth. She notices a shift in behavior, but his body does
not come within her probing looks. In turn, the assumption of sexual secrets simply does
not exist in Madeline's inquisitive gaze. The novel carves out a powerful space for the
heroine who, instead of replicating social assumptions, deploys visual perception to
uphold her understanding of moral obligations.
The inversion of gender matters much less than the positioning of authority within
the mysterious relationship. For Madeline, her father's opacity is inviolable because of
parental authority-a lesson she seems to know from the beginning of the narrative. The

20 Ultimately Madeline's conclusions prove correct: her suitor was ashamed of his relative poverty. As the
novel ends, however, de Sevingie learns that he is heir to a fortune and title.
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mysteries of her beloved, however, command no such compliance. This easy dichotomy
between parent and suitor becomes complicated as Madeline is exposed to crimes. When
Merville is murdered, Roche instigates a crisis in Madeline's understanding of
transparency, which she continues when Madeline hears about her grandmother's
experiences. Madeline learns that victimized women experience intense conflict when
faced with the contradictions between public demands and private interests. Countess
Merville and Madeline's grandmother provide Madeline with models offeminine
responses to personal violations that enable her to develop her own stance regarding her
father's crime, which eventually becomes a central struggle for Madeline.
In an explicitly violent scene, Madeline and the servant Agatha find the

Countess, already suffering from a terminal illness, stabbed in a nearby monastery.
While bleeding on the floor of the chapel, the Countess swears Madeline and Agatha to
silence about the crime and the perpetrator.
"Dearly shall he, who raised that hand against you, rue his crime," exclaimed
Agatha; "I know the villain-I discovered his accursed confidant near the chapel,
and 1 will bring him to punishment, though my own life should be forfeited by
doing so."
"Mistaken woman," said the Countess in a hollow voice, "how would you avenge
me? is it by exposing to infamy and death those more precious to me than life
by giving to my heart a deeper wound than my body has sustained?"
"This spot 1 will not quit!-no aid will 1 receive-on this cold marble will 1 die
except you promise to give up such an intention--except you swear, solemnly
swear, [...] never to divulge to mortal ear the author of my injuries." (121)
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Taken back to her home, the Countess slowly declines and eventually dies on a wildly
stormy night. It is my claim that the juridical gaze should work well here. According to
Gilbert's Laws ofEvidence, Agatha's eyewitness account would provide substantial
evidence to convict the criminal, even if her testimony would not offer the highest degree
of certainty. In addition, the dead victim's testimony, to which both Agatha and Madeline
could attest, would provide significant proofs. Positive law also demands, as a civic duty,
the exposure of homicides. Blackstone argues that crimes such as murder are not
"confined to individuals only," but are instead "of much more extensive consequence"
(4.176). They violate not only the law of nature but also "the public peace"; furthermore,
"by their example and evil tendency they threaten and endanger the subversion of all civil
society" (4.176). By abandoning realistic legal obligations, Roche's fantastic plot twist
exposes the vexed relationship betweenjustice and family in women's lives, a tension
that Madeline acutely experiences at the novel's conclusion.
At first glance, Countess Merville denies her family and herself the justice that
crime demands. She creates a mystery where apparently none need exist. Although she
earlier indicates that transparency is desirable, here Countess Merville demands secrecy.
Indeed, she describes the exposure necessary for legal punishments as deeply harmful.
For Merville, then, private interests take precedence over public law. The Gothic impulse
to privacy and isolation, so often represented in the remote, exotic settings, is especially
powerful in this scene. The Countess refers to a personal economy ofjustice as she
rejects the transparency of law and its mechanisms (such as arrest, trial, and execution).
Later in the narrative, the reader discovers that the Countess's son-in-law murdered her.
The Countess feared that accusing D'Alembert would result in repercussions for her
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daughter. Knowing that her son-in-law is motivated by inheritance, the Countess
correctly assumes that her daughter's life would be endangered by D'Alembert ifhe were
exposed as a murderer. Until this revelation occurs, however, Madeline (as well as the
reader) only knows that secrecy, even for capital crimes, can be necessary or desirable.
She learns that secrecy is a choice, even if the motives for it remain unclear. Now a
witness to an actual crime, though ignorant ofthe perpetrator, Madeline chooses to hide it
at the request of Merville, taking an oath that she holds more sacred than the obligations
of positive law.
Roche creates a trangressive fantasy: justice, or at least the relationship of women
to positive law, can be determined by women's individual choices. Here the Countess
insists that her murder is her own to conceal or disclose as she sees fit. She exercises
power over her property in herself by choosing how violations of that property will be
handled. Rejecting the openness that will endanger her daughter, the Countess relies on
her own values and on a sense ofjustice to her family. Merville's decision indicates a
moment of power and choice, which is fascinating since it is also a moment of intense
"violent vulnerability" (Bruhm 1). At the very moment that her daughter's husband
violates her body by piercing it with a dagger (a sexualized image that emphasizes
masculine forms of domination), she also exercises much power over the way in which
that violation will be handled. Although Diane Hoeveler argues that Gothic writers
depended on a kind of victim feminism, this scene does not show a woman who acquires
a special sense of self through her victim status. Instead, Merville demonstrates female
power in the face of, or in spite of, victimization. Although women's choices are
complicated by women's internalized notions of sociability, domestic responsibility, and
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affective relations, Roche nevertheless creates a female character that is not defined by
vulnerability or violation: Merville remains in control of herself and her family
relationships.
The sense that women must control family, and thus legal, relationships continues
in the tale of Madeline's grandmother. From Clermont, Madeline learns of a family
history marred by deceit, crime, and passion, which provides the heroine with another
important example of feminine response to moral and legal crimes. In particular, she
learns how legal transparency protects women and how certain private demands might
hamper or compel such transparency. The grandmother, Madeline St. Foix, had agreed to
marry her beloved in secret to protect his future inheritance, yet after the birth of
Clermont, St. Julian coldly informed his wife that he intended to abandon her and deny
their marriage. He warned, "Madeline...be wise, nor mar my good intentions towards
you by useless endeavours to support claims, which I am determined to deny; 'tis
impossible, you know, for you to prove your marriage; there were, you may recollect, no

witnesses to it, and with the name of the priest who performed the ceremony you are
unacquainted" (226, my italics).
Through this tale, Roche invokes the gaze of society and law. In particular, she
alludes to the Marriage Act of 1753, which was designed to protect women, particularly
heiresses, from seduction and inappropriate marriages. 21 In a significant move towards
social transparency, The Act for the Better Preventing of Clandestine Marriages,
commonly referred to as the Marriage Act, stipulated that banns must be "published in an

As I will explore more fully in the next chapter, this purpose was highly contested by many critics, who
denounced the Act as unfair, punitive, and elitist.
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audible manner" in a church or chapel for three Sundays precedin'g the marriage (469). A
week before the ceremony the minister must have written notice of the names and
residence of the parties. Marriages in which either party is under twenty-one years old
were considered void, unless the parent or guardian publicly agreed to the union.
Licenses were also restricted: only persons who resided in a parish for four weeks or
more could be granted a marriage license. The Act significantly curtailed the authority of
ecclesiastical courts in marriage

matter~;

they could no longer "compel a Celebration of

any Marriage ... by reason of any Contract of Marriage whatsoever" (476) Yet the
marriages had to be performed in a church, which was required to maintain public parish
books of all unions. Most importantly, the Act required two witnesses besides the
minister, "in order to preserve the Evidence of Marriage, and to make the Proof thereof
more certain and easy" (477). While the Act simply enforced rules that had been on the
law books for centuries, it was an important move toward putting marriage on display as
a public transaction, under the scrutiny of public gaze.
The problem raised by Gilbert in his Law ofEvidence finds dramatic expression
in this scene. Although Madeline St. Foix can generate "clear and distinct perception" for
herself, she cannot provide a verifiable report that will satisfy others' need for certainty.
Furthermore, Madeline appears to seek "private benefit," another condition that,
according to Gilbert, renders a witness less reliable. Thwarted by evidentiary assumptions
and her faithless husband's insinuations, Madeline's attempts to claim her rightful
position as his wife fail miserably. As others unjustly assume her mercenary motives, this
wronged woman experiences an internal conflict. In the letter, Madeline tells her son,
"Oh! agonizing in the extreme to divulge to my son the crimes of his father. Oh! St.
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Julian, beloved, though perjured from every mortal eye, I would have concealed those
crimes, had not justice to your child compelled me to disclose them" (231). The conflict
that Madeline experiences initially appears to be between justice and family. Madeline
would have perjured herself, making herself into an unlawful subject by admitting that
her marriage was void, in order to conceal his crime. Yet the obligations of natural lawthat is, providing for one's child-undennine Madeline's romantic desire to conceal her
husband's crimes toward herself. As Madeline St. Foix follows the law of nature, she
collapses the divide between public and private spheres: justice, a supposedly public
virtue, becomes intensely personal with the introduction of a beloved infant. For these
Gothic women, justice is always relational, linking self and other in a moral framework.
TIrrough the story of her grandmother, Madeline learns that women can demand
restitution or conceal crime, according to a personal measure ofjustice. These women
conceal crimes or neglect to punish their oppressors when it serves the needs of a
precious "other."
In both Abbey and Clermont Roche gestures to the Marriage Act to limit her
authorization of secrecy, yet the narratives always threaten to break down the cultural
gaze as they depict women's ability to maintain moral integrity while keeping secrets.
Because secrecy implies illicit or dangerous knowledge, however, the narrative must
address this issue. When Clennont explains, "I carefully concealed my story from you,
well knowing from your sensibility the pain you would feel if acquainted with my
injuries" (242), he presents a paternalistic view of women's knowledge, in which women
are too fragile, too emotional, to handle disturbing truths. Clennont's reference to
Madeline's sensibility also underscores the conjunction of pain and sympathy, which
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renders women particularly susceptible to tales of woe (Bruhm 88). Furthermore, his
excuses for concealment emphasize the physical nature of women's emotions, an almost
tactile sense of the embodied mind's response.
Yet Roche substitutes Clermont's view with a more complex response formed
through pressures of loyalty, obedience, and love rather than just emotional delicacy.
Madeline does feel saddened by her father's story, but she also experiences doubts about
his openness, remaining unsatisfied after their conversation: "[H]e ceased without
gratifying the curiosity of Madeline: much of his story, she was convinced, remained
untold, and she shuddered as she thought it was concealed merely because it was too
dreadful to be known" (243). Roche creates a conflict here: on the one hand, Madeline
does respond with tears, as Clermont supposes; on the other hand, her ungratified
curiosity indicates that she desires even "dreadful" knowledge. Unable to be simply the
obedient and sympathetic daughter, Madeline becomes an intellectual thus somewhat
autonomous agent as she evaluates her father's tale-and subsequently experiences
Gothic emotions of fear and dread. Although she received but a hint from. Countess
Merville of a much more violent and horrific past, Madeline begins to piece together the
information she has received:
"She told me," cried Madeline, "and her lips knew not falsehood, that the
calamities of his life were unprecedented; that its characters were marked by
horror, and stained with blood; --but in the view he gave me of it, no such
calamities, no such characters met my eye; 'tis therefore too evident, that much of
it remained concealed." (251)
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Processing information and reconciling conflicting accounts, Madeline becomes an
emblem of self-determination, an individual structured primarily by visual perception
rather than by sensation.
Visuality poses a significant problem in Abbey but becomes desirable in Clermont
because it enables women to resist constructions of "sensibility," defined by touch rather
than by sight, which however denigrated, still remains the master sense. Here the gender
inversion within Clermont, from Mortimer's gaze to Madeline's, becomes pertinent.
Referring to Madeline's "eye," Roche draws attention to women's cognitive ability to
piece together the evidence of their senses. What is evident to Madeline, what she cannot
fail to perceive, is oddly enough a lacuna in the "view" Clermont gives her. This is a new
response on Madeline's part, which sterns from her earlier decision to keep Merville's
murder a secret. She continually expresses curiosity about her father's past; here, she
doubts his complete honesty. Madeline's perception and reason lead her to question her
,1
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father's story, linking her ability to judge the information she receives to her sense of
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individualism. Unable to trust Clermont, Madeline looks to multiple sources of
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information to decide what the truth must be. As she breaks away from parental wisdom,
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as she attempts to reason privately beyond,her father's story, as she trusts the evidence of
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her own senses, the heroine experiences self-determination.
Roche's argument about women's ability to perceive, reason, and judge becomes

j
j

most clear as Madeline's suspicions become agonizing. Although Madeline consciously
refuses to probe the mystery further out of a sense of respect and duty to Clermont, she
continues to suspect that her father might be a murderer: '''Oh, God!' she cried to herself,
while every nerve was strained with agony at the idea, 'should the suspicions that now

IIIIIIII

184
rack my breast be just!-This torture of suspense is more than I can bear,' continued she;
'I will throw myself at the feet of my father, I will disclose to him my suspicions'" (253).
Interestingly, the pain that Madeline describes here is not the pain of sympathy that her
father fears will result from his tale, but it is the pain of doubt and possibilities. As in the
beginning of the narrative, Madeline's impulse to remain transparent occurs when she
attempts to police her father. Here again she feels the need to discipline her disloyal
thoughts through confession and display. Unlike the earlier incident, however, this one is
not easily resolved because her ideas are too close to the truth. Corroborated by multiple
avenues of evidence, Clermont's guilt separates Madeline from her duties as a daughter.
Instead of confessing her thoughts, she contemplates the effects that such a disclosure
might have on their relationship. The "interested" nature of their secrets differentiates
Clermont and Madeline. Whereas Clermont conceals his own criminal past, Madeline
conceals crime at the victim's insistence. In consequence, Madeline affirms personal
justice over public obligation, an affirmation she continues to uphold when confronted
with her father's crime.
Before Madeline knows the extent of Clermont's transgressions, the tension
between her need to know the truth and her desire to protect her father impels her to
repress thought and judgment: '''I must not think,' said she, 'since thought is so
dreadful'" (254). Roche first presents the expected response of a proper lady: filial
obedience and propriety to the point of mindlessness. Too dreadful to be known, truth
must be suppressed when it threatens to undo the parent-child relationship. Madeline's
desperate attempt to secure the parental bonds contradicts all the intelligent perception
she has demonstrated in the narrative. This extreme expression of anti-individualism
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constitutes another fonn of sacrificing self for other. Roche, however, does not sacrifice
her heroine completely. Instead, she counteracts the effects of Madeline's resolution with
the narrator's commentary: "Saddened beyond expression by obtrusive ideas, she strove
to banish that sadness by banishing thought-but, ah! how vain the effort! the 'vital spark
of heavenly flame' within us must be extinguished, ere we can cease to think" (255).
Roche creates an authorial message about women's ability to think, even in the face of
improper conclusions. If Madeline trusts her own perceptions, then she opposes her
father's authority and his attempts to impose his "view" on her "eye." In a bold turn,
Roche argues that Madeline's thoughts are appropriate because they are natural. Turning
the issue of natural ability into autonomy, the narrator's comments indicate that thinking
is irresistible and that Madeline should continue to participate in intellectual activity,
which will in turn enable her to be a lawful subject. Yet such thoughts do have
consequences, creating tensions that eventually lead to a temporary suspension of self
and thought.
Before Madeline experiences that brief insanity, Roche draws further attention to
the split between Madeline's will to knowledge and her physical limitations. During
Clennont's conversation with his father, Madeline is shocked to hear Clennont change
the story he told her and becomes certain of her earlier suspicions. Wishing vengeance on
the murderer ofPhillipe St. Julian (his son and Clennont's half brother), the Marquis
rages, "[S]till then will I trust, 0 God! that some heaven-directed hand shall point out the
murderer of my son" (261). In a ghoulish and supernatural turn, a hand pokes out from
behind a tapestry and gestures toward Clennont, a hand that only Madeline observes.
Her response is curious: "Shrieking aloud, she started from her seat, and, with a desperate

.
186
resolution, was flying to the wall in order to examine it, when her strength and senses
suddenly receded, and she fell fainting on the floor" (262). While her fainting and
shrieking are expected, her resolve to uncover the mystery is not. Intriguingly, her first
impulse is to "examine" the source of the mystery. If suspicions are so dreadful, then
Madeline's attempt to examine the next mystery she encounters has important
implications. One implication is that she has reinstated her earlier intellectual curiosity
and no longer strives to "banish thought." Another consideration is that her conscious
efforts are undermined by her physical responses. Her body-strength and senses-shuts
down at the crucial point of discovery. Fainting represents a lack of perception, of
consciousness, of control. 22 Here, it also illustrates the heroine's lack of resources. What
indeed would she do with the information she would discover by pulling back the
tapestry? Would she bring this ghostly event in to the prosaic world of realism, and thus
into the realm ofjuridical power? If her father were proved a murderer, what
responsibility would Madeline bear as the one who exposed the truth to the Marquis?
Perception, Roche indicates, is not always a solution for women governed by love and
loyalty. However, these questions arise once more when Madeline leamsjust what her
father's past holds.
Depicted as a visual process, Madeline's desire for knowledge ceases somewhat
after she learns from the villainous d'Alembert the secret her father has hidden.
Supplying a blood-encrusted dagger as physical proof, d' Alembert explains that
Clermont actually murdered his brother after overhearing servants discussing Phillipe's

22 This aspect has been explored in part by Bruhm in Gothic Bodies. As he argues, Emily's fainting
demonstrates the danger of over-sympathetic responses to others.
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treachery. Clermont learned that, before he met Geraldine (his wife), Phillipe and
Geraldine were engaged in a sexual affair that resulted in her pregnancy. The servants
talked about how the couple hid the affair from Phillipe's wife by arranging Geraldine's
marriage to Clermont. After he finished listening to the story, Clermont, in a passionate
rage, stabbed his brother and left him bleeding on the ground. Madeline hears the story
with horror, but after her father corroborates the tale, she is satisfied with the facts and
must then act upon that knowledge, which always implies an obligation.
Like Countess Merville and her grandmother, she must make a decision about the
crime she discovers. From the choices of those two women, Madeline leans that she can
choose to conceal or expose family crime. The transparency demanded by positive law,
therefore, becomes less a public duty than a private choice. In some ways, this is a rather
disturbing conclusion. While it puts a great deal of power in women's hands by making
them responsible for legal justice, it is also a burden for women, as it forces them to
navigate an already perilous divide between private and public domains. The pressure of
domestic loyalties can lead to further victimization. Roche does not provide an easy
solution-in fact, there appears to be no solution at all to this dilemma. Instead, there are
just consequences for the heroine's SUbjectivity. In Madeline's case, the consequence is
Gothic terror and madness, following a much more powerful position of resistance and
fortitude.
Madeline demonstrates a strong sense of familial obligation when D'Alembert
attempts to coerce her into marrying his son by threatening to expose her father's crimes
to legal authorities. Faced with blackmail, Madeline, sensing that the young D'Alembert
might only seek financial gain, agrees with her father's plan to sign away her rights to the
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Marquis de Montmorenci's fortune. She eagerly offers the vast estates she will inherit
from her paternal grandfather in exchange for her father's security. For the heroine who
owns estates, maintaining property never takes precedence over affective, familial
relationships. In this, Roche again places legality at the service of moral obligations.
When D'Alembert refuses her offer, however, Madeline's choice to conceal her father's
crime by caving to blackmail results in an unbearable position of sexual vulnerability.
Transparency seems to be the only safe option for Madeline, but transparency would
expose her father to legal punishment. The social gaze that proves such a problem in
Abbey appears once more as ineffectual. Roche's clear warnings about clandestine

marriages only partially address the nature of the gaze; the novel continues to explore
how transparency might fail to secure personal safety.
Madeline dramatically experiences these tensions in the novel's final scenes.
After learning that the young d' Alembert has imprisoned his wife and lied about her
death, Madeline escapes by hiding in an empty mansion. Suspicious of the housekeeper
and her nephew who help her hide, the intrepid heroine attempts to temper fear and
imagination with fortitude and reason: "I will then exert myself.... I will combat my
fears, nor to the pressure of real evils add those of imaginary ones" (335). In an assertion
that recalls the imaginary terrors of Emily st. Aubert, Madeline affirms her ability to
exert control over her cognitive processes. She soon recognizes, however, that she is in
real danger: Dupont is indeed the young D'Alembert. As he attempts to force the
marriage, Madeline is fiery, articulate, angry, and proud:
The fear of Madeline gave way to indignation; her eyes flashed fire; she rose, and
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looked upon him with scorn. "And what punishment does the villain merit who
forced me to such actions?" she exclaimed. "What punishment does he merit who
assumes a name but for the purpose of deceiving, who spreads his snares for the
friendless and unhappy?" (341)
Depending on moral references that go beyond positive law, Madeline refuses to yield to
emotional weaknesses. Yet her refusal is complex and conflicted. At one moment, she
repels D'Alembert with spirited anger; at another, she weeps and pleads for her father.
In her anger, Madeline is the very picture of rebellion against injustice. Roche
grants Madeline the authority developed through her juridical gaze: able to police and
discipline her own behavior, she turns that same judgmental look on d'Alembert's
criminal behavior. There is power in Madeline's gaze. Earlier, she easily recognizes
d'Alembert as a threat: "[S]he conceived a prejudice against him; --his gentleness seemed
assumed, and there was a fierceness, a boldness in his eyes, which at once alarmed and
confused her" (333). Madeline sees that d'Alembert, then disguised as Dupont, exposes
his character through his eyes, and his boldness is an invasive glance that penetrates and
objectifies. As Madeline repels d'Alembert in her imprisonment, she returns the gaze;
this time with anger and pride.
Notwithstanding her powerful resistance, Madeline's position is an unstable one.
Solidifying the heroine's contradictory role, Roche articulates the maddening tension in
the dramatic final chapters. The heroine vacillates in her response because she must take
her father's needs into consideration. Like Merville' s ties to her daughter and Madeline

st. Foix's ties to her son, Madeline's bond with her father has a restraining effect on her
personal choices. Unlike Merville and her grandmother, however, Madeline never
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finalizes her decision. Roche does not sacrifice her heroine, but uses another option to
extricate Madeline from the situation. Fluctuating between extremes, Madeline becomes
temporarily deranged:
The agony and disappointment she experienced were too much for her; her brain
maddened; and wild as the waves which destroy the hopes of the mariners, she
raved about the room, till, utterly exhausted by the violence of her emotions, she
dropped upon the floor, where her shrieks sunk into groans, which by degrees
died away in hollow murmurs, and a total insensibility came over her. (345)
This option, while unattractive, is certainly significant. The threat of madness is a
common one in the female Gothic. Emily, for example, is frequently in danger of
madness. 23 For Roche, madness is directly related to specific aspects of Madeline's
character and experiences. First, Madeline is as unlike herself in this scene as Roche can
manage. Before, the heroine could not help but think; here she is functionally
unconscious. Earlier, she attempted to analyze her situations; now she abandons herself to
violent emotions. Instead of controlling her mind, she raves until insensible. The contrast
echoes and intensifies the earlier fainting scene.
This scene also represents a crisis for Madeline. Her wildness is the result of
imprisonment, threats, and conflict. Tom between self and parental loyalties, Madeline
must choose between a sexual relationship with d'Alembert and her father's
imprisonment and punishment. She could sacrifice herself for her father, but she refuses.
Then she yields and refuses once more. Finally, she goes mad with grief, despair, fury.

As I explored in chapter one, Emily's mental and rational capabilities are a constant source of anxiety for
the novel.
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The conflict here reflects the split in the gaze. The relationship between self and other
that has been structured by the gaze comes up in another form at the end. Madeline, even
though she is a product of the juridical gaze, cannot resolve the dialectic between self and
other because as a woman, she is always split-and can exercise power only over her
inviolable self. Now, she must abandon self for other and cannot do it. In this scene,
Madeline exhibits power and debility at the same time. Throughout the novel, Madeline
easily appropriates the internal gaze, which impels her to police herself. When she
becomes the spectator or external gaze, problems appear.
With the villain, she initially uses a judging gaze, but cannot sustain it because it
gives her no power to save her father. Instead, saving Clermont entails degradation so
horrific that she would not be able to escape the internal gaze that would condemn her. In
other words, she is subjected to the juridical gaze, even if it only comes from herself. On
the other hand, the motivations of love and loyalty with which she has struggled again
clash with the juridical dimensions of her subjectivity. Madness-an absence of the
subject or self that comes when meaning is emptied out-represents Madeline's crisis.
Roche creates a messy, shocking dilemma between self and other that she elides rather
than solves. Madeline's insanity quickly dissipates, leaving no lasting stigma or lingering
traces. Its very impermanence suggests that madness provides Roche with an
uncomplicated option for her heroine's emotional range. When Madeline revives, she is
back to her resourceful, active self.
The final chapter retraces and explains the remaining mysteries. Clermont and
Madeline learn that d' Alembert staged the conversation that implicated Clermont's wife
and half-brother in an affair. D'Alembert also killed Phillipe, whom Clermont had only
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wounded in his attack. De Sevignie, the reader discovers, is actually Phillipe's son-and
Madeline's cousin. 24 All the relationships clarified and inheritances restored, Clermont
liberally bestows forgiveness in a God-like manner. The most hardened villain, young
D'Alembert, kills himself amidst confessions and repentance. The clarity of this chapter
rivals Radcliffe's denouements. As neatly as Roche finishes the novel, however, the
conclusion leaves some critics unsatisfied. Natalie Schroeder argues that in order to
create a happy ending, Roche "rewards. and punishes some of her characters without
respect to their deserts" (137). This quality means that "Rochean characters are never
fully in control of their own destiny, unlike their Radcliffean counterparts" (137).
Schroeder's assessment is faulty in several respects. First, Radcliffe's heroines do not
fully control their destiny. Instead, they attempt to maintain control over what they can,
such as property, emotions, and judgments, within arbitrary, threatening situations. Roche
shares a similar concern over women's control, putting her in conversation with, rather
than opposition to, Radcliffe's novels. Also, because Roche's heroines are actively
involved in creating and concealing mysteries, they often seem quite independent.
Finally, and most importantly, Roche's treatment of rewards and punishments does not
distort free will but instead reflects a system in which individual choices can serve
justice.
The tropes of visuality in both The Children ofthe Abbey and Clermont signify a
conflict for the heroines. In Abbey the gaze is depicted as an objectifying force that

De Sevignie is Phillipe's legitimate son by his wife, not by Clermont's wife Geraldine, whose innocence
and faithfulness is upheld by D'Alembert's confession. D'Alembert (the elder) explains that he arranged
for Clermont to overhear the servants' scripted conversation regarding Phillipe and Geraldine's affair-but
that it was indeed a lie. The relationship between de Sevignie and Madeline, who do get married, is a close
one: their fathers are half-brothers, and their mothers are sisters.
24
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depends on cultural assumptions. Presented in medical terms, the social gaze both
produces and interprets the symptoms that Amanda exhibits. Amanda finds that others'
perception is often structured by techniques that encourage prejudice. In turn, she resists
the probing looks of friend and foe and establishes her own response to social demands of
transparency. The gaze in Clermont has two effects: it restrains and authorizes impulses
as it polices self and other. Madeline's perception enables her to examine her own
thoughts, motives, and suppositions within a moral framework. Judging others, however,
is problematic because it implies authority and autonomy, especially when she attempts
to "police" her father. In consequence, the heroine experiences a vexed relationship to
scopic power, which offers her moments of self-determination as well as painful tension.
Although their sense of moral obligation preserves their relationships to others, for
Amanda and Madeline, perception and the power that comes with it offers transgressive
possibilities for personal agency.
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Chapter Five
Diseased Spaces: Confmement in Secresy and The Wrongs of Woman
Eliza Fenwick's Secresy; or, the Ruin on the Rock (1796) and Mary
Wollstonecraft's The Wrongs of Woman: Maria, a Fragment (1798) revise the female
Gothic in significant ways. 1 Both refuse the fairy-tale resolutions of marital bliss; both
depict suffering heroines who experience no relief within the plot; and both make explicit
references to women's equality, rights, and sexuality. Although they change the content
ofthe female Gothic, Fenwick and Wollstonecraft retain the threatening environments
and masculine persecution that more conventional Gothic novels depict and then sweep
away. Secresy begins with the heroine's confinement. Secluded in Valmont Castle,
Sibella initially appears independent and healthy. As she transgresses boundaries
established by positive law, especially those circumscribing marriage, and as her faithless
lover takes refuge in those boundaries, Sibella becomes increasingly ill. Although the
heroine asserts her freedom and individual will, she cannot impose marriage laws on her
lover once he rejects their secret vows. Throughout the novel, spatial references mark the
heroine's progression from health to illness.
Mary Wollstonecraft, too, presents space as a register ofthe heroine's physical
and emotional experiences, particularly the tragedy of women's encounters with positive
law. Maria first appears in a private madhouse rather than simply a gloomy castle that
would be just as imprisoning, as novels like The Castle of Wolfenbach and The Children
ofthe Abbey make clear. Indeed, such settings create a powerful image of the domestic

I Isobel Grundy praises Secresy, while noting its resistance to classification: "None of the available
labels--epistolary, gothic, sentimental, radical, novel of manners, or novel of social conscience--can
package this stunning single work" (30).

..
196
sphere as confinement. 2 Significantly, the asylum, unlike the confining castle, casts
doubts on Maria's ability to reason, as others indicate that her independent actions are
beyond comprehension. As she creates Maria's experience within the madhouse,
Wollstonecraft shows that men define what is rational, reasonable, and appropriate. At
the extreme end of this definitional power, they can physically enforce a view of reality
that enables the power structures to remain intact. This, indeed, is the horror of the
madhouse. However, the final scene, in which Maria makes her most reasoned appeal to
humanity and justice, takes place in juridical spaces. I argue that for Wollstonecraft, both
spaces are diseased, even if the courtroom can potentially enforce justice for the wronged
woman. Although she appeals to the court with reason and passion, Maria is ultimately
deemed insane by the judge, who colludes with medical power to strip Maria of agency.
In both Secresy and The Wrongs of Woman, the heroines' bodies are inscribed by medical
and legal discourses within the various spaces within the novel. Unlike the Gothic novels
I have previously examined, these texts do not end by placing the heroines in utopian
spaces of freedom, justice, and empowerment. Ultimately, both authors settle for a
realism in which men use positive law to enforce their version of reality.
In Secresy and The Wrongs of Woman, spaces function as concrete and symbolic
representations of confinement. Space does not exist as a neutral geography but is always
structured within legal discourse, as Foucault asserts and as scholars such as Henri
Lefebvre and Nicholas Blomley elaborate. Lefebvre, for example, argues, "Space is not a
scientific object removed from ideology or politics; it has always been political and
2 Kate Ellis's The Contested Castle and Eugenia Delamotte's Perils ofthe Night offer comprehensive
discussions of domestic confmement in the Gothic novel. These early feminist readings, however, do not
examine the specific constructions of space, law, and disease in Secresy or The Wrongs ofWoman. My
analysis focuses more exclusively on the cultural configurations of masculine power.

197
strategic" (31). Blomley explains that a conception of "legal geography" enables us to
examine critically the physical, local sites of power upon which (and through which) the
law operates (24-26). As the heroines experience the determining effects of space, they
become increasingly powerless until they are silenced by literal or symbolic death. For
Sibella, Valmont Castle initially presents little threat, but her attempt to redefine legal
relationships within that space changes her relationship to her environment. Moving from
the ancient castle, where she had developed a "natural" sense of moral obligation, to
London, where she experiences the definitional power of positive law, Sibella
deteriorates. Maria Venables, on the other hand, endures spatial domination within the
madhouse and the courtroom without breaking down. Nevertheless, when she is defined
as insane by the judge, Maria, too, experiences the oppressive power of corrupted spaces.
The two heroines' experiences with positive law are marked by disease and illness:
Sibella's death is literal, while Maria undergoes a symbolic death in law through
coverture and "insanity."
In distinctive ways, Secresy and The Wrongs ofWoman represent the legal
geographies that the heroines inhabit as diseased and infectious. In Romanticism and
Colonial Disease Alan Bewell provides a conception of diseased spaces that is
particularly useful for mapping out the problems Sibella and Maria face. Bewell explains,
"[T]hinking about disease and health had [by the late eighteenth century] become
inseparable from the medicalized representation of place" (32). 3 As Bewell examines the
ways in which disease, as lived experience and as literary metaphor, shaped British
The "geographical dimensions of disease" are most important to Bewell as he "examines the role played
in the making and unmaking of national and cultural identities by ideas about the geographical distribution
of diseases and what kind of people were susceptible to them" (17). In his study, Bewell describes the ways
in which spaces were conceived as "diseased," in need of improving measures.

3
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identity, he also notes that the communicability of disease "established a profound link
with those being defined as other" (17). According to Sander Gilman, disease represents
all that we cannot control; thus, we project disease on to the Other in order to insulate
ourselves from the chaos, degeneration, and death that result from illness: '''Disease' is
the social construct that always provides the frame for an understanding of 'illness'...
'Disease' is thus never a mere label; it always relates to the social construction of
'illness'" (Health and Illness 12). Arguing that disease is socially constructed, Gilman
explains, "How we see the diseased, the mad, the polluting is a reflex of our own sense of
control and the limits inherent in that sense of control" (Disease and Representation 3).
We draw boundaries around the diseased, separating the healthy and the ill, in an attempt
to control the disorder and to distance ourselves from inevitable death (4). Spatial
references here provide a conceptual link to the legal geographies that Lefebvre and
Blomley discuss, and indicate the significant influence that medical and legal discourses
exert over notions of space. Secresy and The Wrongs ofWoman depict the spatial
problems of control and boundaries as the heroines attempt to establish agency and
autonomy.

Secresy; or, the Ruin on the Rock
In Secresy Sibella Valmont is a radical figure that conceives of her moral agency
in startling new ways. Unlike the heroines of the other Gothic novels I have discussed,
such as Matilda and Laurette, who obey the law of nature but never transgress positive
laws, Sibella follows her natural reason and cultivated knowledge into a sexual
relationship unsanctioned by positive laws and thus condemned by society. Described as
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healthy and free in a place where she seems confined and oppressed, Sibella appears to

others as a "phenomenon." She does not see herself as confined because she chooses to
submit to her tyrannical uncle, Valmont. Her body reflects this freedom: she is healthy,
strong, robust. Further, as she chooses. transparency over secrecy, personal openness, like
the physical openness of healthy spaces, enables her to maintain the sense that she
follows natural law. Sibella's "marriage" thus becomes an occasion to show her
allegiance to the dictates of nature. As Fenwick warns her audience about the dangers of
secret passion and secret marriage, the novel presents a conflict between female
knowledge and institutional definitions, which is mapped onto the heroine's body. As
Sibella becomes confined by marriage laws, she becomes distraught and ill. Ultimately,
the novel removes the transgressive heroine from social spaces through her death.
.Secresy begins with the correspondence of Caroline Ashburn and Sibella.

Caroline, the reader learns, visited Valmont Castle with her mother, who was a childhood
friend of Mrs. Valmont. Slightly older than Sibella, Caroline is clearly a model of rational
womanhood. Fenwick presents her as generous, intelligent, independent, and virtuouscharacteristics that Caroline developed through personal experience and reflection, since
her vapid mother had no part in her education. During their visit, Caroline becomes
intrigued by Sibella and requests permission to write to her. In a rare show of generosity,
Mr. Valmont allows and indeed commands this correspondence, although Sibella's first
letter reveals a determined, independent person who would have defied her guardian's
commands to the contrary. Through these two women, Fenwick puts forth radical ideas
about women's intellectual equality to men and argues against oppressive systems of
education and law. While Sibella and Caroline's correspondence shows empowering
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ways of responding to their world, however, the secret, sexual relationship between
Sibella and Clement will prove malignant and deadly.
Fenwick fIrst describes the heroine's upbringing in order to clarify her intellectual
and physical abilities. Caroline tells Sibella that she sensed Sibella's ties to nature when
they initially met: "There was something wild in your air; your language was simple and
concise, yet delivered with an impressive eloquence; and 1 thought you altogether a
-phenomenon" (54). Yet Caroline recognizes that Valmont has attempted to construct
-Sibella as a "natural" creature through education. Caroline probes this paradox:
But how comes it to pass, my dearest Sibella, that when your uncle had the means
of gratifying his darling wish [to educate a female] to whom according to his
creed, nothing should be granted beyond what the instinct of appetite demands,
how comes it, I say, that you possess the comprehensive powers of intellect? from
what sources did you derive that eager desire of knowledge of which 1 find you
possessed? (65)
As Caroline suggests, Valmont assumes that his educational program will cultivate
Sibella's submissiveness, not her intellectual abilities. In one conversation, Valmont tells
Sibella, "[Y]ou are not the docile and grateful creature 1 expected to find you" (42).
Further, he attempts to keep Sibella within the bonds of "instinct," which he believes will
exclude her from reason. He argues, "I tell you, child, you shall not reason. Repine in
secret as much as you please, but no reasonings.... Child, you are not born to think; you
were not made to think" (43). Valmont makes an argument about women's nature, yet he
needs to educate Sibella in order to make her "natural." In this, the tyrannical uncle
reflects patriarchal systems of domination.
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Fenwick relies in part on Jean Jacques Rousseau's vision of women's education
as she depicts Valmont's attempts to make Sibella a compliant, feeling person. In Emile
(1762), Rousseau writes, "The man should be strong and active; the woman should be
weak and passive; the one must have both the power and the will; it is enough that the
other should offer little resistance" (322). Rousseau argues that the more women
resemble men, the more power men will have over women; thus, women's power lies in
their difference (327).4 He believes that "nature means [women] to think, to will, to love,
to cultivate their minds as well as their persons," although he explains that women's
"special purpose" should guide educational methods: "To be pleasing in [man's] sight, to

win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend him in manhood, to counsel
and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are the duties of woman for all
time, and this is what she should be taught while she is young" (327, 328). The "natural
woman" in Rousseau's theory is not a mindless slave or a sickly creature, but rather a
sensitive administrator of the household. Indeed, Rousseau asserts that women's docility
will enable them to bear the injustices and wrongs that "often vicious and always faulty"
men will perpetrate (333). Female education thus teaches women to survive in a
patriarchal society.
In her introduction to Secresy, Isobel Grundy notes that Fenwick challenges
Rousseau's subordination of women (26). Grundy also observes Mary Wollstonecraft's
influence on Fenwick: "From both children, though especially from Sibella, Valmont
exacts a blind obedience which reflects the governing habits of his class, and which
Wollstonecraft attacks" (26). In her famous rebuttal to Rousseau, A Vindication ofthe
4 WoUstonecraft replies, "This is the very point I aim at. I do not wish them to have power over men; but
over themselves" (VRW91).
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Rights o/Women, Wollstonecraft writes, "I finnly believe, that all the writers who have
written on the subject of female education and manners, from Rousseau to Dr. Gregory,
have contributed to render women more artificial, weak characters, than they would
otherwise have been; and, consequently, more useless members of society" (90). In

Vindication Wollstonecraft argues,
[T]he woman who strengthens her body and exercises her mind will, by managing
her family and practising various virtues, become the friend, and not the humble
dependent of her husband, and if she deserves his regard by possessing such
substantial qualities, she will not find it necessary to conceal her affection, nor to
pretend to an unnatural coldness of constitution to excite her husband's passions.
(96)
This radical feminist argues that Rousseau's female education will result in infantine
women who cannot take on any intellectual tasks, even instructing their own children.
While Fenwick incorporates the Rousseau-Wollstonecraft debate in her
presentation of Sibella's upbringing, she offers new possibilities for women's natural and
cultivated abilities. Sibella is never a "weak, artificial creature." She knows that
Valmont's education should make her "a timid, docile slave, whose thoughts, will,
passions, wishes, should have no standard of their own, but rise, change or die as the will
of a master should require!" (156). Although Valmont's education fails to influence
Sibella's sense of obedience, the heroine attributes her specific notions of equality to the
instruction of Clement's tutor, Bonneville: "[He] taught me that I make an unimpaired

one of the vast brotherhood of mankind" (74).5 In her physical health, intellectual

S

Grundy notes that this is "the revolutionary ideal offratemity" (74, n. 1).
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independence, and impassioned love for Clement, Sibella seems to represent
W ollstonecraft' s ideal woman, but her conflicting educational experiences complicate
this ideal. For Sibella, intellectual powers are as natural as breathing:
Shall my uncle tell me that my actions are confined to the mechanical
operations of the body, that I am an imbecile creature, but a reptile of more
graceful form, the half-finished work of nature, and destitute of the noblest
ornament of humanity? Blind to conviction, grown old in error, he would degrade
me to the subordinate station he describes. He daringly asserts that 1 am born to
the exercise of no will; to the exercise of no duties but submission; that wisdom
owns me now, could not fmd in me a resting place.
Tis false, Caroline! I feel within the vivifying principle of intellectual life.
My expanding faculties are nurtured by the passing hours! and want but the
beams of instruction, to ripen into power and energy that would steep my present
inactive life in forgetfulness. (74)
Furthermore, Sibella claims innate rational power: "I know, and he knows too if he would
but own it, that I do think; that I was born to think; and I will think" (43). Caroline often
remarks on Sibella's surprising abilities: "Always mentally alive, she has the glow of
animation on her cheeks, the fITe of vivacity in her eye" (94). Fenwick celebrates
Sibella's intelligence and disrupts Valmont's assumption about the "natural" woman by
having her correspondent reject blind obedience to patriarchal desires. Sibella presents a
paradox here: she is both tutored Englishwoman and ''Nature's child." In turn, both
means of knowledge enable this feisty heroine to resist mental slavery.
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Despite her connections with nature and her awareness of her rational instincts,
Sibella can never achieve the status of a true "natural" woman. She has been raised
among the civilized English, and thus has been molded by her experiences and education.
Indeed, she does not enter Valmont Castle until she is six years old, well past the
acquisition of language and reason, in early modem psychological (and natural law)
theories. One might argue that Sibella's isolation from the mores of eighteenth-century
British society makes her simply one more Gothic heroine growing up in pastoral
solitude. Her upbringing, stripped of its most oppressive elements, closely resembles that
of most Gothic heroines. Yet Sibella opposes patriarchal, positive law by asserting
natural rights. She transgresses moral and social codes of conduct because she is ignorant
of positive law, customs, and manners. In the place of social custom she follows natural
law, which enables her to discover more "natural" ways of defining her identity as a
woman and to develop her own understanding of the ties between individuals. This
understanding culminates in her conception of marriage as a private exchange of vows. 6
As a result of her unintended education and her relationship to the law of nature,
Sibella does not view space in the same ways that others do. Although Sibella chafes at
her confinement and wishes to move beyond ''the narrow boundary of this castle and its
parks" (73), that same confinement nurtures the young heroine. Sibella often walks
through the expansive grounds, and in consequence, Clement tells Murden, "Oh, she is
Nature's genuine child! more lovely than painting can trace: yet robust as the peasant

According to Sue Chaplin, Sibella "cannot retain her 'self and behave properly in the eyes of the law"
(115). Although she also notes that Sibella's innate rationality becomes revolutionary as she resists
Valmont's authority, Chaplin concentrates primarily on the relationship ofSecresy to Burke's notions of
masculine sublimity and posits Secresy as "an alternative to the Burkean myth ofrevolution" (126).

6
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who climbs yon hill ... No trembling nerves has she!" (155). Thriving in seclusion, she
enjoys a degree of self-detennination and physical health. Her mind, if not her body, is
able to transcend the limits that Valmont sets on her. Indeed, she remarks to Caroline, "I
am held in the bondage of slavery. And still may Mr. Valmont's power constrain the
forces of this body. But where, Miss Ashburn, is the tyrant that could ever chain thought,
or put fetters on the fancy?" (73). Instead of fleeing the castle and its oppressive owner,
Sibella maintains her freedom because she creates her own sense of boundaries through
the law of nature.
Although the heroine struggles with intellectual confinement, she only begins to
feel the effects of diseased spaces after she transgresses sexual boundaries. The novel's
representation of space is thus medicalized in ways discussed by Bewell. A cultural
example of "diseased spaces" appears in William Buchan's Domestic Medicine (1792).
Buchan sees the roots of contagion and epidemic in the cramped, crowded, diseased
spaces of the home and city. Even confining children in swaddling clothes, he explains,
renders their bodies defonned and susceptible to disease. Noting that stifling spaces breed
and spread disease, Buchan recommends fresh air for prevention and cure, replacing an
older model of evacuation-bleeding, purging, and sweating-with a regimen of natural
openness. Such medical metaphors find expression in Secresy. First, Valmont sees his
castle as a hygienic space that protects him from social infection. He returns to the estate
after his disappointing experiences in society: "Shocked at the contaminating mixture, he
had fled back with precipitancy to his castle" (62). Furthennore, the novel idealizes
nature and outdoor spaces, privileging a pastoral ideal of natural growth and positing the
city as "contaminating" and contaminated. This opposition illustrates the differences

•
206
between positive law (and its association with society/cities) and natural law (which is

associated with the free spaces of nature).
Like the inhabitants of "uncivilized nations" that Buchan describes in his medical
treatise, Sibella is strong and vigorous. Notably, Buchan explains that native cultures rear
"strong and hearty" children because they follow the "dictates of Nature" (10-11).
Further, Buchan mentions that "savage nations" who do not practice infant-dressing
(binding them tightly) have hardier children who become independent much more
quickly than English children. Indeed, he continues, using stays deforms the body so
much so that "there are ten defonned wo~en for one man"; thus, the delicacy of the
female body is frequently the result of unnatural and damaging social fashions (14). Not
bound by social custom and fashion, Sibella does not feel effects of social restrictions.
Although such openness contributes to Sibella's health, the novel also suggests that her
sturdiness is exotic and strange, much in the way that Buchan distinguishes uncivilized
peoples as hearty. The heroine thus demonstrates a series of conflicting qualities. English
and exotic, confined and free, educated and natural, Sibella becomes a paradoxical figure.
Sibella's vigorous body becomes especially notable because the castle is often
presented as a symbol of disease--toxic, contaminated, and even deadly. This
pathological environment affects a number of characters. Valmont' s wife, for example,
feels "buried" in "obscurity and horror at Valmont castle" (64). A sickly and
hypochondriacal woman, Mrs~ Valmont resents the seclusion of the estate. When she
becomes distraught after learning that her husband has built a family tomb on the
property, Valmont sneers, "Contemptible folly! ...The vicinity of a tomb becomes a
mortal disease" (79). The tutor who instructs Sibella falls prey to his environment, as she

207
explains, "He was enervated with disease. The chill damps of evening pierced him. The
wintry blast shook his feeble frame" (75). Even sensible, rational Caroline Ashburn
states, "What a freezing sensation crept in my veins, as we waited for your uncle's draw
bridges" (52) and remarks, "[T]he damp and darkness affected me" (54). Another v.isitor
comments, "[I] feel the benumbing effects of this cold gloomy dwelling, too. -These old
buildings are admirably contrived to fix odd impressions on the mind. [...] I should not
exist six months in this castle" (223, 228). Those characters that are affected negatively
by Valmont's estate have a relationship to society and positive law that Sibella does not.
Described as "nature's child," she resists the castle's effects by envisioning her mind and
will as free, self-determined, and autonomous.
Sibella, then, is distinguished as unusually suited to survive in her environment, in
part because she redefines the space she inhabits. Others find Sibella's ability to thrive in
her environment mysterious and even disturbing. On a visit to the castle, Lord Filmar
remarks on Sibella's imperviousness to the creaking, trembling edifice, and notes, "She
must indeed be a strange unformed being." Upon hearing that Sibella walks in storms, he
calls her "[a] little too hardy of nerve for a Countess" (207). While Filmar describes
Sibella as physically hearty and strong, he also imagines her as a barbaric Amazon:
"Robust health, no doubt; strong limbs; hanging arms; a gigantic stride; and the openmouthed stare of a savage! -Dh, dear!" (228). In turn, he doubts her intellectual abilities.
After meeting her, Filmar writes, "this frightful place has deranged her intellects!" (229).
Caroline's mother, Mrs. Ashburn, tells her friends that Sibella is "a little handsome, a
little proud, a little ignorant, and half insane," to which one woman exclaims "I dearly
love to hear of queer creatures" (92). Viewing her as savage, other characters cannot
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believe that Sibella shares in the rationality of civilized nations. Sibella, always imagined
outside the boundaries of society's expectations and laws, appears removed from
ordinary experiences; however, Fenwick flatly refuses to use the most fantastic aspects of
the Gothic genre in this tragic novel. Introducing a mysterious, secretive hermit thus
allows Fenwick to demonstrate Sibella's rationality and to develop the self-proclaimed
focus ofthe novel. 7
When she meets the strange figure (Murden in disguise), the heroine exhibits no
tremulous wonder or frightened surprise. Sibella states, "I do not deem you worth of
enquiry... for you came with pretences of falsehood and guile, and those are coverings
that virtue ever scorns" (103). Fenwick continues to use spatial metaphors as she
explicitly raises the problem of secrecy_ In contrast to secrets, coverings, and pretense,
Sibella demands openness in her relationships and her communication-in ways that
correspond to the images of healthy spaces discussed earlier. Sibella angrily tells the
hermit that he is interrupting her remembrances of her beloved. The mysterious figure
questions her, "Is then your heart so narrowed by love, that it can admit neither friendship
nor benevolence?" She replies, "To my friendship, you have no claim; for, we are not
equal. You wear a mask. Esteem and unreserved confidence are the only foundations of
friendship" (104). Sibella's reply indicates that healthy relationships are possible only
when people are completely open and honest. Influenced by her sense of virtue, which
demands openness, the heroine also asserts her need for equality. As explored in chapter
7 When Murden claims to be a ghost, Sibella argues: "I know... that the sleep of death is eternal. That the
grave never gives back, to form and substance, the mouldering body; and it indeed matters little to me who
or what you are, since I well know you cannot be what you would seem" (102). His claim to be a guardian
angel is met with equal skepticism. She tells him, "I do not fear you, though I know ofno guardian angels
but my innocence and fortitude" (102). Like Matilda in Wolfenbach, Fenwick's heroine approaches strange
phenomena with courage, yet Sibella's arguments supplement her courage with a rational rejection of
ghosts and angels.

..

r
i
209
three, women's secrecy typically indicates sexuality. Intriguingly, more conventional
novels such as Abbey undermine this construction. Secresy, however, maintains a clear
parallel between Sibella's virtue and her attitude toward secrecy. As long as Sibella
displays open resistance, she remains an autonomous moral agent. Once she embraces
v

concealment, she can no longer preserve her belief that she acts within moral boundaries.
Sibella's faith in the power of transparency encompasses her relationship with
Valmont as well. When Murden asks why Sibella submits to Valmont, she replies, "I am
not yet convinced that the time is arrived when my submission ought to cease."
Surprisingly, this independent woman reveals that she chooses to submit to Valmont's
authority. While this initially appears to be a docile response, Fenwick turns it into a
radical statement about the nature of power, which continues in Sibella's letter:
"Ah rather confess," he replied, "that you shun a stem contention with that power
which here detains you. But there are other means. A secret escape. If you resolve
to exert yourself for that purpose-"
''No,'' I said, "I am not weak enough to descend to artifice. Did I think it
right to go, 1 should go openly. Then might Mr. Valmont try his opposing
strength. But he would find, 1 could leap, swim, or dive; and that moats and walls
are feeble barriers to a determined will." (104)
Her reply illustrates that Sibella rejects secrecy in part because it connotes weakness. She
contrasts her physical and mental strength with the ineffectual barriers that Valmont has
constructed, refusing to define her relationship to Valmont in any other terms but
personal choice. Asserting the power of her' individual will, the heroine argues that
weakness is only found in secrecy, while open rebellion demonstrates her resolve. Sibella
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writes, "1 told him, 1 despised concealments; that 1 had ever scorned to separate my
wishes from my acts, or my actions from my words" (106). Sibella desires a
correspondence between interior and exterior that is ultimately-and fatally-abandoned
when she marries her beloved.
The marriage between Sibella and Clement is the turning point of the novel.
Returning home from London, Clement reveals that he enjoyed the worldly pleasures he
encountered, subverting Valmont's desire that his son would despise them. Angry and
disappointed, Valmont decides to give Clement a small yearly stipend with which
Clement might learn a trade. Clement quails at the thought that he might live in relative
poverty: "After four hours of this cruel interview's duration, he permitted me to stagger,
sick, oppressed, drooping, dying, to my chamber" (126). He continues, "1 have not told
Sibella, yet she sees misery in my looks. She hears it in my sighs, and the contagion has
reached her" (126). Clement attributes his drooping feebleness to his burning jealousy,
rather than the true source--fear ofpoverty.8 Clement's contagious emotions equate his
unworthy feelings with disease. This scene clearly reworks gendered expressions of
emotion, yet more subtly, it indicates that Clement infects Sibella, that the healthy
heroine can catch the "contagion" of her unworthy beloved. 9

Grundy compares him to Lovelace, but Clement seems a more likely counterpart to Valancourt. As
Fenwick rewrites Gothic elements, she extends and transforms the heroine's suitor from wayward but
ultimately innocent youth (Valancourt) to a faithless and increasingly corrupt seducer. Like Valancourt,
Clement grows up sheltered from the pleasures and corruption of fashionable cities. Also like Emily's
lover, Clement feels genuine passion and love for Sibella before encountering society. Finally, Clement
retains some feeling forhis early beloved even while enjoying fashionable life. However, as Emily
discovers, Valancourt never fully immersed himself in fashionable pursuits. His apparent corruption turns
out to be a desperate act of benevolence, and most importantly, he remains sexually faithful to Emily.
Clement, on the other hand, has none of these redeeming features.
9 Chaplin, for example, notes the gender reversal but does not examine the medical constructions upon
which the novel depends (120).
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In order to "cure" her beloved, Sibella decides to propose marriage. She writes to
Clement: "Come to my apartments. With pure hearts and hands, we will plight our
fervent unspotted faith. Say I am your's, and you are mine, and sorrow and jealousy will
vanish as a mist. You shall go the transported confiding husband" (131). Unlike Clement,
Sibella exhibits strength and power in the face of Val mont's authority. In turn, her
"vigour," "perseverance and courage" must sustain him (155). The narrative takes a
radical position: Sibella's self-determination turns deadly only when her sexuality is
defined as illegitimate by the state's marriage laws. Before the union, Fenwick depicts
Sibella's strength and independence; after, Sibella begins to deteriorate mentally and
physically.
The marriage that takes place is, according to English law, no marriage at all.
In her "natural" approach to marriage, Sibella believes in the bonds of the heart-that is,

the obligation of the law of nature. 10 Rejecting Valmont's prohibitions and unwittingly
abandoning legal and social custom, she asserts, "'tis our hearts alone that can bind the
vow." (129). Later, Sibella writes to Caroline,
I heard Clement speak one day of some ceremonials which would be deemed
necessary to the ratification of this covenant, when we should enter the world.
Methinks I shall be loath to submit to them. The vow of the heart is of sacred
dignity. Forms and ceremonies seem too trifling for its nature. But of the customs
of your world, Caroline, I am ignorant. (250)

10 Although the novel presents her views as a result of her natural understanding, Sibella's views also draw
on an older form of marriage. Bannet explains that in contracts per verba de praesenti, "words ofthe
present tense," "the couple's promises to live together as man and wife created a binding marriage, even
when unconsummated, and even without any witness." In contracts per verba de futuro "words of the
future tense," "the marriage became binding as soon as consummation occurred" (234). After the
Marriage Act, such contracts were no longer enforceable in the ecclesiastical courts.
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Her proposal to Clement reveals her belief that a private exchange of vows creates
marriage and sanctions sexuality, and she describes the exchange as "the sacred union
plighted by our willing hearts in the sight of heaven" (250). Isobel Grundy briefly states,
"Sibella believes, with natural law, that the individual's solemn promise is binding" (129,
n. 2).11 Yet the implications of such a belief form the central dilemma of the novel. While
Sibella's choice appears reasonable, natural, and innocent-according to her personal
moral code-the novel demonstrates that such choices lead to tragedy. 12
Caroline's responses to Sibella reveal an ambivalence toward marriage laws.
Sibella first writes somewhat frantically to Caroline, "Why in that moment should I turn
coward, and rush from my purposes? Why did imagination cast an unusual gloom around
me? Why did I sigh and tremble? Such alone ought to be the emotions of a guilty mind,
and surely I am blameless" (128). In reply, Caroline writes, "[H]ad you ... enquired
narrowly into the cause of your sensations, you must have discovered that error was
creeping in upon you, and that your native frankness and stedfast sincerity were making a
vigorous effort to repel secrecy, that canker-worm of virtue" (139). Indeed, Ca,roline
seems to be more concerned with Sibella's concealments than with her sexual affair. As
clearly as Caroline condemns Sibella's secrecy, however, her feelings toward the
II Grundy also explains that Fenwick was "influenced by"her knowledge ofWollstonecraft's relationship
with Gilbert Imlay" (129, n. 2).
12 William Alexander's The History o/Women makes two points relevant to the novel's themes. First, he
discusses "primitive" marriages, such as those on the "island of Otaheite," in which the birth of a child
seals the permanent union ofa man and woman (187). Complex social arrangements, however, make
"methods of a more public and solemn nature" necessary (188). Sibella, in her exotic descriptions
(''Nature's child") and in her rational sociability, appears on both registers. The clash here becomes deadly
when she leaves the enclosed space of the castle, with its ties to a more primitive order, and enters the
complex social world of London.
Second, Alexander notes that freedom of marriage directly corresponds to women's natural rights. He
argues, "Wherever the rights of nature remain unviolated by oppression, women have a power of disposing
ofthemselves in matrimony; where these rights are a little infringed, the consent of parents, relations, or
guardians is necessary; where they are totally obliterated, they are disposed ofhy their kindred ...to the
highest bidder" (208).
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marriage itself are more conflicted. The voice of reason and propriety, Caroline does not
see the failure to follow legal procedures as the central problem. Instead, Caroline notes
that Clement's "feebleness of character" makes it difficult for her to rejoice in their
union: "Had he been your equal, and had there been no secrecy in the case, I would have
hailed your marriage . ...Motives the most chaste and holy guided you. No forms or
ceremonies could add an atom to your purity, or make your's in the sight of heaven more
a marriage" (141). Caroline believes, with Sibella, that their vows constituted a marriage;
however, she rejects the logic of the Marriage Act, whereas Sibella had little (or no)
knowledge of it to begin with. 13
Fenwick taps into the cultural debate surrounding the Marriage Act through
Caroline's discussion. Henry Stebbing in his 1755 Review argues that marriage "is simply
and solely the Mutual Consent of the Parties: which is in its own Nature binding upon
Conscience. The Intervention of Society neither adds to this Obligation, nor can diminish
from it; but directs the Form and Manner of making the Contract, so as to draw it under
civil Cognisance [sic]" (Stebbing 36). Following the social and legal forms, however, is
the only way "by which the Marriage lays Claim to civil Protection" (36).14 In his
treatise A Vindication o/the Power o/States to Prohibit Clandestine Marriages (1755),
James Tunstall argues, "A Limitation then of the natural Power of contracting Marriage,
in every Subject of a Civil State, to the Solemnities and Circumstances of Marriage...
[is] implied in the original Contract of Civil Society." In turn, a marriage that does not
13 As I discussed in chapter three, the Marriage Act stipulated that the couple was required to post banns for
three Sundays preceding the marriage. Also, marriages in which either party is under twenty-one years old
were considered void, unless the parent or guardian publicly agreed to th,e union. Further, all the marriages
had to be perfonned in a church, which was required to maintain public parish books of all unions. Finally,
the Act required two witnesses besides the minister.
14 In this treatise, Stebbing reestablishes the arguments he made in Enquiry concerning the Operations of
the annulling Clauses in the Marriage Act and in Dissertation on the Power ofStates.
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fulfill the obligations of the state "in Reality is no Marriage" (23). Tunstall concludes: "A
Marriage then between the Subjects of Civil Society, however complete in the
Qualifications required by the Law of Nature, but deficient in Qualifications appointed,
as necessary, by the Law of the State; does not carry with it the Force ofa Marriage in

any Respect whatsoever" (24). In The History ofWomen, William Alexander explains
that whether the oath of marriage be civil or religious, it derives force "from our ideas of
moral rectitude and fidelity, and [the oath's] obligation upon us would be as strong, and a
breach of it as immoral and dishonourable, if we made it in our closet, as if before
witnesses" (260). Nevertheless, he continues, a person may not enter into marriage
"according to his own whim and caprice, but according to all the forms and ceremonies
prescribed by the laws of his country" (260). As it brings the full force of these
arguments to bear on the description of Sibella's secret marriage and its consequences,
the novel presents the tension between the private individual and the public state. IS
Clement writes, "[T]he moon and stars shone sole witnesses of our contract"
(130). Using natural imagery in conjunction with "contract," Fenwick evokes both the
law of nature and the marriage laws of eighteenth-century British society. Stebbing
writes, "[A] Person's Right to the Use of the Marriage-bed neither is, nor can be vested in
the State" (12). He recognizes that the issue is state power:

15 In her article "The Marriage Act of 1753: 'A most cruel law for the Fair Sex,'" Eve Taylor Bannet notes
that women writers generally responded in one oftwo ways. "Enlightenment Democrats," Bannet explains,
privileged "conscience and morality" over legality: "What really counted was still the truth and troth of the
union, not observance of the legal procedural forms" (242). On the other hand "Matriarchs" believed that
following legal procedures would ensure women's virtue and protection, and "tried to get other women to
understand that, after the Marriage Act, a legally solemnized contract of marriage was the only way to
transfer the 'Property of one's Person' to the 'Possession' of another which assured ladies a financial
'Maintenance' in return" (242). Although she places Fenwick in the latter category, I argue that Fenwick's
response is much more ambivalent, as her presentation of Caroline reveals.
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If the Power of States flowed from an inherent, underived Right within
themselves, there would have been no Occasion to have gone to the natural Law.
But if Society breaks out from the natural State, and has no more Power than what
every Man yielded up to it by Consent or Compact; it will be impossible to settle
the Power of States without shewing what are "natural Rights, and how, and how
far, such Rights were, by the original Compact, transferred from Individuals and
vested in the Body politick: beyond which if the Laws of Society go, they are
contradictory to the natural Law. (14)
In Observations on the Actfor Preventing Clandestine Marriages (1753), Alexander

Keith notes that British law should not hinder marriage, a "divine privilege, which the

I
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law of ~ature has not denied [individuals]" (8). Keith particularly objects to the Marriage
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Act's stipulation that the man and the woman must be over twenty-one in order to marry
against their parents' wishes, arguing that the "power here given by the Act to parents
and guardians is altogether unscriptural" and "unreasonable" (9).16 The transfer of power
not only occupies the attention ofStebbing and Keith; it also forms part of Fenwick's
argument.
The problems of the Marriage Act are only problems when Clement rejects the
binding- nature of his and Sibella's private marriage. Clement initially appears to agree
with Sibella's view of their marriage, as he calls their union a "contract" and writes to
Murden, "I am her husband. She never heard of ties more holy, more binding, than those
of the heart. Custom has not placed its sordid restraints 'on her feelings" (154). When
Clement says "I am her husband," it is unclear whether he considers himself so, or
16

He does note that the couple can petition the Lord Charicellor, Lord Keeper, or the Lords Commissioners

if their parents are unavailable. insane. or unreasonably influenced "by undue motives" (12).
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Sibella believes this is the case. Significantly, he emphasizes that Sibella-"she"--does
not see the bond of the state as prior and superior to her own heart. He, however, does
understand the implications of her "natural" understanding. Further, Clement touches on
a complicated issue when he says that Sibella relies on "the heart" for binding contracts.
On the one hand, he is correct: Sibella considers her love for him pure and binding.
Sacred and holy in Sibella's mind, their union partakes of natural law in its divine sense;
that is, religious terminology connects this "marriage" to a divine source of natural law.
While she states that her feelings for him impel her to pledge her permanent ties, Sibella
also argues that her reason leads her to consummate their relationship. Writing to
Caroline immediately before she proposes to Clement, Sibella asserts, "I am about to do
nothing rash, 1 obey no impulse of passion, 1 have not separated duty and pleasure. 1 have
examined the value of the object 1 would obtain with calmness; and whatever view 1 take
of the means, still duty points to the part 1 have chosen (128). Against cultural notions of
irrational passion, she does not dichotomize reason and feeling. Although Sibella's
arguments seem persuasive, it is nevertheless significant that Clement would draw
attention to Sibella's "heart"--doing so enables him to reject easily her claims on him.

I7

For someone who recognizes the claims of positive law rather than the law of nature,
emotional ties can be loosed with impunity.
Sibella argues that her reason, and concomitantly her duty, insists that she
contract marriage with Clement. She tells Caroline that her "love and reason have
become one" (128). By equating the heroine's love with her reason, Fenwick sets up the
deadly conclusion: when Sibella's love and consequently her "natural" rational
17 Although Fenwick does not indicate that Clement initially intends to reject Sibella, she does foreshadow
Clement's ability to redefme, without scruple, their relationship.
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understanding are rejected, she becomes mad with grief, and dies. This problematic
conflation of heart and mind appears to contradict the claim that natural law is based on
reason, which I examined through other Gothic novels. Although Sibella clings to the
notion that rational thought processes led her to follow her duty and her pleasure, there
remains a sense that Sibella might be in danger of self-delusion, a danger against which
Gothic heroines from Emily to Madeline continually struggle. The consequences of
Sibella's rejection of positive law are inscribed on her body, yet Fenwick delves into the
complexities of such consequences rather than making Sibella's death a simple, logical
result. 18
One way in which Fenwick presents the problem of disease and "otherness"
comes through an incident that seems to be an isolated subplot, but is in fact one of the
keys to understanding the metaphors (and reality) of disease in the novel. In an early
letter to Sibella, Caroline relates her strange encounter with a foreign woman. While
Caroline dines at the country manor of a wealthy acquaintance, a woman bursts into the
room, flinging herself in front of Caroline's mother. As Caroline explains, this East
Indian woman was searching for her son, who served as secretary to Sir Thomas Barlow,
the owner of the country estate. Arriving in London, the mother "had languished in the
extreme of misery and disease" (85), before traveling to Sir Thomas's home. Sir Thomas,
Caroline's mother, and the rest ofthe wealthy guests recoil in disgust from the clearly ill
woman. Only Caroline and Murden demonstrate compassion and offer assistance;

18 Intriguingly, Henry Gaily, in his treatise Some considerations upon clandestine marriages (1750) notes
that clandestine marriages have dangerous consequences, and that "the Provisions made to prevent them
are, by no Means, adequate to the Disease" (2). His metaphorical reference to the "disease" of secret unions
exemplifies the dangers that Fenwick's heroine faces. Attempting to redefme marriage, Sibella unwittingly
clashes with positive laws that have already created strict boundaries around marriage and sexuality.
I

I

I
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however, the Indian woman dies from a fever shortly afterwards.
Functioning as an uncivilized character, as well as a bearer of passion and
illness,19 this colonized subject demonstrates the significant ways in which disease works
in the novel. As Gilman explains, illness serves as a boundary that demarcates the
"other," yet the contagious quality of disease renders that boundary permeable and
frightening. First, the East Indian woman threatens others' physical health. Sir Thomas
frets that her contagion will overtake his body: "The nabob recollected she had spoken of
her fever in London; and already, he saw himself in the utmost danger, and half his
family dead or dying of the mortal disease" (87). Additionally, she continues the novel's
medicalized representation of place. Caroline tells Sibella that the frantic, raving mother
cursed Britain as "a climate that would kill a dog" (86). In Bewell' s terms, such an
indictment of climate also serves as a criticism of culture. Portraying the East Indian
woman as pitiable, the narrative critiques the damaging effects of the English
environment and patriarchal culture. Furthermore, this ill mother upsets constructions of
value atpong British identities. Forced to respond to the disruption, the guests expose
their true natures. The nabob is selfish instead of paternalistic, and the noblewomen are
uncompassionate rather than beneficent. On the other hand, Murden, a supposed libertine,
acts with generosity and tenderness, and Caroline, an independent, rational woman,
displays sympathy and charity?O

19 As Malinda Snow points out, this foreign woman also represents the exploitation that supports Britain's
wealth. Although she argues that Sibella and the unnamed mother are parallel characters, Snow neglects to
examine how disease might figure in to the representations of the two women.
20 As the reader learns, Murden had been a devoted libertine who initially encouraged Clement to pursue
sexual and fashionable pleasures. Once he learns of Sibella's singular intelligence and unique nature,
however, he gives up his libertine lifestyle and turns to charitable pursuits. Caroline, however, learns
through the gossipy conversation of another guest at the estate that Murden only wears a "mask" of
gentility and is indeed a corrupt man. His reputation for licentious behavior lingers long after he has
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Likewise, Sibella acts as a disruptive force, particularly once she "marries"
Clement and becomes pregnant. Moving from the contained spaces of the castle to the
public spaces of London, she threatens the health of others: her child dies as she raves,
and Murden dies of passionate disappointment. Furthermore, with her emotional demands
and illegitimate pregnancy, she threatens the "health" of Clement's legal marriage to
another woman and the health of the body politic by exposing marriage laws as a tool for
corrupt men. Finally, Sibella as well as the Indian woman overturns British identity and
values. Indeed, as I will argue, Fenwick critiques British culture and law, describing the
various ways in which these forces destroy women's "natural" spirit. Specifically, disease
functions in the novel as a signifier of the (generally invisible) progress of the damage
these forces can do to the viotim. There ultimately appears to be no social space for the
"other," exotic woman in this novel.
The spatial references that Fenwick employs are both external and internal, which
becomes especially clear once Sibella embraces secrecy. Fenwick indicates that the
heroine's concealment results in an internal confinement that creates illness. The early
emphasis on Sibella's robust health and intelligent thoughts makes her subsequent
disintegration especially startling. Once she is "confined" by illegitimate pregnancy, she
can no longer escape her body, which in turn is represented as a diseased space. Before
her pregnancy, in a letter to Caroline, Sibella writes, "Is the mind so much fettered by its
earthly clog the body, that it cannot long sustain these lofty flights, soaring as it were into
divinity, but must ever sink back to its portion of pains and penalties?" (101). Her mental

refonned; thus, Caroline must wrestle with her knowledge of his past and her observations of his
generosity.
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experiences are divine, lofty, soaring. Even before her pregnancy, Sibella identifies her
body as a confining space that she longs to escape.
After her sexual experiences with Clement, however, Sibella's body becomes
even more entrapping. Moving from a confined yet self-determined subject position into
her new identity as Clement's lover, Sibella no longer controls her body in the same way.
The specter of disease begins to enter into Fenwick's descriptions of the heroine when
Clement describes their sexual consummation as "those transports which wrap my senses
in delirium" (130). Like his earlier, contagious misery, Clement's sexual delirium
continues Fenwick's metaphorical link: of emotion with illness. Her use of the word
"delirium" here echoes medical discussions of disease. For example, William Buchan's
treatise makes multiple references to delirium as a symptom of various diseases (such as
smallpox, measles, or malignant quinsy) and fevers (such as nervous, scarlet, or putrid).
Clement's indulgence of his feverish passion results in Sibella's pregnancy. Indeed,
Clement regrets that he "stooped to gross allurements, and obeyed the calls of appetite,"
which "pollute[d]" him and made him unworthy of her "angelic purity" (154).21 Their
secret sex does not result in venereal disease--even if the narrative slyly hints at such a
connection-but pregnancy clearly marks Sibella's body with the consequences of their
illegal passion. After their consummation, we begin to see more references to illness as
Sibella's body begins to break down. For example, she suffers as she waits to hear from
Clement: "Broken sleep and appalling visions create debility of mind and body for the

Intriguingly, Clement's lover, Janetta, is a French emigre. Clement's "pollution" thus appears to have at
least a possible connection to the French pox, the common term for syphilis. Toward the end ofthe novel,
Caroline speaks to an acquaintance who tells her that Clement was seeking a physician and was "very bad,
dreadfully bad, too bad to be seen." Caroline replies, "That he is bad, my Lord... I can very well credit.
And, ere long, I shall endeavour to point out some persons who have the same infectious disorder" (314).
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ensuing dawn!" (249). Later, her pregnancy is marked by waves of "giddiness" and "an
appearance of ill health" (251).
The horrors of the illicitly pregnant body fmd expression in Clement's letter to
Murden. Remarking on Sibella's desire to tell Valmont of their marriage, he writes "Was
ever any thing so violent, so absurd, so pregnant with evil as this scheme?" (200).
Rhetorically linking violent and evil results to "pregnant" schemes, Clement reveals the
dangers that await Sibella. In that same letter, Clement first distinguishes between
Sibella's and positive law's definition of marriage: "Her charms cannot pall in
possession. Ever a source of new desire, of fresh delight, adoration must ever be her
lover's tributer-Arthur, I will make her my wife" (200). Here, for the first time, Clement
repudiates the contract that earlier he said made him Sibella's husband. While he initially
calls their vows a contract, Clement knows that such a union has no legal force and that
he is able to redefme their relationship when expedient. The status of their marriage and·
the illegitimacy of Sibella's pregnancy only become "evil" after Clement positively
denies the marriage. When Valmont discovers that his niece is pregnant and hears her
claim that she and Clement are married, he demands that Clement explain. The faithless
lover replies, "Miss Valmont's mode of expression is strong and vehement. She may call
the early union of our affections a marriage, for I know o/none other . ... I flatter myself
that you will rely on this assurance, and consider the assertions of your lovely niece as
romantic as they really are" (283). In this moment, Clement sets in motion the events that
will lead to Sibella's and their child's deaths.
The legal geographies that Sibella must traverse prove deadly. Shocked by
Clement's letter, Sibella determines to find her husband. However, the Gothic castle in
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which Sibella exercises some territorial authority-that is, she asserts her independence
even while confined-becomes a literal prison as Valmont prevents her from going to
Clement. The spaces she inhabits thus undergo a significant change. While Sibella retains
her virginal purity, she does not feel the boundaries of positive law. Once she "marries"
Clement, however, she enters a new legal space and a new relationship to her body. Now
confined by marriage laws, her pregnant body, and Valmont Castle, Sibella experiences
illness and disease. In keeping with her independent character, she makes a very
impressive attempt to escape by leaping in the moat, and does escape fmally, albeit with
the help of Murden. However, as Murden explains, she "panted for freer, respiration" and
"is much worse for the journey" (323). Frantic and ill, Sibella proceeds to the fashionable
London parlor of her worthless lover. As Sibella moves outward, beyond the confining
castle, she becomes more ill and perhaps more dangerous. Cloistered and hidden, she can
potentially be redeemed. Caroline, in fact, urges her to forget Clement and to marry
Murden, even though Sibella carries Clement's child. But when she moves into the social
circles that Clement inhabits, Sibella exposes her pregnancy and thus her sexual activity
to the view of others.
The devastating effects of Sibella's illegitimate pregnancy are first seen when
Murden comes to rescue her from Valmont Castle. When she leaves his care to find
Clement, he believes she has been kidnapped and goes insane. The scene in which
Clement finally and irreparably rejects Sibella completes her descent into fatal illness.
Her body and her feelings are so intertwined at this point in the narrative that each
threatens to undo the other. Taking her to Clement's residence, Filmar describes Sibella's
intense emotion, "I was on the point of grasping her in my arms, lest her very form
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should dissolve into feeling" (343). Physically and emotionally, Sibella verges on
dissolution. No longer able to define her boundaries, the heroine is nearly a non-entity.
Yet when she bursts into the London drawing room, Sibella fills the room with her
powerful emotion. She rushes into Clement's arms, with Mrs. Ashburn (now Mrs.
Montgomery) and Caroline watching. Wordlessly, Clement first retreats from Sibella's
embrace, then he declares, "Madam, I am married," to which Sibella replies, "Are we not
both married?" (345). She cries to Clement, "Lover! Husband! All!" before she collapses
at his feet. Shrinking from her, Clement leaves his wretched lover on the floor. Clement's
new wife promptly asserts the legality of her and Clement's marriage, and turns Sibella
out of the house.
This scene illustrates the ultimate clash of truths. The answer to Sibella's poignant
question seems painfully obvious: Clement is indeed married to Caroline's mother, the
former Mrs. Ashburn, whereas Sibella remains unmarried. Indeed, even critics can hardly
refer to Clement and Sibella's marriage without qualification. The narrative demonstrates
that when natura1law conflicts with positive law, the final definition of marriage belongs
to positive law-and ultimately to Clement since he can enforce that definition if he
chooses. Indeed, the novel indicates that the power of defming legal and even moral
relationships rests with the state. Whatever Sibella's knowledge of their contract,
whatever her belief in their union, the "truth" resides outside of her natural understanding
and within the legal system that has the power to enforce truth and consequences. In
Secresy, no providential intervention, no emotional commitment to natural law, will save
Sibella from the consequences of Clement's perfidy when he takes shelter in positive law.
As long as he fulfills the contracts of the state, he may behave without compunction.
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Sibella, on the other hand, sees nothing coercive except the abstract qualities of virtue,
justice, honor, truth, and faith, which appear in Gothic depictions of natural law. Because
she does not concede society's "truths"-that is, bonds created by individuals and the
state-she has no authority in the final scene.
After Clement's rejection, the novel quickly draws to a close. Caroline attends
Sibella as she gives birth to a stillborn child (347). The rejected suitor, Murden, dies
beside her bed, the "Fatal end of an ungoverned passion" (357). Valmont repents: "sick,
sick at heart" (357). Unrelieved by tears, Sibella raves as she holds her dead daughter and
tells Caroline: "[I]t was mine own secrets destroyed me-Oh that fatal contract!" (358).
The heroine's fmal statement invokes both medical and legal discourses. The contract is
fatal because it is secret and non-legal-laws that specify the procedures of marriage
contracts confme the heroine. Disease, then, forms a boundary around the "other," as the
heroine's mind and body are corrupted by her passion and sexual experience, which are
defmed as illicit through marriage laws. Positive law, in Fenwick's view, can potentially
be a prophylaxis against such disease, since Clement could not have abandoned Sibella
with impunity had they been "legally" married. Further, the legal geographies that trap
Sibella could be protected spaces, in which she might freely express her ardent passion
and sexual desire for her beloved. Because she rejects those boundaries, the heroine
experiences the oppressive power of positive law in the poignant conclusion.
Cultural pressure for Secresy's tragic ending comes from many sources, including
medical discourse. In Domestic Medicine Buchan argues: "It is [woman's] province, not
only to form the [child's] body, but also to give the mind its most early bias. They have it
very much in their power to make men healthy or valetudinary, useful in life, or the pests

....

1
225

of society" (5). Sibella, with her monomania for Clement, seems incapable of
perpetuating a strong, healthy British race. As Buchan describes the ways in which
"diseased parents" spread their own illnesses and weaknesses through their children, he
asserts, "The man who marries a woman of a sickly constitution, and descended of
unhealthy parents, whatever his views may be, cannot be said to act a prudent part" (8).
Sibella's removal from the narrative, as well as the death of her child, enables the novel
to reestablish the healthy spaces of the British nation. Intriguingly, Buchan encourages
such a connection by linking the castle, or family estate, with family health. He states,
"Family constitutions are as capable of improvements as family estates; and the libertine,
who impairs the one, does greater injury to his posterity, than the prodigal who squanders
away the other" (9). Confiating space and health, Buchan also recognizes that legal
inheritances depend on robust constitutions.
Death, however, does not appear to be the only option for Fenwick's heroine. As
previously mentioned, Caroline suggests an oddly optimistic vision for Sibella's future
happiness. Fenwick presents the rather shocking possibility that Murden and Sibella
might fall in love and marry, even after Sibella's sexual experiences with Clement-a
possibility that the reader is encouraged to desire, against the social conventions that
condemned illicitly sexual women. In a letter to Henry Crabbe Robinson, Fenwick
expresses similarly unconventional (or at least unspoken) notions. She tells Robinson that
her daughter's husband is en route from the West Indies to England: "[My daughter] has
drawn an unhappy lot. Company and the prevalent vice of the West Indies (drinking) has
detached Mr. Rutherford from his family and his duties. He had become not merely a
burthen, but an injury to our affairs, when happily for us he determined on going to
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England, where I trust he will remain.,,22 Seeing their separation as desirable, Fenwick
suggests that women's happiness should not be sacrificed to bad marriages. Sibella's
death, therefore, is a source of grief, not merely authorial punishment. Yet Sibella does
seem contained at the end. In death, she no longer threatens Clement's "real" marriage or
the social system. Her radicalism dies with her and her child; the disturbing elements are
no longer present. The robust woman and innocent child are sacrificed to the dictates of
social order that has no space for the exotic, the diseased, the "other." The reader is thus
left with a sense of relief-and of tragedy.

The Wrongs of Woman: or, Maria, a Fragment
Mary Wollstonecraft's The Wrongs ofWoman: or, Maria, a Fragment (1798)
recounts the suffering of several wronged women, with Maria Venables at the center. The
novel begins as Maria awakens in a madhouse. Incarcerated by her wicked husband,
Maria observes the insane people around her with horror and dismay. However, she
meets and falls in love with a fellow inmate, Darnford, who has also been unjustly
imprisoned in the asylum. He pledges his love to Maria, and she considers him her
husband. Maria also cultivates a friendship with her warden, Jemima. Part of the novel is
devoted to an account of Jemima's traumas. At the heart of the novel is Maria's own
memoir to her infant daughter, which she writes in the madhouse. She recounts her
childhood, early womanhood, and her wretched marriage to George Venables. The
personal violations that she suffers while married to a brutish husband are offered as an
example to her child and as an explanation for Maria's behavior. She attempts to leave
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Venables, but is captured, drugged, and imprisoned in the asylum, an experience which
she vividly describes as being "buried alive." After Maria's memoirs end, the novel
continues, if in incomplete form ("imperfect and mutilated," according to Godwin). For a
brief chapt~r, Maria and Darnford live together in London, but the setting swiftly changes
to the courtroom, where Darnford is accused of adultery and seduction. Maria writes an
essay for the defense, in which she defends Damford and ultimately herself. Yet the
judge, dismissing her argument, states that Maria's conduct "did not appear to be that of a
person of sane mind." The final fragments offer little comfort or hope for Maria's
ultimate happiness.
I argue that Wollstonecraft's novel, like Fenwick's Secresy, also develops a
connection between space, disease, and power. In Secresy Sibella is diseased because she
is unlawful. In The Wrongs o/Woman, Maria is unlawful because she is "diseased." As
she moves through institutions that corrupt her credibility and undermine her knowledge,
Maria becomes progressively disempowered. What becomes increasingly clear is that
men have the power of defining truth through medicine and through law. Although Maria
proposes an alternative truth based on her sensibility, this alternative disappears in the
face of institutional power. Women, Wollstonecraft suggests, cannot rely on their own
understanding because it offers them no power. I will demonstrate that because Maria is
incarcerated in the madhouse her claims are aligned with insanity when she makes her
most elaborate and sustained polemic within juridical spaces. I assert that the novel
makes concrete the inequities Maria experiences through the two institutions, rhetorically
equating the diseased space of the madhouse with the corrupt space of the courtroom. The
Wrongs o/Woman demonstrates that those very systems have the ability to define
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madness and rationality. Finally, I will explain that the novel illustrates how truth itself
can become no more than ill-disguised power.
Wollstonecraft's vision is a Gothic one. 23 Maria is the "other" woman of the
female Gothic. Instead of the virtuous, victorious heroine, she is the suffering, oppressed
woman that such heroines ~ght encounter in their travels. Maria's story could be that of
Laurentini, Olivia, or Victoria (Countess Wolfenbach). Just as Madeline Clermont's
wronged grandmother writes to her son, Maria also writes her memoirs to her daughter.
Maria is "other" in suffering, as she does not receive vindication; in sexuality, as she is
not the virginal maid; and in mind, as she is burdened with the stigma of madness.
Nevertheless, Wollstonecraft takes pains to distance herself from such Gothic romances.
The very first paragraph both invokes and critiques the Gothic novel:
Abodes of horror have frequently been described, and castles, filled with specters
and chimeras, conjured up by the magic spell of genius to harrow the soul, and
absorb the wondering mind. But. .. what were they to the mansion of despair, in
one comer of which Maria sat, endeavouring to recall her scattered thoughts! (75).
Wollstonecraft suggests that Gothic novels inadequately represent the horror of reality;
instead, they fancifully play with emotio~s, leaving the reader with no knowledge of true
horror. Although The Wrongs ofWoman is also fiction, Wollstonecraft claims a special
status for her novel, placing it within the realm of reality. She writes, "[M]y sketches are
not the abortion of a distempered fancy, or the strong delineations of a wounded heart. In

Ferguson and Todd argue that Wollstonecraft "deftly employs gothic elements" as well as "the central
theme of the persecuted virtuous woman who flees the aggressive 'sadist,'" even though she denies using
such literary elements (116). Claudia Johnson notes that the novel "bring[s] the conventions of gothic
fictions to bear on present-day England" and that the beginning "is an extended, one-upping allusion to
Radcliffean gothic" ("Mary Wollstonecraft's novels" 200).
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writing this novel, I have rather endeavoured to pourtray passions than manners" (73).24
Many critics point out that Mary W ollstonecraft intended The Wrongs of Woman to serve
as the fictional counterpart to, or second volume of, her Vindication ofthe Rights of

Women, in much the same way that William Godwin's Caleb Williams fictionalized his
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice.
Omitting many of the supernatural elements, Wollstonecraft concentrates on the
Gothic conventions that have real meaning for women in their oppressed condition. We
see this especially in Maria's persecutions and in the institutions that confme women.
Wollestonecraft also uses such Gothic elements as atmosphere, oppression, victimization,
villain, pursuits, and ruins. Curiously, however, critical attention to The Wrongs of

Woman has avoided discussion of the madhouse. The most common interpretation is that
the madhouse parallels Maria's marriage: both imprison Maria. Indeed, some critics use
the term "prison" interchangeably with "madhouse" as they analyze the nove1. 25 The
prison imagery is clear in the heroine's description ofthe asylum: "The gates opened
heavily, and the sullen sound of many locks and bolts drawn back, grated on my very
soul, before I was appalled by the creeking [sic] of the dismal hinges, as they closed after
me. The gloomy pile was before me, half in ruins" (184). Taken up a staircase and down
a long gallery, the drugged and confused Maria hears unearthly shrieks and sees twisted
faces. The following day, she awakens: "[G]radually recovering the use of reason, I

24 Wollstonecraft's attempt to dissociate her work from "distempered fancy" and "strong delineations" in
her prologue, according to Gary Kelly, "refers to the way transgressive work by women writers was
dismissed as madness or merely individual discontent" (207). See also Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar's
classic analysis The Madwoman in the Attic (1984).
25 Gary Kelly, for example, argues that Maria's "prison turns out to be a site ofliberatio~f'mind' ifnot
bodt' (212). Because he overlooks the medical function of the asylum, however, Kelly fails to recognize
the subjectivizing force of this space--and the subsequent stigma of her confmement.
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began, starting affrighted from the conviction, to discover where I was confined-I
insisted on seeing the master of the mansion-I saw him-and perceived that I was
buried alive" (185). Although both are confining, it is significant that W ollstonecraft uses
a mental asylum rather than a real prison. Because she is in a madhouse, Maria's claims
are disregarded. This significance often escapes critical attention. Claudia Johnson is
among the rare exceptions, as she writes,
Maria's prison is also an insane asylum, and as such calls our attention to the
complex issue of madness and delusion in the novel. Maria, after all, is a prisoner
to her marriage but is also in a larger sense a prisoner to the delusoriness of love
that chained her to Venables in marriage to begin with, a love that enchains her to
Darnford as well. (Johnson 200-201)
Johnson's analysis is persuasive, yet her focus on romantic delusions fails to account for
the relationship between the asylum and the courtroom in the final scene. I argue that the
two institutions work together to strip Maria of by redefining her arguments as madness.
Symbolically and historically, the asylum constitutes a Gothic space that enables
Wollstonecraft to demonstrate unjust institutional power. She writes in the introduction:
"[M]y main object [is] the desire of exhibiting the misery and oppression, peculiar to
women, that arise out of the partial laws and customs of society" (73). Both the asylum
and the court are gendered spaces that subordinate women, yet positive law is supposed
to be impartial. Drawing attention to the paradoxical quality of law, Wollstonecraft then
turns to the madhouse to dramatize the wrongs of women. The eighteenth-century asylum
occupies a liminal place between law and custom. Although not precisely a legal space, it
did serve as a site of power that operated with symbolic authority. Furthermore, because
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it was possible for individuals to be incarcerated indefinitely, the asylwn generated
cultural fears about secret abuses. As it physically removed and separated the mad person
from society, the madhouse also exerted an imaginative power over social perception.
The most spectacular and public example of the asylwn was Bethlem Hospital, or
Bedlam. In Customers and Patrons ofthe Mad-Trade, Jonathan Andrews and Andrew
Scull note that "Bedlam," Bethlem Hospital's epithet, "became identified in the Englishspeaking world with chaos, tumult, danger, and disorder" (6). The hospital itselfwas an
eighteenth-century tourist attraction: "[T]hrongs of visitors might inspect the product
(and price) of immorality, the wreck of the human intellect, the dolor of the downcast,
and the rages of the raving" (6-7). 26 Wollstonecraft took her realistic aims seriously; in
February 1797, she and Godwin visited Bethlem to witness the treatment and conditions
ofthe inmates (Kelly 211). Bedlam exemplifies the public asylwns; however, madness,
in its many incarnations, was also managed privately. Indeed, Maria appears to be an
inmate of a private asylwn. Medical historians record the nature and problems of such
madhouses. Unlike larger institutions, private asylwns were often family..owned; their
therapies and cures were "family secrets" and "craft-skill[s]" (porter, Mind Forg'd 137).
These asylwns were typically small since the owners often housed the inmates in a wing
oftheir private home. Wardens also preserved the anonymity of their inmates at the
request of embarrassed families, a practice which was clearly open to abuse (137-38).
The profit-making aspect of private madhouses aroused fears of corruption. In
Observations on the General and Improper Treatment ofInsanity (1790), Benjamin
Although these examples are quoted in several sources, they are not universally accepted. In her article
"Bedlam: fact or fantasy?" Patricia Allderidge argues that specific, commonly cited ideas about Bethlem
simply were untrue-such as the use ofWhipping, the number of visitors, the typically lifelong
incarcerations of inmates, and the hospital's aristocratic governance.
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Faulkner, keeper of a private madhouse, criticizes the dual role of the private asylum
owner. As both physician and innkeeper, the madhouse manager has conflicting
interests--curing and profiting. Faulkner proposes that physicians "whose knowledge
cannot be surpassed, whose integrity is unimpeachable, and who can derive no advantage
from the local situation of the afflicted" come into the madhouse at the request of the
~

patient, while the asylum owner simply charges for accommodations (qtd. in Porter, Mind

Forg'd 145). Wollstonecraft commented on Faulkner's work in the Analytical Review:
"This pamphlet. .. may be reckoned a kind of advertisement. .. yet the useful hints and
cautions, which it contains, deserve particular attention." Quoting Faulkner, she writes,
"[T]o run into extremes, and to treat the patient as a confinned lunatic, locking him up
from society, and debarring him the attentions of his friends, is a practice which no
skilful and humane physician will adopt or countenance." 27 Wollstonecraft mentions ''the
importance of this subject," which "renders any apology for the length of this extract
[from the pamphlet] unnecessary." Clearly, this subject captured her attention and
imagination as she wrote The Wrongs ofWoman.
The historical realities of and the social fears regarding confmement shape
Wollstonecraft's nightmare vision of the power that the asylum exerts over Maria.
Proponents of refonn, for example, noted that the asylum could be used to incarcerate
heirs and wives who did not confonn to their families' expectations. According to
William Parry-Jones, opposition to private madhouses was common. Daniel Defoe, for
example, argued that women were ''unjustly confin'd, while their husbands kept
mistresses, etc., and many widows are lock'd up for the sake of their jointure" (qtd. in
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Parry-Jones 223). In one sensational case, a woman, confined in Turlington's madhouse
at her husband's request, had to be rescued by her relatives through the courts. When the
physician examined her and found her sane, the wife was released (225). This 1761 case
paved the way for the Act of 1774, which limited the power and scope of private asylums
by issuing licenses and requiring inspections. However, the Act had only a marginal
effect on the actual practices within the houses (288). Notwithstanding such stunning
examples of injustice, Parry-Jones argues that the general impression that late eighteenthcentury, private madhouses were rampantly abusive and filled with illegally incarcerated
women is untrue. While abuses did occur, he continues, to judge the treatment without
examining cultural attitudes leads to unfounded claims about its cruelties (290).
Such ambiguities surrounding the private asylum have resulted in critical
confusion. Ferguson and Todd, for example, claim that Maria's husband "legally
incarcerate[s]" her in the madhouse (106). Kathryn Temple, on the other hand, identifies
Venables' act as illegal (72). The problem, however, is that the definitional power of
insanity shifts between medical and legal discourse. In the above example, the courts may
have set the unjustly confmed woman free, but a medical expert was' called to testify on
her behalf. Furthermore, confmement itself was sometimes seen as the cause of insanity.
In 1763, Gentleman's Magazine published an anonymous essay on private madhouses.
"What must a rational mind suffer that is treated in this irrational manner?" the author
asks, describing such a person as "Weakened by physic, emaciated by torture, diseased
by confmement" (qtd. in Porter, Mind Forg'd 151). The author illustrates that
confmement and disease are inextricably linked. In A Treatise on the Real Cause and

Cure ofInsanity (1789), physician Andrew Harper argues, "The custom of immediately

•
234
consigning the unfortunate victims of Insanity to the cells of Bedlam, or the dreary
mansions of some private confinement is certainly big with ignorance and absurdity"
(59). Furthermore, he notes that confinement "destroys all the obligations of humanity,
robs the sufferer of every advantage, and deprives him of all the favourable
circumstances which might tend to his recovery.... I am equally convinced that
confinement never fails to aggravate the disease" (59-60). The primary reason for putting
away mad people, he explains, is convenience. Harper concludes, "Confinement thwarts
every salutary purpose, and defeats every effort which nature makes" (61). The Wrongs
ofWoman engages with this cultural conversation, indicating that Maria's predicament is
realistic. Further, by showing the reader that Maria is sane, Wollstonecraft indicates that
confmement threatens Maria's sense of self and of reality. This intersection of medicine
and law illustrates that certain bodily "realities" can be produced.
In her confinement, Maria notices the other inmates, whom she can see from her
window, and "contemplate [s] the most terrific of ruins-that of a human soul," which she
calls a "living memento of the fragility, the instability, of reason, and the wild luxuriancy
of noxious passions" (83). As a "ruin," the mad person embodies the decaying buildings
of the Gothic novel. The geography of the soul is subject to natural forces that may be out
of an individual's control: "[A] mental convulsion, which, like the devastation of an
earthquake, throws all the elements of thought and imagination into confusion, makes
contemplation giddy, and we fearfully ask on what ground we ourselves stand" (84).
Wollstonecraft plays with the relationship of madness to reason. She does not argue that
madness does not exist except in the oppressive definitions of men. Instead, she examines
the significance of madness, probing what it might mean to lose one's "self':
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Thinking it selfish to dwell on her own sufferings, when in the midst of wretches,
who had not only lost all that endears life, but their very selves, her imagination
was occupied with melancholy earnestness to trace the mazes of misery... Often
at midnight was she waked by dismal shrieks of demoniac rage, or of excruciating
despair, uttered in such wild tones of indescribable anguish as proved the total
absence of reason, and roused phantoms of horror in her mind, far more terrific
than all that dreaming superstition ever drew. (92)
In this Gothic moment, W ollstonecraft notes that absence of the "self' is the ultimate
horror. Madness tears apart emotion and reason, passion and will, leaving a miserable
being full of rage, despair, anguish. Such wretches experience emotional suffering
without the "self' that can govern the feelings and transform them into knowledge.
Instead of collapsing in terror or grief, Maria retains her ability to reflect on her
situation. She thinks about the madness that surrounds her in order to conjecture its cause
and to think of solutions. The narrator notes,
Maria, accustomed to generalize her observations, was led to conclude from all
she heard, that it was a vulgar error to suppose that people of abilities were the
most apt to lose the command of reason. On the contrary, from most of the
instances she could investigate, she thought it resulted, that the passions only
appeared strong and disproportioned, because the judgment was weak and
unexercised; and that they gained strength by the decay of reason (92-93).
Maria thinks like a scientist or even like a physician. She theorizes, investigates,
generalizes, and concludes. In every situation she encounters, Maria attempts to reason as
well as to feel. Her passions appear to be under the control of her reason, even though she
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demonstrates sensitivity toward others and grief for her daughter. While in the asylum,
she resists her environment, which exerts a pervasive hold over her emotions and mind.
She finds the madhouse horrifying, and often expresses her fears that she will not escape.
Wollstonecraft' s attention to her heroine's mind and body reflects her
commitment to exploring the knowledge that the material mind generates. W ollstonecraft
recognizes that perception, reason, emotion, and will are connected. Maria's intellectual
and emotional development before her incarceration plays an important role in her
ultimate experiences within the madhouse. For example, she decides to leave England,
hoping that a change of scenery will cheer her mind Maria explains that this is the
"natural" result of travel "unless we carry the barbed arrow with us, and only see what we
feel" (182). Later, the narrator notes, "We see what we wish, and make a world of our
own-and, though reality may sometimes open a door to misery, yet the moments of
happiness procured by the imagination, may, without a paradox, be reckoned among the
solid comforts of life" (189). These two comments are psychologically influenced
articulations of the subjective construction of the individual's perception. Imagination
becomes reality; reality is the result of the individual's subjectivity. Susan Khin Zaw
argues that Wollstonecraft intended "to show that reason and feeling, public and private,
culture and nature are inextricably intertwined; she was struggling to reconceive them so
that instead of conflicting, they strengthen each other" (92). Although Zaw primarily
examines Vindication o/the Rights o/Women and Original Stories, this struggle
manifests itself in The Wrongs o/Woman. According to Alan Richardson,
Wollstonecraft's views on education reflected Lockean principles of psychology,
particularly in her notion that early childhood is a formative period for the intellect and
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rational abilities. Although Wollstonecraft generally subscribes to Locke's associationist
principles, she also attributes "a fonnative role ... to 'innate' principles of truth and to
'feelings which nature has implanted in us as instinctive guards to virtue'" (27).28
Through Jemima, Maria's warden in the asylum, Wollstonecraft explores the
relationship among reason, feeling, sensibility, and justice. Earlier in Jemima's life, she
demonstrates "perversions of the understanding." Growing up without affection or
wannth, physically and emotionally abused, and treated as a servant, Jemima exemplifies
the oppressed, lower-class woman. The novel's portrayal of Jemima is unusual in several
respects, not the least of which is Jemima's intelligent, articulate discussion of her
oppression. The narrator explains that when Jemima decides to act compassionately
toward Maria, she enters a new sphere of understanding: "A sense of right seems to result
from the simplest act of reason, and to preside over the faculties of the mind, like the
master sense of feeling, to rectify the rest; but. .. how often is the exquisite sensibility of
both weakened or destroyed by the vulgar occupations, and ignoble pleasures of life?"
(80). Although she exhibits a will to knowledge, Jemima's story demonstrates how social
and class experience "educate" her to be the person she becomes.
Intriguingly, there remains a discourse of nature running through Jemima's story.
She tells Maria and Darnford that her stepmother blamed Jemima's misconduct on "the
wicked disposition which I had brought into the world with me, inherited from my
mother" (104). The idea that moral corruption is genetic, natural, passed from mother to

28 The Cambridge Companion to Mary Wollstonecraft. See also Saba Bahar in Mary Wollstonecraft's
Social and Aesthetic Philosophy, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), who argues that Wollstonecraft was
influenced by sensationalist psychology (97-111). Reason, for Wollstonecraft, was innate, whereas
knowledge was acquired through a struggle with the passions: "Modesty, defined as the acquisition of
virtue and knowledge through the exercise of reason, and come only with experience ofthe. world" (85).
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daughter is particularly noteworthy. W ollstonecraft recognizes that such notions
contribute to the continued oppression of women, even though her depiction of Jemima
illustrates her belief that miseducation is responsible for women's corruption. Indeed, the
possibility of inherited insanity belongs within such a discourse, as later events prove.
W011 stonecraft ultimately argues that physical conditions, especially the body's
condition, affect moral and intellectual development: "The mind is necessarily
imprisoned in its own little tenement; and, fully occupied by keeping it in repair, has not
time to rove abroad for improvement. The book of knowledge is closely clasped, against
those who must fulfil [sic] their daily task of severe manual labor or die; and curiosity,
rarely excited by thought or information, seldom moves on the stagnate [sic] lake of
ignorance" (114). Confined by the body, the mind is doubly imprisoned when freedom is
stripped away, as in Maria's situation.
In her memoirs, Maria describes her delusions, especially the most dangerous
one--believing that Venables was a suitable companion. As mentioned above, Johnson
connects Maria's self-imposed, romantic delusions to her confinement in the asylum.
Wollstonecraft, however, carefully explains that Maria's fantasies are corrected over the
course of the novel as she gains more experience. Wollstonecraft insists that even
mistaken impressions can be rectified. The narrator excuses Maria's romantic mistakes,
caused in part by her "ardent imagination," because of her inexperience and immaturity.
In fact, Maria's youthful errors "prove the strength of her mind," although those same
errors committed in her maturity "would demonstrate [the mind's] weakness, its
incapacity to acquire a sane judgment" (99). Degeneration of mind causes women to
depend only on "outward circumstances [and] the objects of their affections," rather than
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to "act from the impulse of a nerved mind, able to choose its own pursuit" (99).29
However, the asylum and the courtroom close off the circuit of error and enlightenment,
leaving only the stigma of irrationality and criminality.
When her husband sues Darnford for seduction and adultery, Maria argues at her
lover's defense. Her history of confinement in the madhouse, however, renders her voice
powerless. Indeed, one of the earliest statements made within the court rhetorically places
Maria back in the madhouse. The prosecution asserts: "After the birth of her child, her
conduct was so strange, and a melancholy malady having afflicted one of the family,
which delicacy forbade the dwelling on, it was necessary to confine her" (194).30 The
lawyer combines vague hints at a family history of insanity with sentimental appeal in
order to avoid naming Maria's disease. Like Jemima, Maria is tainted with genealogy.
This assertion of "fact" (that is, no witnesses or doctors are necessary to support the
claim) circumscribes Maria's essay. The judge finally uses the stigma of insanity to reject
her appeals. As Maria's rationality appears illusory, she is unable to insert her voice into
the legal discourse that joins with medical discourse to render her ineffectual. 31

According to Zaw, Wollstonecraft believed moral education could break: down gender hierarchies. The
dichotomy Zaw explores between male and female versions of moral reasoning is resolved in
Wollstonecraft's careful program of moral education. Zaw asserts, "Wollstonecraft... thought justice was
a fonn of care" (85). Wollstonecraft has a clear vision of female psychology, which enables her to make
claims about women's moral knowledge. Catherine Parke notes that Wollstonecraft attempted to "redefme
sensibility... toward a new definition that would combine the qualities of self-defmition with justice"
(104).
30 In his medical treatise, Harper rejects the notion that insanity is hereditary. He also notes: "Perturbations
ofmind that proceed from bodily causes are merely circumstantial and temporary, and being only a
symptomatic affection, and not an original disease, the derangement, which is the symptom, will cease
when the first cause is removed" (vii). The insane person, interestingly, exhibits anatomical deviations, or
"a material difference in the confonnation and appearances of the brain of [insane] individuals" (3-4).
31 Interestingly, critics also misidentify Maria as insane. Roy Porter argues that Wollstonecraft "places her
eponymous heroine in the madhouse as a 'slave' of her villainous husband, conceiving ofher as a superior
being by virtue ofthat persecution which drives her out of her senses" (107). Although a "slave" in
marriage, Maria does not go mad; she is not driven out of her senses. Porter's mistake indicates an easy
slippage between the assumption and the reality of madness, which institutionalization encourages.
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Being in a madhouse thus becomes conflated with being mad, as the courtroom
scene illustrates. The lingering sense that Maria's voice is too passionate and
emotional--qualities aligned with at least some fonns of madness--comes through in
analyses of the courtroom scene. Kathryn Temple, in "Imagining Justice: Gender and
Juridical Space in the Gothic Novel," argues that Maria inappropriately uses "the
discourse of sensibility" in the courtroom, which "results in [her] expulsion from juridical
culture" (71). Temple believes that, "at the very moment when she had been given the
opportunity to demonstrate a 'manly' reliance on reason, Maria's 'paper' selfrelies on
sentimentality and insists on the importance of women's subjective experience over that
of black-letter law" (73). According to Temple, Maria's rejection of legal language
(Temple gives precedence and generalization as two such possibilities) "allows the judge
to classify her not as 'Woman' but as one particularly difficult, possibly mad woman"
(74). There is a clash, Temple explains, between two linguistic registers-the
particularized, emotional language of sensibility and the generalized, objective language
oflaw. 32 Gary Kelly, on the other hand, explains that Maria's appeal to justice and
humanity was a common rhetorical strategy (230, n. 2). Maria's phrase "man to man,"
according to Kelly, "suggests that the relation of woman to man is only a particular case
of the general principles of 'right' and 'justice' that should apply to all relationships and
be embodied in law" (220) Kelly calls Maria's style "brisk, clear, detached but frrm,"
illustrating "Maria's capacity to reason from personal experience, and thereby make her
own choices in life" (221).
Syndy MicMillen Conger makes a similar claim: "Wollstonecraft's innovative metaphoric use of a
madhouse in her last novel lends some credence to the claim that her language of sensibility can imprison
its speakers" (xii). She continues, "The judge, too, interprets Maria's emotionality as probable madness"
(173).
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There does indeed appear to be a conflict of discourses in the courtroom scene.
However, this conflict arises not from sensibility's clash with legal language. Instead, it
comes from two sources: the taint of irrationality that Maria brings with her from the
madhouse and the register of natural law that inflects legal discourse with revolutionary
individualism.33 Early in the courtroom scene, Wollstonecraft alludes to more
conventional expressions of Gothic heroinism:
A strong sense of injustice had silenced every emotion, which a mixture of true
and false delicacy might otherwise have excited in Maria's bosom. She only felt
in earnest to insist on the privilege of her nature. The sarcasms of society, and the
condemnation of a mistaken world, were nothing to her compared with acting
contrary to those feelings which were the foundation of her principles. (195)
Maria's nature and feelings are foundational to her moral sense. In this, she sounds much
like the Gothic heroines of The Castle ofWolfenbach and The Orphan ofthe Rhine. Like
Matilda and Laurette, Maria depends on her internal self to supply her moral dictates.
Maria accepts Darnford's argument against oppressive marriage laws: "Ties ofthis nature
could not bind minds governed by superior principles; and such beings were privileged to
act above the dictates of laws they had no voice in framing, if they had sufficient strength
of mind to endure the natural consequence" (187). Firmly asserting her own moral sense
and mental strength, Wollstonecraft's heroine attempts to redefine the boundaries that
law places on her actions. Furthermore, Maria rejects the intruding, judgmental gaze of
others-their "sarcasms" and "condemnations"-in ways that resemble Amanda in The

33 Wollstonecraft directly refers to the French Revolution at the end of the novel. The judge announces,
"We did not want French principles in public or private life--and, if women were allowed to plead their
feelings, as an excuse or palliation of infidelity, it was opening a flood-gate for immorality" (199).
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Children ofthe Abbey. Nevertheless, her "nature," "sense," and "feelings" are codified

and regulated within medical and juridical discourse. Because Maria, like Sibella,
participates in unlawful sexuality, she cannot survive in the social spaces Wollstonecraft
depicts.
Maria's essay, read aloud by the defense, provides a polemic against oppression
and a justification of her sexuality. She mentions her early, blind submission "to the rigid
laws which enslave women" and her obedience to "the man whom I could no longer
love" (195). She lists Venables' infidelities and describes his attempted prostitution of
her. He squandered her fortune, her settlement, which she gave to him after inheriting her
uncle's fortune. Because he never beat her, Maria explains, she had little recourse to
positive laws that would protect her-that is, she could not swear the peace against him.
She states that she was hunted like a criminal and finally imprisoned in a madhouse. Her
attachment to Darnford, she explains, was willing and intentional, "never considering
myself as any more bound to transgress the laws of moral purity, because the will of my
husband might be pleaded in my excuse, than to transgress those laws to which [the
policy of artificial society has] annexed [positive] punishments" (197, original brackets
by Godwin).
Maria rejects charges of seduction, asserting that she willingly went with
Darnford. Based on her husband's perfidy, she claims a divorce and the right to her
fortune. She argues, "A false morality is even established, which makes all the virtues of
women consist in chastity, submission, and the forgiveness of injuries" (197). As
previously discussed, forgiveness is a virtue at which Gothic heroines excel. In The
Orphan ofthe Rhine, for example, Laurette and Julie stand by the Marchese's deathbed
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like two "ministering angels," offering the forgiveness he requests. Yet Sleath's
conclusion, with its self-punishing villain, releases the heroines from the burden of
prosecution. They can freely forgive because the villain repents and because he is about
to die. W ollstonecraft, on the other hand, does not return to a natural or internal moral
order. No one rescues Maria, nor does her villainous husband crave her forgiveness. Left
alone in the institutions that shape her subject position, Maria rejects the passive virtues
that, according to Wollstonecraft, perpetuate injustices. Unlike the heroines who operate
under the law of nature, Maria attempts to claim property and legal independence.
As part of her defense, Maria attempts to establish the completely separate
\

interests of her husband and herself. However, the principles of coverture and the laws
governing evidence and testimony make such a separation nearly impossible. Gilbert's

Laws on Evidence states:
Husband and Wife cannot be admitted to be Witnesses for or against each other.
For if they swear for the Benefit of each other, they are not to be believed,
because their Interests are absolutely the same ... And it would be very hard that
a Wife should be allowed as Evidence against her own Husband, when she cannot
attest for him: such a Law would occasion implacable Divisions and Quarrels, and
destroy the very legal Policy of Marriage that has so contrived it, that their
Interest should be but one; which it could never be if Husbands were permitted to
destroy the Interests of the Wife, nor could the Peace of Families be well
maintained, if the Law admitted any Attestation against the Husband (230).
Referring to the legal fiction of inseparable interests, Gilbert raises an issue that troubles
W ollstonecraft. Positive laws, rather than nature or social custom, conflate the interests of
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husband and wife. Yet as Gilbert recognizes, positive laws can just as easily create the
opposite effect.

~

his A General Abridgment ofLaw and Equity (1791-95) Viner agrees:

"A feme covert cannot be a witness against her husband. .. for it would be, if admitted,
an occasion of perpetual dissension between man and wife"{12.2). The legal experts
present a united front in disallowing wives' testimony against husbands; however, they
. do not dismiss completely the possibility of wives as witnesses. For example, Viner lists
two precedents (12.2), and even Gilbert reluctantly and with much qualification admits
that in a case where the husband assisted in his wife's rape, the wife was allowed to
testify against her husband (231).
In eighteenth-century law, Maria would be barred from testifying against her
husband. Faced with this historical problem, Wollstonecraft offers a partial solution with
Maria's essay. However, this method has several limitations. According to Viner,
witnesses "may assist themselves or demean in giving their Evidence." Maria does not
appear to assist herself in her court case because she fails to follow proper protocol. First,
her statement is read by her lover's lawyer, a proceeding that does not command the same
attention as "viva voce" testimony. As Viner explains, "Where a witness swears to a
matter, he is not to read a paper for evidence, though he may look upon it to refresh his
memory; but if he swears to words, he may read it, ifhe swears he presently committed it
to writing, and that these are the very words" (12.33). The rationale for this, Viner
continues, is to discover the truth through questioning and spontaneous replies. In some
cases, though, written statements are allowable: "Evidence viva voce is always best; and
though the law requires the best proofthat can be had, yet when better cannot be had, it
is satisfied with that which can be had. Resolved" (12.52).
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A second consideration is the content of Maria's letter. The laws of evidence
state, "Witnesses are sworn to tell the truth of what they know, not what they believe, for
they are to swear nothing but what they have heard or seen" (Viner 12.40). Although
Maria testifies to a litany of atrocities committed by her husband, she also draws
conclusions and makes appeals to reason and justice. Viner clarifies this distinction: "A
witness swears, but to what he hath seen or heard, generally, or more largely, to what
hath fallen under his senses; but a juryman swears to what he can conclude, and infer
from the testimony ofsuch witnesses, by the act and force of his understanding, to be the
fact inquired after" (47). Even some of her husband's monstrous acts are not admissible
as evidence, although they might have some effect on the ruling: "Licence by husband to
the wife to lie with another man, cannot be pleaded in bar to an action of trespass by the
husband, nor that she was a notorious lewd woman; but these matters may be given in
mitigation of damages" (4.65).34 The legal intricacies that Viner explains are simply not
examined in Wollstonecraft's conclusion. IfWollstonecraft did know this law of
evidence, she ignores it in to expose women's oppression--or perhaps to illustrate the
problems of such evidentiary laws.
Maria's essay thus seems to be directed toward the reader, in a rhetorical rather

than realistic setting. In the eloquent style of Gothic heroines, Maria argues, "While no
command of a husband can prevent a woman from suffering for certain crimes, she must
be allowed to consult her conscience, and regulate her conduct, in some degree, by her

34 In Every Man His Own Lawyer, Giles Jacob explains, "Action oftrespass lies generally for any wrong or
damage, which is done with force and arms by one private man to another... In all trespasses, there ought
to be a voluntary act, and a damage" (82). Although Venables' attempts to prostitute his wife would bar
him from seeking damages from that relationship, Maria's attempts to mitigate damages on the basis of
Venables' actions seem inappropriate in context.
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own sense of right" (197). Wollstonecraft echoes Sarah Chapone's The hardships ofthe

English laws in relation to wives (1735). Chapone argues, "[Men] have voted us Dead in
Law, except in criminal Causes. They do us indeed the Favour to consider us as real
Persons, when they think fit to burn or hang us: This is incorporating with a
Vengeance!" (51). Pointing out the law's inconsistent treatment of women, Chapone also
notes that women's bodies disappear in the law, until certain crimes "re-incorporate"
them. Thus, positive law symbolically declares women's death until it resurrects their
bodies for capital punishment. Through the courtroom scene, Wollstonecraft illustrates
the difficulty of breaking away from this civil death and acting with self-determination.
Maria implicitly argues that law based on force and coercion cannot bind independent
citizens. She states, "1 wish my country to approve of my conduct; but, if laws exist,
made by the strong to oppress the weak, 1 appeal to my own sense ofjustice, and declare
that 1 will not live with the individual, who has violated every moral obligation which
binds man to man" (197). Furthermore, like natural law theorists, she wants and needs the
law to mean more than collective will, more than unjust power.
The sense of right and justice to which Maria refers are personal feelings, yet they
carry the impersonal authority of natural law. Wollstonecraft employs the language of
equity, another branch ofjudicial authority that was equally as codified and systemized as
common law, with its own jurisdiction. However, equity laws were designed to provide
access to the courts to enforce a legal right. In her conclusion, Maria asserts, "1 appeal to
the justice and humanity of the jury-a body of men, whose private judgment must be
allowed to modify laws, that must be unjust, because definite rules can never apply to
indefinite circumstances" (198). In A treatise ofequity (1793-95), John Fonblanque
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explains, "For, as the universal laws of matter, in many instances would prove hurtful to
particulars if art were not to interpose and direct them aright; so the general precepts of
municipal law would oftentimes not be able to attain their end, if equity did not come in
aid of them" (1.10). Maria's general appeals to justice apply to the jurisprudence of
equity law. Significantly, she works within legal discourse, even as she refers to
principles outside positive law that shape her beliefs. At times W ollstonecraft indicates
that positive law, perhaps interpreted through laws of equity, has the potential to enact
justice, but she ultimately forecloses such redeeming qualities. In consequence, Maria has
no recourse to any enforceable rights, and as the fragmented endings suggest, she has few
options.
Wollstonecraft here also refers to the highly contested principle of "jury
nullification," in which juries were allowed to decide according to "conscience." Simon
Stem's article "Between Local Knowledge and National Politics: Debating Rationales for
Jury Nullification" traces the history and legal implications of this principle. In the late
seventeenth century, as Whig dissenters were being tried for "seditious libel and treason,"
the jurors refused to prosecute and instead "returned findings of ignoramus ('we know
nothing of it')" (1819). Consequently, the judge had no power either to sentence the
accused or to force the jury to render a guilty verdict. The balance of power shifted to the
jury, whose ability to "find both law and fact" established their capacity to find facts
according to their personal understanding. The new debates, then, centered on juries'
"personal knowledge." Simon states that "one of the main factors prompting juries to
nullify involves a sense of kinship with the defendant. In such cases, even if the jurors are
not personally acquainted with the defendant, their empathy may cause them to regard the
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attack as 'personal'" (1857-58). Maria's pleas to the jury fit well within a tradition of

legal justice and within a rational, appropriate rhetorical style. The Wrongs ofWoman
thus provides two legal means of redress, yet neither proves effective.
When she argues against the legal claims of her husband and her legal status as
wife, Maria exposes the central problem of her experiences within both the courtroom
and the asylum. Maria claims, "The death of my babe dissolved the only tie which
subsisted between me and my, what is termed, lawful husband" (197). Embedded in this
assertion is a gesture toward the definitional power of law, although she also indicates a
limit to that definition. Wollstonecraft brings the problem of Maria's "insanity" to bear
on the courtroom drama. In his study of Old Bailey Trials with insanity pleas between
1760 and 1815, Joel Peter Eigen explains, "[I]t was the subtle twists and turns of moral
insanity, of inhibitory insanity, and of irresistible will which required the special insight
of a physician to 'bring the pathology to light'" (38). The judge's influence on the jury,
however, remained intact. He was "examiner-in-chief for both the witness and the
accused" and had "[apparently] unlimited power to comment on the events of the trial
while court was in session" (39). Eigen documents the judge's broad hints and directions
in this "judicially dominated social setting" (39) It was often in the judge's power to
direct the jury to consider the defendant insane or not. Scientific proofs, then, were only
partially responsible for influencing the jury's decision (45). The dialogue between
medical and legal discourses, Eigen argues, "was conducted in a highly structured social
setting where the language of disease was decidedly subordinate to the legal concern with
intent.... Competing dialogues were certainly in evidence, but it was not a dialogue
between equals" (47).
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Eigen's argument illustrates two significant problems that Maria faces in the
courtroom. First, because the judge can direct the jury's consideration of Maria's case,
his opinion of the medical "evidence" dominates the judicial process. Her appeals to the
jury thus become futile. Second, Maria's presence in the madhouse confrrms her insanity
in a circular, self-evident proposition. Once inserted into this space, she cannot escape its
defining power unless redeemed by medicine or law. Because the judge refuses to
recognize Maria's rationality, her essay has no power, force, or efficacy in judicial
spaces. Maria's hyper-medicalized body thus disrupts her argument that reason and self
governance should be the basis of positive law, an argument that forms the basis of most
political and legal philosophy·in the eighteenth century.
The judge ultimately argues that it is a "fallacy" to let "women plead their
feelings" (198). He continues, "What virtuous woman thought of her feelings?-It was
her duty to love and obey the man chosen by her parents and relations, who were
qualified by their experience to judge better for her, than she could for herself" (199). He
dismisses what he calls the vague, unsubstantiated claims made by Maria, whose conduct
"did not appear that of a person of sane mind" (199). There is no judgment given,
however, and there is a hint that she might pursue a separation in the ecclesiastical courts.
Wollstonecraft presents the judge as a particular person rather than a universal
embodiment of law-she gives him a voice and a character. This humanization points to
the particular prejudices and human flaws imbedded in the legal system. Although
Wollstonecraft earlier writes, "Truth is the only basis of virtue" (153), she demonstrates
here that truth and power can be contlated within unjust institutions. Madness occupies a
strange territory as it becomes a medico-legal category. In medicine, insanity is a disease
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that can be cured, while in law, insanity effectively removes political agency.
Wollstonecraft's description of women as "idiots" in law brings the full implications of
Maria's incarceration to bear on the narrative. She notes that a husband is allowed "with a
show ofjustice, to keep this idiot, or perpetual minor, for ever in bondage" (159). Indeed,
it is unsurprising that the judge deems Maria mentally incompetent-not simply because
the law had already pronounced her absent through coverture, but because the entire
structure of the novel, bound by the madhouse, renders Maria's voice suspiciously
irrational.
Like Fenwick, Wollstonecraft offers no utopian vision, no vindication of women's
rights, no justification of her heroine's bold claims. In The Wrongs ofWoman, the Gothic
romance turns horrific without scenes of domestic bliss to counter the preceding terrors.
The potential for Maria's ultimate fulfillment, for love and happiness, is held out in the
fragments at the end, without a conclusion. Godwin, as Wollstonecraft' s posthumous
editor, includes an extended passage in which Maria attempts suicide but decides to live
for her child. In other sketches that Wollstonecraft listed as possible endings, however,
Maria's fate seems to be death or wretchedness. Maria's and Sibella's attempts to create
positive freedom (the freedom to act}-end disastrously.35 Both transgressive heroines
suffer deeply for their transgressions and mistakes. In one of the fragmented endings,
Wollstonecraft depicts Maria's sense of triumph as she rejects suicide. Yet, this
triumph-"I willlive!"--comes only through a kind of sacrifice, a giving up of self: "I
will live for my child!" Sibella, on the other hand, does not find motherhood redeeming.

By contrast, the freedom that Gothic heroines such as Laurette receive is a negative freedom: they are
free from threat or violation, although they also enjoy a measure of positive freedom in that they can
behave morally or virtuously.
35
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Instead of living for her child or for herself, Fenwick's heroine dies in despair and
anguish. Unable to develop agency within the spaces they inhabit, both Maria and Sibella
exhibit the symptoms of a diseased social order. In both novels, therefore, the authors
demonstrate the oppressive power of law and medicine, which work together to render
the wronged woman a nonentity.

I

253

Chapter Six
Conclusion: Embodiment and Gender
Over the course of this project I have argued that female Gothic novels of the
1790s serve as textual agents of resistance. The last decade ofthe eighteenth century was,
as many historians and literary scholars note, a tumultuous period marked by revolution
and reform. While Gothic novels written by women during this decade do indeed reflect
revolutionary fervor and anxieties, it is my belief that the novels depict more specifically
discourses that women experienced on a deeply personal level. As I have illustrated,
medicine and law exerted considerable influence over the ways in which women
perceived themselves, their bodies, their choices, their virtue. Because neither medical
nor legal discourse is seamless, the Gothic novelists I have examined are able to respond
with their own versions of female physicality as they attempt to imagine women's
agency. Exposing the ideological work of such dominant discourses, the novels in this
study offer representations of the female subject that break down binaries ofmind and
body, as well as reason and emotion. Since the heroines reflect an embodied self that
might participate in self-determination, I have focused on particular medical and legal
attempts to inscribe the female body. In turn, I demonstrate that the heroines often deploy
a rhetoric ofjustice that empowers their struggles to overcome physical determinism.
My contribution to the critical conversation lies in my examination of the
historical and literary material that shaped cultural notions ofwomen's bodies, minds,
and rights. Even as scholars recognize the considerable influence of Gothic conventions
on Romantic-era literature, they frequently relegate such popular but neglected novels as

The Children ofthe Abbey or The Castle of Wolfenbach, for example, to a footnote in

,
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literary history. Scholars generally skim through the Gothic genre without necessarily
noticing finer distinctions and nuances that a closer examination would reveal. Such
neglect is unfortunate because it fails to develop the variations that make this popular
genre complex. Certainly Radcliffe has garnered a great deal of attention, as a cursory
glance at Gothic studies might reveal, yet the powerful image of the Gothic female body
has only been partially explored. Throughout this project, I have examined the cultural
configurations of female bodies and identities which preoccupied these women writers. In
so doing, I argue that the body's discursive shape within eighteenth-century medical and
legal texts has a distinct bearing on the Gothic novels in this study. In tum, these
neglected novels do not take scientific objectivity as axiomatic, even though medicine
and law appear to approach the body with systematic detachment. Indeed, they often
expose the interested nature of medical and legal discourses as they depict women's
physical experiences. Although typically fantastic, the narratives address realistic
concerns over the nature of the self and its relationship to institutional forces.
I have examined several maj or novelists who produced Gothic works that lingered
in the cultural imagination and in literature long after the Gothic craze had ended.
Analyzing novels within the "Racliffean school," I have argued that the female body
presents a cultural dilemma, which the novelists attempt to address within and against the
professional, masculine discourses of medicine and law. While the sensitive body can be
seen as a barrier to agency, it also serves as the solution to oppressive forces. Thus, while
Radcliffe, Parsons, Sleath, and Roche depict women's vulnerability, they also explore the
possibilities for resistance, freedom, and justice. In the first chapter, I have argued that
medical discourse's emphasis on the nervous system and brain has political implications
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for the sensitive heroine. In two of Ann Radcliffe's major works, sensibility's medical
roots enable her to explore the female body's possibilities and dangers. In conversation
with prominent medical theories, Radcliffe presents sensibility as one means of
establishing women's autonomy, while portraying nervous disorder as an obstacle to
knowledge and power. Significantly, it is my argument that such nervous disorders are
not presented as women's "natural" debility; instead, such illnesses represent a
breakdown of body and mind that can be prevented or cured. In Udolpho, although
Emily's physical and emotional weaknesses hamper her ability to claim knowledge,
rights, and agency, Radcliffe depicts her heroine's ultimate triumph through bodily and
mental control. The connection between mind and body remains a significant challenge
that Radcliffe must address, as The Italian makes clear. When Ellena faces unjust power,
her claims to rights and knowledge always appear secure because Radcliffe spends much
of the novel establishing Ellena's healthy physicality and emotional fortitude. In these
two novels, problems with women's ability to think, feel, and know are illustrated and
solved. In consequence, Udolpho and The Italian conclude with a vision ofjustice that
rewards the heroines.
My second chapter explores more thoroughly the contours of Gothic images of
justice. Examining two novels that are typically represented as Radcliffean imitations, I
argue that Eliza Parsons and Eleanor Sleath addressed the problematic barriers to justice
that eighteenth-century English women faced. While conventional means of legal justice
appear outside the reach of virtuous heroines pursued by wicked and lawless men, natural
law offers a solution. Working within yet beyond positive law, these heroines have an
innate and cultivated relationship to the principles of natural law and morality, which
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stems from their sensitive bodies. Natural law theory's account of moral epistemology
thus presents the body as an individualized means of virtuous self-determination. In The
Castle of Wolfen bach, Parsons demonstrates that the heroine's innate virtue must be
supplemented with knowledge of positive law. However emotionally committed to
lawful, moral behavior Matilda might be, she finally relies on legal rights in order to
solidify her personal agency. Sleath's The Orphan ofthe Rhine similarly presents
innately virtuous women, yet this author depends more thoroughly on the efficacy of
natural law to produce justice. Both novelists introduce natural and positive law in order
to uphold the heroines' sense of morality, which enables them to elide the implications of
\

natural law's gendered dimensions, while asserting the potential of the female body. As a
source of moral knowledge, the embodied mind must retain an integrity that places it
above suspicions of delusion or debility. Thus, Parsons and Sleath do not address, as does
Radcliffe, the medical constructions that might cast doubt on women's ability to claim
certainty. The novelists suppress the problems of delusion by carefully correlating the
heroines' understanding with positive law and social custom.
The epistemological crisis that Radcliffe depicts and that Parsons and Sleath elide
serves as the focus of the third chapter. As she presents common Gothic themes of
secrecy and mystery, Regina Maria Roche uses tropes ofvisuality that signal a dilemma
in women's representation. Her novels The Children ofthe Abbey and Clermont provide
clear examples of the scopic power of medical and legal discourses, as they address the
problems of the secretive female subject. In The Children ofthe Abbey, Roche taps into
the destabilized nature of vision in order to subvert the power of the masculine gaze. As
Amanda attempts to hide her perilous situation, the romantic hero's gaze, perception, and
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interpretations prove dangerous. The result is a significant critique of the cultural
expectation that women should remain transparent. In Clermont, perception enables
women to cultivate self-determination; thus, Madeline's attempts to deploy the juridical
gaze offer her considerable power. While both novels describe the consequences of
observing and being an object of observation, Clermont in particular represents the dual
nature of the gaze. Depicting Madeline's struggle to establish certainty as an activity
fraught with emotional and intellectual difficulties, Roche clarifies the implications of the
female gaze. In turn, she challenges the ways in which medical and legal techniques of
visual perception turn into moral norms for women, making a transgressive argument
against dominant modes of seeing.
Although Radcliffe, Parsons, Sleath, and Roche undermine various oppressive
aspects of medical and legal discourses by imagining their heroines as virtuous agents
that might act against social dictates, these authors do not transgress moral boundaries. In
the fourth chapter, I analyze texts that include such sexual transgression and, in
consequence, do not end with utopian spaces of freedom, justice, and empowerment.
Beyond the Radcliffean school, in the tragic Gothic novels of Fenwick and
Wollstonecraft, the female characters again appear vulnerable and resilient, yet their
experiences offer little hope for the autonomous woman. While the authors explicitly
celebrate women's self-determination, they demonstrate that such radical figures will be
confined by the power of institutional forces. Medical discourse appears complicit with
unjust positive law in these novels, as representations of diseased spaces and bodies serve
to highlight the oppressive power of legal discourse. While the authors encourage the
reader to identify with the wronged women of the narratives, they close off the dangerous
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examples of illicit sexuality. Intriguingly, Fenwick and Wollstonecraft implicitly argue
for the power of the female body, since it takes extreme measures, such as death or
"insanity," to foreclose women's potential for agency.
The cultural concerns expressed in these late eighteenth-century novels remain
part of feminist conversations even today. In Gender Trouble Judith Butler notes that as
the term "woman" has become increasingly contested in feminist theory, assumptions
about the biological basis of "sex" have been reevaluated. She argues that "sex, by
definition, will be shown to have been gender all along" (8). Likewise, Radcliffe,
Parsons, Sleath, Roche, Fenwick, and Wollstonecraft struggle with the medical
definitions of the female body. Although these authors do not necessarily deconstruct
"sex" and "gender," they do intervene in the discourses that attempted to classify women
through physical differences. Butler argues that, within the notion of social construction,
"'the body' appears as a passive medium on which cultural meanings are inscribed or as
the instrument through which an appropriative and interpretive will determines a cultural
meaning for itself" (8). Importantly, the novels discussed in this study resist either
reading: the heroines' bodies are neither completely passive nor entirely self-willed.
Instead, they exist within a matrix of discourses that constrain certain options while
constructing other possibilities. Examining both medical and legal discourses has allowed
me to treat more thoroughly the novels' cultural significance, in ways that Avril Homer
and Angela Keane describe as necessary to feminist analysis. Continuing Butler's
theoretical project, they assert in their introduction to Body Matters, "Attention to the
history and to the cultural processes ... that constitute corporeality allows us to critique,
re-evaluate and transform women's relations to their own and others' bodies" (Homer
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and Keane 12-13). These statements resonate with the problems that faced the late
eighteenth-century woman writer. As I have discussed, these authors imaginatively carve
out a space of resistance and fulfillment for women by depicting the heroines as
physically and intellectually capable of self-determination, even if Secresy and Maria end
with a bleak collapse of that space. It is my claim that the uneasy equation of the body
with political identity creates friction between medical and legal discourses, resulting in
the sometimes chaotic inconsistencies of Gothic representation.
As Londa Schiebinger demonstrates in The Mind Has No Sex, eighteenth-century
science configured the relationship between mind and body in ways that had significant
implications for gender politics. From the early modem period to the present, the problem
remains: how does one begin to discuss gender and the body without reifying biological
differences? While my study does not attempt to solve such a dilemma, I do explore the
cultural preoccupations with this problem as fictionalized within the female Gothic.
Consequently I pay close attention to the sexed body and mind-not in an effort to reify
gender as the primary vehicle for political change or institutional challenge, but rather in
an attempt to understand how the "nature" of female physicality fosters a need for
resistance and engenders a means of personal agency. As I have discovered, Gothic
expressions of the sexed body and gendered mind reveal a moment in literary history in
which the relationship between body and mind reached a crisis. Corporeality and
spirituality find a common ground in the Gothic heroine whose body appears at the
forefront of her intellectual, emotional, and moral experiences. Gothicized female bodies
thus highlight the perils and potential of women's physicality. In poststructuralist theory,
particularly in Foucault's work, the body and the mind are not considered "raw materials"
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upon which institutions work. Instead, these objects are produced through the discursive
work of institutional practices, ideas, resistance, and changes. The affective, somatic
responses of the embodied mind, however, make such constructions seem implausible.
We continue to theorize the body, even as we succumb to its effects: we all sicken and
die, and death-of the body, the mind, the self--becomes the ultimate boundary, beyond
which we can only imagine.
The experience of being a person who feels pleasure and pain, delight and
anguish, is so visceral, immediate, and indeed sensational that the theoretical organization
of experience pales in comparison. Indeed, the physicality expressed in the narratives I
have examined overwhelms the orderly explanations scholars impose on them. Instead of
gratifying our quest to explain the powerful effect of such narratives, the critical texts
continue to raise more problems than they solve. The dissatisfaction that one review
(often attributed to Coleridge) expresses over Radcliffe's "explained supernatural"
appears particularly pertinent. In The Critical Review (August 1794), the reviewer writes
of The Mysteries o/Udolpho, "Curiosity is raised oftener than it is gratified; or rather, it
is raised so high that no adequate gratification can be given it; the interest is completely
dissolved when once the adventure is finished, and the reader, when he is got to the end
of the work, looks about in vain for the spell which had bound him so strongly to it"
(365). In a similar manner, scholarly discussions reproduce this dissatisfaction as they
demystify the intangible workings of literary terror, leaving a nagging sense that their
solutions have not addressed the novels' significance. Until we recognize the force of the
embodied mind in its literary, cultural, and historical representations, we may never grasp
the power of the female Gothic novel.
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